E.O. v. R.T., and R.T. v. E.O.

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case Nos. 2023-0020, E.O. v. R.T., and 2023-0021, R.T.
v. E.O., the court on June 29, 2023, issued the following order:

R.T.’s motion to reconsider our order of June 5, 2023, and to accept his
late-filed brief and appendices is denied. The court has reviewed the written
arguments and the record submitted on appeal, and has determined to resolve
the case by way of this order. See Sup. Ct. R. 20(2). R.T. appeals a domestic
violence final order of protection, see RSA 173-B:5, I (2022), issued by the
Circuit Court (Maloney, R., approved by Cabrera, J.), following an evidentiary
hearing, in favor of E.O., and dismissing R.T.’s separate domestic violence
petition that he had filed against E.O. On appeal, R.T. argues that the trial
court deprived him of due process under the State and Federal Constitutions.
R.T. further argues that the evidence does not establish, and that the trial
court erred by finding, that he “abused” E.O. for purposes of RSA 173-B:1, I
(2022), and that the trial court erred by dismissing his domestic violence
petition against E.O. on the basis that E.O. had not abused him. We affirm.

To obtain relief under RSA chapter 173-B, a plaintiff must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant engaged in “abuse.” S.C. v.
G.C., 175 N.H. 158, 163 (2022). A finding of abuse requires proof that the
defendant, who is a family or household member or a current or former sexual
or intimate partner of the plaintiff, committed or attempted to commit one or
more statutorily enumerated crimes, and that such conduct constitutes “a
credible present threat to the [plaintiff’s] safety.” RSA 173-B:1, I; see S.C., 175
N.H. at 163. The trial court “may consider evidence of such acts, regardless of
their proximity in time to the filing of the petition, which, in combination with
recent conduct, reflects an ongoing pattern of behavior which reasonably
causes or has caused the [plaintiff] to fear for his or her safety or well-being.”
RSA 173-B:1, I.

In this case, the trial court found that R.T. had abused E.O. by engaging
in “[i]nterference with freedom as defined in RSA 633:1 through RSA 633:3-a,”
RSA 173-B:1, I(d), and “[h]arassment as defined in 644:4,” RSA 173-B:1, I(g).
The trial court further found that E.O. had not abused R.T., and it dismissed
the domestic violence petition that R.T. had filed against E.O. On appeal, the
trial court’s findings of fact are final, and we engage in de novo review of
questions of law raised by the appealing party. RSA 173-B:3, VI (2022); S.C.,
175 N.H. at 162. We review sufficiency of the evidence claims as a matter of
law, and will uphold the trial court’s findings and rulings unless they lack
evidentiary support or are tainted by error of law. S.C., 175 N.H. at 162. We
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed at trial,
here, E.O., deferring to the trial court’s judgment as to the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight of the evidence presented. Id. at 162-63.

To the extent that R.T. argues that the trial court deprived him of due
process, he has not sufficiently developed the argument to warrant appellate
review. See State v. Blackmer, 149 N.H. 47, 49 (2003). Moreover, as the
appealing party, R.T. has the burden of demonstrating reversible error. Gallo
v. Traina, 166 N.H. 737, 740 (2014). Based upon our review of the trial court’s
orders, the arguments R.T. is raising, the relevant law, and the record
submitted on appeal, we conclude that R.T. has not established that the trial
court’s findings and rulings lack evidentiary support or are tainted by error of
law. S.C., 175 N.H. at 162; see Gallo, 166 N.H. at 740.

Affirmed.

MacDonald, C.J., and Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ.,
concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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