K.B. v. J.B.

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2023-0077, K.B. v. J.B., the court on July 23,
2024, issued the following order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted
on appeal, and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See
Sup. Ct. R. 20(2). The defendant, J.B., appeals an order of the Superior Court
(Smith, J.) granting the plaintiff’s, K.B., request for a civil injunction.1 We
affirm.

I. Background

The following facts were found by the trial court or are supported by the
record. The plaintiff has been the librarian at a town library since 2017. The
defendant, the former librarian, resigned from that position in 2017. In 2021,
the defendant was elected a member of the library’s board of trustees (the
board). The board is the plaintiff’s employer and supervisor.

At a board meeting in August or September 2022, the defendant
presented a letter she had written that was addressed to the town’s Board of
Selectmen and the Attorney General’s Charitable Trusts Unit. The letter
criticized the board’s work and the plaintiff’s work performance. Upset by the
letter and the defendant’s presentation, the plaintiff went to her office and
cried. When the meeting concluded, the defendant went to the window of the
plaintiff’s office and made faces at the plaintiff. The defendant laughed while
the plaintiff continued to cry. On other occasions the defendant berated and
harassed the plaintiff. The defendant’s conduct caused the plaintiff to suffer
adverse health impacts.

On October 3, 2022, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the trial court for a
restraining order in which she requested, among other things, that the court
“[r]estrain the defendant from threatening, harassing or intimidating [her], or
interfering with [her] liberty.” On October 17, the court held an evidentiary
hearing on the merits.

1 Federal law prohibits a state from making “available publicly on the Internet any information

regarding . . . the issuance of a protection order . . . if such publication would be likely to publicly
reveal the identity or location of the party protected under such order.” 18 U.S.C. §2265(d)(3)
(Supp. 2022). The term “protection order” is defined to include “any injunction . . . issued by a
civil or criminal court for the purpose of preventing . . . harassment against another person.” 18
U.S.C. §2266(5) (2016). Accordingly, we identify the parties by their initials to protect the identity
of the plaintiff.
 Following the hearing, the trial court issued a narrative order granting
the plaintiff a civil injunction. The court ruled that to the extent the
defendant’s actions fall within the statutory powers and duties of a library
trustee, those actions are not subject to the injunction. However, with respect
to conduct not associated with the defendant’s position as a library trustee, the
court ordered that the defendant shall not:

1. Harass, threaten, intimidate or interfere with the liberty of the
Plaintiff;

2. Contact or attempt to contact the Plaintiff whether in person, or
through third persons, including but not limited to contact by telephone,
letters, fax, texting, social media, e-mail, the sending or delivery of gifts
or any other method, except as necessary pursuant to her obligations as
a library Trustee, unless specifically authorized by the Court;

3. Appear within 100 feet of the Plaintiff’s residence, place of
employment or at any other place the plaintiff may be except as
necessary pursuant to her obligations as a library Trustee, unless
specifically authorized by the Court.

The defendant filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied. This
appeal followed.

II. Analysis

On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred: (1) because
there was insufficient evidence of conduct unrelated to the defendant’s role as
a library trustee to warrant the issuance of a civil injunction; (2) by finding that
the plaintiff did not have an adequate and complete remedy at law; (3) in failing
to address the defendant’s argument that the conduct at issue was
constitutionally protected speech; and (4) by issuing a civil injunction which
acts as an unconstitutional prior restraint that restricts the defendant’s speech
and limits her ability to perform her statutory obligations as an elected official.

The issuance of injunctions has long been considered an extraordinary
remedy, and a court has power to issue equitable relief in the form of an
injunction when the plaintiff does not have “a plain, adequate and complete
remedy at law.” RSA 498:1 (2010); see N.H. Dep’t of Envtl. Servs. v. Mottolo, 155 N.H. 57, 63 (2007). An injunction should not issue unless there is an
immediate danger of irreparable harm to the party seeking injunctive relief.
Mottolo, 155 N.H. at 63. We will uphold the trial court’s factual findings unless
the evidence does not support them or they are erroneous as a matter of law.
Town of Atkinson v. Malborn Realty Trust, 164 N.H. 62, 66 (2012). It is within
the trial court’s sound discretion to grant an injunction after consideration of
the facts and established principles of equity, and we will uphold the issuance

2
of an injunction absent an error of law, an unsustainable exercise of discretion,
or clearly erroneous findings of fact. Id.

We first address the defendant’s argument that there was insufficient
evidence to warrant the issuance of the injunction. The defendant argues the
trial court made an erroneous finding of fact when it found that some of the
defendant’s behavior directed at the plaintiff was not related to the defendant’s
role as a trustee. The defendant argues “all the conduct at issue was related to
or had some nexus to the [defendant’s] role as a Trustee” and, therefore, the
court’s decision to grant an injunction should be vacated. We disagree. The
trial court found, and the record supports, that the defendant, on occasions
outside of board meetings, “berated and harassed” the plaintiff, causing the
plaintiff to suffer “adverse health impacts.” This evidence is sufficient to
support the trial court’s issuance of the injunction.

We next address the defendant’s argument that it was unreasonable for
the trial court to conclude that the plaintiff did not have an adequate remedy at
law for all of the conduct, when the conduct between the parties occurred
during public meetings or immediately after a public meeting on library
property. The trial court order states that, “with respect to the Defendant’s
conduct which is not, or [is] only tangentially, related to the Defendant’s role as
a Board member, the Plaintiff’s available remedies at law are neither ‘adequate’
nor ‘complete’” and “[n]o action at criminal law is available to her to prevent the
Defendant’s conduct until that conduct meets the standard for stalking or
assault, and the civil actions available to the Plaintiff do not reach this
conduct.”

The application of the general and familiar rule that equitable remedies
will not be granted where there is an adequate remedy at law necessarily
depends upon the factual circumstances in each case. Exeter Realty Co. v.
Buck, 104 N.H. 199, 200 (1962). This state has long proceeded on the basis
that the division line between equity and law is not precise and that trial courts
have considerable discretion in determining whether equity should intervene to
aid litigants in the protection of their legal rights. Id. There is no rule, except
the rule of reason, which can be applied to determine when an action at law is
or is not an adequate remedy. Tapley v. Crothers, 103 N.H. 46, 48 (1960).
Each case depends on its own facts. Id. When determining whether to grant
equitable relief, the superior court should not limit its inquiry solely to the
question of the adequacy of the remedy at law; it should also consider whether
the remedy at law is plain and complete. See Sands v. Stevens, 121 N.H. 1008,
1011 (1981).

We conclude that the plaintiff had no “plain, adequate and complete
remedy at law.” RSA 498:1. We conclude that there are no plausible civil
actions available to the plaintiff in these circumstances to prevent the
defendant’s harassing behavior. As to the defendant’s conduct outside her role

3
as trustee, the trial court properly exercised its “considerable discretion” in
determining that “equity should intervene to aid” the plaintiff in this case.
Buck, 104 N.H. at 200.

Finally, we turn to the defendant’s constitutional arguments. As the
appealing party, the defendant has the burden of demonstrating reversible
error. See Gallo v. Traina, 166 N.H. 737, 740 (2014). Based upon our review
of the trial court’s order, the defendant’s challenges to it, the relevant law, and
the record submitted on appeal, we conclude that the defendant has not
demonstrated reversible error based upon the defendant’s constitutional
arguments. See id.

Affirmed.

MACDONALD, C.J., and BASSETT, HANTZ MARCONI, and DONOVAN,
JJ., concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

4