C.W. v. J.G.

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2023-0351, C.W. v. J.G., the court on March 20,
2024, issued the following order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted
on appeal, and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See
Sup. Ct. R. 20(2). The defendant, J.G., appeals a civil stalking final order of
protection, see RSA 633:3-a (2016), entered against him by the Circuit Court
(Cabrera, J.), following a hearing, for the protection of the plaintiff, C.W.
We construe the defendant’s brief to argue that the trial court’s order is
unsupported by the evidence and contrary to the weight of the evidence.
We affirm.

A person commits the offense of stalking if he “[p]urposely, knowingly, or
recklessly engages in a course of conduct targeted at a specific person which
would cause a reasonable person to fear for . . . her personal safety. . . , and
the person is actually placed in such fear.” RSA 633:3-a, I(a). A course of
conduct “means 2 or more acts over a period of time, however short, which
evidences a continuity of purpose,” and includes, but is not limited to,
“[f]ollowing, approaching, or confronting that person,” and “[a]ppearing in close
proximity to, or entering the person’s residence, place of employment . . . or
other place where the person can be found.” RSA 633:3-a, II(a)(2), (3).

At the start of the hearing, the plaintiff testified that the facts in her
petition were true to the best of her knowledge and belief, and she made them
part of her testimony. She testified that the defendant told her that he was not
allowed to purchase firearms because he had robbed a bank, and that he
asked her to purchase firearms for him. She testified that the defendant wrote
a list of firearms that he wanted her to purchase. The plaintiff testified that the
defendant’s request gave her “a very odd feeling.” She testified that “[f]irearms
are very dangerous,” that she had no intention of buying firearms for the
defendant, and that she hoped that the issue would “go away” if she did not
meet up with him on the day he requested. She testified, however, that the
defendant continued to contact her. She testified that she was concerned that
“maybe because I didn’t [purchase the firearms], I might get killed too.”

The plaintiff reported this information to the police, although she felt that
by doing so, she was placing herself in danger. She expressed her concern to
the police that “if [the defendant] was angry or upset at me for not doing what
he asked or for going to somebody and reporting it, something might happen to
me.” The plaintiff testified that the police were familiar with the defendant from
a prior interaction with him, and that “they wanted to make sure that I was
safe.” The plaintiff testified that, although the defendant said his name was
“Jack,” she did not know his real name. In his brief, the defendant asserts that
his nickname is “Jack,” but he did not provide any such testimony in the trial
court.

The defendant testified that his conversations with the plaintiff were
“thoroughly innocuous.” He testified that if the plaintiff did not want to
continue communicating with him, then she could have asked him to stop, but
she never did. The defendant testified that the plaintiff asked him if he wanted
to buy a gun from her. The defendant testified that he cannot legally purchase
a firearm because he had been convicted of theft, and that although he gave
the plaintiff a list of firearms he would like to buy, he did not want to obtain a
firearm before it was permissible to have one.

The defendant testified that his prior interaction with the police involved
a domestic matter between two other people, which he reported to police. The
defendant testified that he “spoke with the chief,” who “took something the
wrong way,” and that the chief mistakenly believed that the defendant was
threatening him.

The trial court found that the defendant “[a]sked the plaintiff to purchase
firearms for him even though he is disqualified from purchasing them,” and
that he “[c]ontinued calling and texting to follow up on this request.” The court
found that the defendant “provided [the plaintiff] with a false name, and said he
had seen her around for the last year.” The court found that the plaintiff
“communicated her fear of firearms to him but he continued to follow up on his
request.” The court concluded that the defendant’s conduct constituted
stalking and ordered him to have no contact with the plaintiff.

The defendant argues that the trial erred by crediting the plaintiff’s
testimony, and by rejecting his testimony, as to the issues in dispute at the
hearing. Conflicts in testimony, questions about the credibility of witnesses,
and the weight assigned to testimony are matters for the trial court to resolve.
In the Matter of Kurowski & Kurowski, 161 N.H. 578, 585 (2011). We will
affirm the trial court’s findings if a reasonable person could have made them
based upon the evidence presented. Cook v. Sullivan, 149 N.H. 774, 780
(2003). We conclude that a reasonable person could have made the findings
the trial court did based upon the evidence presented. See id.

Any remaining arguments in the defendant’s brief are insufficiently

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developed and warrant no further review. See State v. Blackmer, 149 N.H. 47,
49 (2003).

Affirmed.

MacDonald, C.J., and Bassett, Hantz Marconi, Donovan, and Countway,
JJ., concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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