State of New Hampshire v. Kevin M. Ruel

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2023-0175, State of New Hampshire v. Kevin M.
Ruel, the court on May 14, 2024, issued the following order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted
on appeal, has considered the oral arguments of the parties, and has
determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See Sup. Ct. R. 20(2). The
defendant, Kevin M. Ruel, appeals his conviction by a jury in Superior Court
(Howard, J.) for felony reckless conduct. See RSA 631:3 (2016 & Supp. 2023).
The indictment alleged that the defendant recklessly engaged in conduct which
placed or may have placed his estranged wife, B.S., and their minor child in
danger of serious bodily injury when the defendant “drove a motor vehicle that
crossed the double yellow lines, and rammed the motor vehicle driven by” B.S.
The defendant argues on appeal that, given the slow speed of the vehicles at
the moment of impact, the State presented insufficient evidence to prove
reckless conduct. We affirm.

I. Background

When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the
jury could have found the following facts. On August 14, 2021, after the
defendant told B.S. to leave his house, B.S. and the child left in B.S.’s motor
vehicle. As they drove away, the defendant observed the child attempting to get
out of the vehicle, prompting him to follow B.S. in his own vehicle. The
defendant came up “pretty fast” behind B.S. in his vehicle and followed her
within inches of her rear bumper. The defendant, traveling at approximately
fifty to sixty miles per hour on a road with a posted speed limit of thirty miles
per hour, tried to “come around [B.S.] onto the driver’s side and get in front of
[her] vehicle,” and, in doing so, crossed the double yellow lines and traveled in
the opposite lane of travel so that he was side-by-side with her vehicle. The
defendant then sped up and got in front of B.S.’s vehicle, causing her to slam
on her brakes and come to a full stop so that she did not hit the defendant’s
car.

Once B.S. was stopped, the defendant started to get out of his car and, to
get away from him, B.S. drove around his vehicle in the opposite lane of travel.
While B.S. was driving approximately twenty miles per hour, the defendant
“turned into [the] oncoming lane of travel diagonally” in front of B.S.’s vehicle,
striking her vehicle, causing the passenger’s side front tire on B.S.’s vehicle to
flatten, and running the car off the road.
 II. Analysis

“A person is guilty of reckless conduct if he recklessly engages in conduct
which places or may place another in danger of serious bodily injury.” RSA
631:3, I. “Reckless conduct is a class B felony if the person uses a deadly
weapon as defined in RSA 625:11, V.” RSA 631:3, II. “A person acts recklessly
with respect to a material element of an offense when he is aware of and
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material
element exists or will result from his conduct.” RSA 626:2, II(c) (2016).

To convict the defendant of felony reckless conduct as charged in the
indictment, the State had to prove: (1) he recklessly engaged in conduct “which
placed or may have placed B.S., his estranged wife, and [their child], in danger
of serious bodily injury, when he drove a motor vehicle that crossed the double
yellow lines, and rammed the motor vehicle driven by B.S.”; and (2) the motor
vehicle, in the manner used by the defendant, “is known to be capable of
causing death or serious bodily injury.” On appeal, the defendant argues that
the evidence was insufficient to prove that he acted recklessly “with respect to
a substantial risk that serious bodily injury would result from his act of
steering his car into the path of B.S.’s, as she sought to drive past him after
both came to a complete stop.” He asserts that “[b]ecause the contact
happened at low speed, the State failed to carry its burden” as to that element
of the crime.

A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence raises a question of law,
which we review de novo. State v. Seibel, 174 N.H. 440, 445 (2021). To prevail
upon a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the defendant must
demonstrate that no rational trier of fact, viewing all of the evidence and all
reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the State, could
have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Fiske, 170 N.H. 279, 288
(2017). The defendant bears the burden of proving that the evidence was
insufficient to prove guilt. Seibel, 174 N.H. at 445.

The defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is based
solely on the fact that “the cars here collided at low speed, as B.S. began to
drive after completely stopping immediately behind” the defendant’s car. Given
the slow speed at the point of contact, the defendant asserts that the State
failed to prove “that the collision posed a substantial risk of causing serious
bodily injury.” We disagree.

The State asserts that “speed is only one factor which a fact-finder may
consider in determining whether the defendant acted recklessly.” As the State
argues, while B.S. was driving around twenty miles per hour, the defendant
collided with her car at an angle at which she only had two equally dangerous
choices: stop, or drive off the road. We agree with the State that stopping in
the opposite lane of traffic “may have caused other cars to collide head-on with

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her car,” while driving off the road, even at a low speed, could have caused her
car to crash into the tree line; either choice created a substantial risk of serious
bodily injury to B.S. and the child.

Accordingly, under the circumstances presented here, we decline to
conclude that, as a matter of law, the slow speed of the vehicles rendered the
evidence insufficient to prove that the defendant’s conduct posed a substantial
risk of causing serious bodily injury.

Affirmed.

MACDONALD, C.J., and BASSETT, DONOVAN, and COUNTWAY, JJ.,
concurred; HANTZ MARCONI, J., sat for oral argument but subsequently
disqualified herself and did not participate in further review of the case.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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