Quinton Cepiel & a. v. New Hampshire Interscholastic Athletic Association & a.

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2023-0640, Quinton Cepiel & a. v. New
Hampshire Interscholastic Athletic Association & a., the court
on June 17, 2025, issued the following order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted
on appeal, has considered the oral arguments of the parties, and has
determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See Sup. Ct. R. 20(3). The
plaintiffs, Quinton Cepiel and Donald M. Cepiel, Jr., appeal an order of the
Superior Court (Kissinger, J.) granting the motion to dismiss filed by the
defendants, New Hampshire Interscholastic Athletic Association, Inc. (NHIAA),
New Hampshire Department of Education (DOE), and New Hampshire State
Board of Education (BOE). We vacate the trial court’s order and remand with
instructions that the complaint be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.

I. Background

The following facts are taken from the trial court’s order or are otherwise
supported by the record. Quinton was a New Hampshire high school student
through the end of the 2021-2022 school year. Quinton is a lacrosse player.
From 2017 to 2019, Quinton attended Cardigan Mountain School (CMS). In
the fall of 2019, Quinton enrolled at St. Paul’s School. Due to the COVID-19
pandemic, the NHIAA cancelled all high school sports for the spring 2020
season. In the fall of 2020, Quinton enrolled at Bishop Guertin High School
(BG). In the spring of 2021, Quinton suffered an injury that prevented him
from playing lacrosse that season. Quinton played lacrosse for BG during the
spring 2022 season.

In early 2022, Donald raised the issue of Quinton’s eligibility to play
lacrosse at BG during the 2022-2023 school year. BG informed him that it
would not certify Quinton for eligibility and would not permit Donald to obtain
an eligibility determination from the NHIAA. The NHIAA is a corporation that
sponsors, administers, and supervises the conduct of interscholastic athletic
competition for most public and private schools in New Hampshire. See
Duffley v. N.H. Interschol. Ath. Assoc., Inc., 122 N.H. 484, 486 (1982). BG
explained that the NHIAA’s eight-semester rule included Quinton’s 9th grade
year at CMS and that “neither COVID nor an injury are sufficient grounds for
an appeal of the rule.”
 The NHIAA’s eight-semester rule provides: “A student is eligible for
competition, whether or not he/she competes in interscholastic athletics, for
no more than eight (8) semesters beyond the eighth grade; the eight
consecutive semesters rule begins upon the initial enrollment date in ninth
grade.” The NHIAA also maintains an “age limitation requirement,” which
provides that “[a] student who has reached the age of 19 on or after September
1st may represent the school in any interscholastic athletic contest during that
school year.” Only the school principal, on behalf of the student athlete, can
request an eligibility waiver from the NHIAA. In the spring of 2022, BG denied
the Cepiels’ request that Quinton be given the opportunity to apply for an
eligibility waiver. For the 2022-2023 academic year, Quinton attended
Deerfield Academy in Massachusetts.

In July 2022, the Cepiels sued the NHIAA and BG seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief. The complaint alleged that as of July 12, 2022, Quinton
was eighteen years old. The Cepiels amended their complaint in September
2022, adding the DOE and the BOE as defendants. The Cepiels subsequently
settled all claims against BG.

The plaintiffs’ amended complaint raises three counts against the
remaining defendants, alleging that they: (1) “delegated to NHIAA, or have
permitted NHIAA to be delegated, agency authority, including rule-making
authority,” in violation of the State Constitution and the New Hampshire
Administrative Procedures Act (APA); (2) violated the plaintiffs’ due process
rights under the State Constitution by denying Quinton an eligibility
determination; and (3) violated RSA chapter 356, the antitrust statute.

Each of the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, variously
arguing that: (1) the plaintiffs lacked standing because they had not been
harmed by the NHIAA; (2) the NHIAA was not a state agency subject to the APA;
and (3) the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim under RSA chapter 356. After a
hearing, the trial court “[a]ssum[ed], without deciding, that the Cepiels ha[d]
standing to bring Counts I-III,” and granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss.
The plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought reconsideration. This appeal followed.

II. Analysis

On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by dismissing
the plaintiffs’: (1) claims that the NHIAA’s rules violate the APA and are an
unconstitutional delegation of governmental power; (2) complaint to enforce
Quinton’s constitutional right to a merits-based eligibility hearing; and (3)
claim that the NHIAA violated New Hampshire’s antitrust law. Although the
plaintiffs’ notice of appeal references “defendants,” their appellate briefs make
no arguments concerning the DOE or the BOE. Thus, we confine our review to

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their claims against the NHIAA. See In re M.M., 174 N.H. 281, 298 (2021)
(declining to address arguments not briefed).

The NHIAA reiterates its argument that the plaintiffs lack standing to
challenge the manner in which its bylaws have been adopted or enforced. In
response, the plaintiffs argue that Quinton has standing under Teeboom v. City
of Nashua, 172 N.H. 301 (2019), because, given that he could not obtain an
NHIAA hearing, Quinton “left the jurisdiction and went to another, more
expensive school,” thereby incurring injuries “far exceed[ing] the $290 that
gave rise to standing under Teeboom.”

Generally, in ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the trial court must
determine whether the allegations contained in the plaintiff’s pleading
sufficiently establish a basis upon which relief may be granted. Avery v.
Comm’r, N.H. Dep’t of Corr., 173 N.H. 726, 736 (2020). However, when a
motion to dismiss challenges the plaintiff’s standing to sue, the trial court must
look beyond the plaintiff’s unsubstantiated allegations and determine, based
upon the facts, whether the plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated his right to
claim relief. Id. at 736-37.

The doctrine of standing limits the judicial role, consistent with a system
of separated powers, to addressing those matters that are traditionally thought
to be capable of resolution through the judicial process. Richard v. Governor,
177 N.H. ___, ___ (2024), 2024 N.H. 53, ¶7. Because standing implicates the
court’s subject matter jurisdiction, it may be raised at any time in a
proceeding. Id. Typically, standing under the New Hampshire Constitution
requires parties to have personal legal or equitable rights that are adverse to
one another, with regard to an actual, not hypothetical, dispute, which is
capable of judicial redress. Id. at ___, 2024 N.H. 53, ¶8. When evaluating
whether a party has standing to sue, we focus on whether the party suffered a
legal injury against which the law was designed to protect. Id. Neither an
abstract interest in ensuring that the State Constitution is observed nor an
injury indistinguishable from a generalized wrong allegedly suffered by the
public at large is sufficient to constitute a personal, concrete interest. Id.
Rather, the party must show that the party’s own rights have been or will be
directly affected. Id.

Count I of the amended complaint alleges that the NHIAA promulgated
rules without complying with procedures set forth in the APA. The amended
complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that the “NHIAA’s By-Laws, including
the ‘eight semester rule’” and “its rules restricting access to NHIAA’s eligibility
decision-making apparatus,” violate the APA. The alleged injury to Quinton is
that he “has a right to pursue a public education” and that right is “inhibited
by NHIAA’s illegally promulgated rules.”

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 The claims raised in a declaratory judgment action must “be of a nature
which will permit an intelligent and useful decision to be made through a
decree of a conclusive character.” Asmussen v. Comm’r, N.H. Dep’t of Safety,
145 N.H. 578, 587 (2000) (quotation omitted). We agree with the NHIAA that
Quinton lacks standing under Count I “because a decision in [his] favor will
have no impact on any claim for relief.” As the NHIAA asserts, even if we were
to determine that the NHIAA’s bylaws “were the product of an unlawful
delegation of authority, or that they were enforced in violation of the APA,” it
would not change anything for Quinton. Quinton’s alleged injury is no longer
redressable. As set forth in the amended complaint, Quinton was eighteen
years old in September 2022. Therefore, Quinton is no longer eligible to
compete in NHIAA-sanctioned events. Because he can no longer receive a
remedy that would directly benefit him, he lacks standing to pursue Count I of
the complaint. See Joyce v. Town of Weare, 156 N.H. 526, 531 (2007)
(explaining that the “requisite personal interest, or standing” must exist at the
commencement of litigation and throughout the appeal).

Count II of the amended complaint alleges that the NHIAA’s refusal “to
hear a determination of Quinn’s eligibility . . . or to provide a process by [which]
Quinn may assert his eligibility position directly,” violated Quinton’s right to
due process under Part I, Article 14 of the State Constitution. When the
amended complaint was filed in September 2022, Count II identified an alleged
personal injury — denial of a hearing — and sought relief that at that time
could have directly benefitted Quinton: a hearing to determine whether he was
eligible to play lacrosse for the 2022-2023 academic year. Accordingly,
Quinton initially had standing with respect to his due process claim under
Count II. However, subject matter jurisdiction must exist throughout a
proceeding, including on appeal. See id. As we explained above, Quinton is
barred from competing in NHIAA-sanctioned events. Accordingly, because he
is now unable to compete, his claim under Count II is no longer capable of
judicial redress.

Finally, the only injuries allegedly caused by the NHIAA’s denial of a
hearing for Quinton are the denial of the hearing itself and the lost right for
Quinton to play lacrosse for the 2022-2023 school year. Thus, because Donald
has failed to allege any injury caused by the conduct described in Counts I and
II, we conclude that Donald lacks standing with regard to those counts.

Count III of the amended complaint alleges a “[v]iolation of RSA 356.”
The standing provisions for RSA chapter 356 are statutory in nature. See RSA
356:11 (2022). RSA 356:11, I, provides that “[a]ny person threatened with
injury or damage to his business or property by reason of a violation of this
chapter may institute an action or proceeding for injunctive relief when and
under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief is granted in

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other cases.” In interpreting this provision, we look to interpretations of the
United States’ antitrust laws for guidance. RSA 356:14 (2022).

To establish antitrust standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate that his or
her injury is of the kind that the antitrust laws were intended to prevent. See
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
Quinton’s alleged injury — the denial of an opportunity to request a hearing
before the NHIAA and the inability to play another year of interscholastic sports
— is not an injury to his business or property, and is therefore insufficient to
confer standing. See RSA 356:11, I. Moreover, to the extent the amended
complaint alleges that “Don and Quinn’s family” incurred a “substantial cost”
based on their decision to enroll Quinton at a boarding school in
Massachusetts in response to Quinton’s adverse eligibility determination, we
conclude that such an indirect and speculative injury is insufficient to confer
antitrust standing. See Associated General Contractors v. Carpenters, 459
U.S. 519, 545-46 (1983) (describing the factors courts use to determine
whether an alleged violation rises to an antitrust injury). Therefore, because
the plaintiffs have failed to allege an injury that would give rise to antitrust
standing, they have failed to satisfy RSA 356:11.

We conclude that Quinton and Donald lack standing to bring Counts I-III
of the amended complaint. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s ruling on
the merits of those claims and remand with instructions that they be dismissed
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Richard, 177 N.H. at ___, 2024 N.H. 54,
¶24 (explaining that a decision rendered by a court without subject matter
jurisdiction is void).

Vacated and remanded.

MACDONALD, C.J., and BASSETT, DONOVAN, and COUNTWAY, JJ.,
concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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