E.D. v. J.N.

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2022-0665, E.D. v. J.N., the court on May 4,
2023, issued the following order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted on
appeal, and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See Sup. Ct.
R. 20(2). The defendant, J.N., appeals an order of the Circuit Court (Keating, J.),
following a hearing, granting a request by the plaintiff, E.D., to extend a final
domestic violence protective order for one year. See RSA 173-B:5, VI (2022). The
defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s order.
We affirm.

“In an appeal from an order on a domestic violence petition, the trial
court’s ‘findings of facts shall be final,’ and we undertake de novo review of
‘questions of law.’” S.C. v. G.C., 175 N.H. 158, 162 (2022) (quoting RSA 173-B:3,
VI). “We review sufficiency of the evidence claims as a matter of law, upholding
the findings and rulings of the trial court unless they are lacking in evidentiary
support or tainted by error of law.” Id. “When performing this review, we accord
considerable weight to the trial court’s judgments on the credibility of witnesses
and the weight to be given testimony.” Id. at 162-63. We view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prevailing party — here, the plaintiff. See id. at
163.

RSA chapter 173-B provides that, upon a showing of “good cause,” a
protective order may be extended for one year after the expiration of the first
order, and thereafter for up to five years, at the request of the plaintiff and the
discretion of the court. RSA 173-B:5, VI. To determine whether “good cause”
exists, the trial court must “assess whether the current conditions are such that
there is still a concern for the safety and well-being of the plaintiff.” MacPherson
v. Weiner, 158 N.H. 6, 10 (2008) (defining “good cause” in the context of stalking
order extension). In its assessment, the trial court must review the
circumstances giving rise to the original protective order and any violation of the
order. See id. “The trial court should also take into account any present and
reasonable fear by the plaintiff.” Id. “Where the trial court determines that the
circumstances are such that, without a protective order, the plaintiff’s safety and
well-being would be in jeopardy, ‘good cause’ warrants an extension.” Id.

Here, the trial court found that

[b]ased on the offers of proof presented by the [p]arties, the court
finds credible evidence that the Plaintiff fears potential reprisal from
the Defendant as a result of the ongoing court proceedings related to
 the [p]arties’ divorce. The evidence suggests that the Defendant was
“extraordinarily frustrated and upset” by court proceedings that did
not go the way he anticipated they would turn out, and that led him
to rash behavior that resulted in the issuance of the existing
Domestic Violence Final Orders. The Plaintiff expressed concern
that the Defendant could become extraordinarily frustrated and
upset as a result of the unresolved components of the divorce
proceedings, which are still underway and scheduled for a Final
Hearing in January of 2023.

Accordingly, the trial court concluded that the plaintiff had carried the burden to
demonstrate good cause, and extended the protective order for one year.

On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support these findings. The defendant argues that the trial court “failed to
assess the current conditions in this case,” observing that it is undisputed that
the defendant has complied with the protective order, and describing certain
events or circumstances involving the plaintiff where the defendant might have,
but did not, react negatively. The defendant also argues that the trial court failed
to properly weigh the evidence, including the events leading to the original
protective order, and contends that the plaintiff’s fear is speculative and
unreasonable. We disagree.

Although the defendant emphasizes different facts and conflicting
evidence, “[t]he trial court is in the best position to view the current
circumstances, as well as the defendant’s prior acts, and determine whether an
extension is necessary for the safety and well-being of the plaintiff.” MacPherson,
158 N.H. at 11. To answer that question in the affirmative does not require that
the defendant actually harm or threaten the plaintiff in violation of the protective
order; indeed, we have expressly held that “the defendant’s compliance with the
order . . . does not bar an extension,” and is but one factor for the trial court to
consider. Id. at 10-11. Accordingly, based upon our review of the record, and
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we conclude that
the trial court’s finding that good cause existed to extend the protective order for
one year is neither lacking in evidentiary support nor tainted by error of law. See
S.C., 175 N.H. at 162-63; MacPherson, 158 N.H. at 10-11.

Affirmed.

MacDonald, C.J., and Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ.,
concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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