In the Matter of Abigail Mathewson and Mark Stuenkel

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2023-0568, In the Matter of Abigail Mathewson
and Mark Stuenkel, the court on June 5, 2024, issued the
following order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted
on appeal, and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See
Sup. Ct. R. 20(2). The respondent, Mark Stuenkel (Father), appeals a final
decision of the Circuit Court (Gorman, J.), issued following hearing, permitting
Abigail Mathewson’s (Mother) relocation to Illinois with the parties’ two
children. We affirm.

We review the trial court’s relocation decision under our unsustainable
exercise of discretion standard. In the Matter of Heinrich & Curotto, 160 N.H.
650, 655 (2010). “This means that we review only whether the record
establishes an objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment
made.” Id. (quotation omitted). We will affirm the trial court’s findings and
rulings unless they are unsupported by the evidence or legally erroneous. In
the Matter of Lynn & Lynn, 158 N.H. 615, 617 (2009). The party seeking to
relocate must prove that the relocation is for a legitimate purpose and that it is
reasonable in light of that purpose. RSA 461-A:12, V. Once this is
established, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that the move is
not in the best interest of the children. RSA 461-A:12, VI.

Here, Father acknowledges that Mother’s reasons for seeking relocation
are “perhaps minimally sufficient[.]” Father asserts, however, that when
mother’s marginal grounds for relocation are contrasted with the impact that
the relocation will have on the children and his relationship with them, it is
apparent that relocation is not in their best interest. Father also contends,
that the court failed to address the Tomasko factors, see Tomasko v. DuBuc, 145 N.H. 169, 172 (2000), when completing its best interest analysis.

In assessing whether a proposed relocation is in a child’s best interest,
the trial court should consider:

(1) each parent’s reasons for seeking or opposing the move; (2) the
quality of the relationships between the child and the custodial
and noncustodial parents; (3) the impact of the move on the
quantity and quality of the child’s future contact with the
noncustodial parent; (4) the degree to which the custodial parent’s
and child’s life may be enhanced economically, emotionally, and
educationally by the move; (5) the feasibility of preserving the
 relationship between the noncustodial parent and child through
suitable visitation arrangements; (6) any negative impact from
continued or exacerbated hostility between the custodial and
noncustodial parents; and (7) the effect that the move may have on
any extended family relations.

Id. No one factor is dispositive, nor are these the exclusive factors bearing
upon a determination of a child’s best interest. In the Matter of Pfeuffer &
Pfeuffer, 150 N.H. 257, 260 (2003). The trial court is not required to consider
each factor individually or to make a specific finding as to each factor. Id.

Here, the trial court held a two-day hearing focusing solely on the
proposed relocation. Through a comprehensive order, the trial court made
numerous factual findings that demonstrate that the trial court thoughtfully
considered the Tomasko factors. The trial court recognized that there were
benefits to the relocation, for example, that the children’s life with mother
would be enhanced through her increased economic opportunity due to the job
offer that she received from the federal government, the proximity to mother’s
extended family in Illinois, and a cost-of-living reduction. The trial court also
acknowledged that material drawbacks existed, for instance, that Father “will
not be able to attend day to day activities or school events on a regular basis as
the children grow.” However, it concluded that “on balance” Father had not
shown that the proposed relocation is not in the children’s best interest.
Although the trial court’s ultimate decision diverged from that of the assigned
guardian ad litem, who expressed the opinion that relocation was not in the
children’s best interest, the trial court was not bound by the guardian ad
litem’s determination. See Heinrich, 160 N.H. at 657 (“The recommendations
of the guardian ad litem do not, and should not, carry any greater presumptive
weight than the other evidence in the case.”) (citation omitted). The trial court
expressly indicated that the case presented a “difficult question” and that it
“considered carefully the GAL’s report and testimony.”

Upon a thorough review of the record and the parties’ filings, we find that
evidentiary support for the trial court’s factual findings exists, and, therefore,
that the trial court did not unsustainably exercise its discretion by approving
the relocation. Lynn, 158 N.H. at 617.

Affirmed.

MacDonald, C.J., and Bassett, Hantz Marconi, Donovan, and Countway,
JJ., concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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