State of New Hampshire v. Dylan Wright

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2023-0579, State of New Hampshire v. Dylan
Wright, the court on June 2, 2025, issued the following order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted
on appeal, and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See
Sup. Ct. R. 20(2). The defendant, Dylan Wright, appeals his convictions,
following a jury trial in Superior Court (Will, J.), on charges of aggravated
felonious sexual assault, see RSA 632-A:2 (2016), felonious sexual assault,
see RSA 632-A:3 (2016), and endangering the welfare of a child, see RSA 639:3
(2016). He argues that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of the
victim’s out of court statements regarding the location of the assaults.
We affirm.

The trial court has broad discretion to determine the admissibility
of evidence, and we will not upset its ruling absent an unsustainable
exercise of discretion. State v. Reinholz, 169 N.H. 22, 28 (2016). Under this
standard, the defendant must demonstrate that the trial court’s ruling was
clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of his case. State v.
Chandler, 176 N.H. 216, 223 (2023).

The victim testified that the assaults occurred in August 2019, in the
living room of the condominium in which she was living with her father,
mother, and maternal grandmother. She testified that in September 2020, she
disclosed the assaults to her father’s girlfriend. Later that week, she told her
father, her boyfriend, and her therapist.

Defense counsel cross-examined the victim with the therapist’s incident
report, which included a statement that the victim reported that the assaults
occurred in the victim’s bedroom. The victim first testified that she did not
remember telling the therapist that the assaults occurred in the bedroom.
After reviewing a highlighted section of the report, she testified, “I still don’t
really remember,” but then agreed with defense counsel that she told the
therapist that the defendant “came to [her] bedroom.” Over defense counsel’s
objection, the trial court then allowed the victim’s former boyfriend and her
father’s girlfriend to testify that the victim told them that the assaults occurred
in the living room.

The defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing such
testimony, asserting that the evidence was inadmissible under Evidence Rule
801(d)(1)(B). The State counters that the trial court properly admitted the
testimony under Evidence Rule 613.

New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 613(c) provides that “evidence of a prior
consistent statement may be admitted only for rehabilitation: (1) after the
witness’s credibility has been attacked through the use of a prior inconsistent
statement; and (2) where the probative value of the prior consistent statement
outweighs its prejudicial effect.” N.H. R. Ev. 613(c). “If a prior consistent
statement is admitted for rehabilitation the court shall give a limiting
instruction that the statement is not substantive evidence.” Id.

The first part of the Rule 613(c) test was met because defense counsel
attacked the victim’s credibility through the use of the prior inconsistent
statement in the incident report. As for the second part, we generally defer to
the trial court to determine whether the probative value of testimony is
outweighed by its prejudicial effect. State v. Colbath, 171 N.H. 626, 636
(2019). In this case, the record supports the trial court’s implied finding that
the probative value of the witnesses’ testimony outweighed any prejudicial
effect.

The defendant argues that, even if the evidence was admissible under
Rule 613, the trial court erred in failing to give a limiting instruction that the
testimony was being admitted only for rehabilitation. Generally, parties may
not have judicial review of matters not raised in the trial court. State v. Shaw, 173 N.H. 700, 710 (2020). The purpose of this rule is to afford the trial court
an opportunity to correct any error it may have made. Id. This requirement is
particularly appropriate when an alleged error involves a jury instruction.
State v. Ainsworth, 151 N.H. 691, 693-94 (2005). Here, the record does not
show that the defendant requested a limiting instruction. Nor does he argue
that the lack of a limiting instruction was plain error. See State v. Leroux, 175
N.H. 204, 210 (2022) (exercising our discretion to consider plain error only
when defendant specifically argues under that rule).

Although the defendant argues that he was not placed on notice that he
needed to request a limiting instruction, the prosecutor relied upon Rule 613
during the court conference addressing the admissibility of this testimony.
Moreover, the trial court cited Rule 613 before allowing the testimony, noting
the prosecutor’s position that defense counsel had “impeached [the victim] with
the statement she made to the therapist[,] and that opens the door under [R]ule
613 to bring in the prior consistent statements.” Accordingly, we construe the
trial court’s order to admit the testimony under Rule 613 and conclude that the
limiting instruction issue is not preserved for our review. See Ainsworth, 151
N.H. at 693-94.

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 In light of our decision, we need not address the parties’ harmless error
arguments. See Antosz v. Allain, 163 N.H. 298, 302 (2012) (declining to
address parties’ other arguments where holding on one issue is dispositive).

Affirmed.

MacDonald, C.J., and Bassett, Donovan, and Countway, JJ., concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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