State of New Hampshire v. Albert D. Lynch

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2022-0654, State of New Hampshire v. Albert D.
Lynch, the court on May 3, 2024, issued the following order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted
on appeal, and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See
Sup. Ct. R. 20(2). The defendant, Albert D. Lynch, appeals his conviction,
following a jury trial in the Superior Court (Leonard, J.), of selling a controlled
drug resulting in death. See RSA 318-B:26, IX (Supp. 2023). He argues that:
(1) the evidence was insufficient to support the death resulting charge; and
(2) the court erred in finding that he implicitly waived his Miranda rights when
he agreed to speak with police. We affirm.

The defendant first argues that the evidence was insufficient to support
the death resulting charge. To prevail in his challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, “the defendant must prove that no rational trier of fact, viewing all of
the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the State, could have found the essential elements of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Cullen, 175 N.H. 628, 630 (2023).
“[W]here the proof involves both direct and circumstantial evidence, a
sufficiency challenge must fail if the evidence, including the jury’s credibility
determinations, is such that a rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, even if the evidence would support a rational conclusion
other than guilt if the jury had resolved credibility issues differently.” State v.
Saunders, 164 N.H. 342, 351 (2012). When the evidence is solely
circumstantial, the defendant must establish that the evidence does not
exclude all reasonable conclusions except guilt. State v. Folley, 172 N.H. 760,
766 (2020). “The proper analysis is not whether every possible conclusion
consistent with innocence has been excluded, but, rather, whether all
reasonable conclusions other than guilt have been excluded.” Id. at 766-67.

RSA 318-B:26, IX provides that any person who sells any controlled drug
classified in schedules I or II, in violation of RSA 318-B:2, I or I-a, is strictly
liable for a death which results from the injection, inhalation, or ingestion of
that substance. Under the statute, the sale of a controlled substance is the
cause of death when “[t]he injection, inhalation or ingestion of the substance is
an antecedent but for which the death would not have occurred.” RSA 318-
B:26, IX(a). In addition, the death must not be “[t]oo remote in its occurrence”
or “[t]oo dependent upon conduct of another person which was unrelated to the
injection, inhalation or ingestion of the substance or its effect,” as to have a
“just bearing on the person’s liability.” RSA 318-B:26, IX(b).

In this case, the defendant does not dispute that there was sufficient
evidence to prove that he sold fentanyl to the victim, that the victim ingested a
dose of the fentanyl that the defendant sold him, and that the victim died from
an overdose of fentanyl. However, the victim also ingested a second dose of
fentanyl shortly after the first one. The defendant argues that one reasonable
conclusion is that the defendant did not provide the second dose, and that the
second dose caused the victim’s death.

RSA 318-B:26, IX(a) requires that the fentanyl the defendant sold the
victim was “an antecedent but for which the death would not have occurred.”
There was evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude that the
first dose was “an antecedent but for which the death would not have
occurred.” There was also evidence from which the jury could reasonably
conclude that the defendant provided the second dose to the victim. We
conclude that the evidence excludes all reasonable conclusions other than
guilt. See State v. Folley, 172 N.H. at 766.

The defendant’s alternative conclusions that the victim’s death was “[t]oo
remote in its occurrence” or “too dependent upon the conduct of another
person” to have a “just bearing” on the defendant’s liability, are not reasonable.
See id. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support
the death resulting charge.

The defendant next argues that he did not impliedly waive his Miranda
rights on two occasions because, although on each occasion, he was read his
Miranda rights, asked if he understood those rights, and asked if, with these
rights in mind, he wished to speak with the police officer, he was not asked
whether he understood that, by speaking with the officer, he was waiving those
rights.

“A waiver need not be express to be valid.” State v. Watson, 170 N.H.
720, 725 (2018). To determine whether the defendant waived his Miranda
rights, we “must ascertain whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the
defendant’s understanding of his rights coupled with his conduct supports the
trial court’s ruling that he otherwise voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
waived his rights beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quotation omitted). “We will
not reverse the trial court’s finding on the issue of waiver unless the manifest
weight of the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, is
to the contrary.” Id. (brackets and quotation omitted).

In this case, the defendant on both occasions willingly agreed to talk with
police after being asked to do so with the understanding of his Miranda rights
in mind. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court’s

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determination that the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
waived his Miranda rights was not contrary to the manifest weight of the
evidence. See id.

Affirmed.

MacDonald, C.J., and Bassett, Donovan, and Countway, JJ., concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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