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First, we note that the trial court’s ruling in this case preceded our decision in Doe v. New Hampshire Attorney General (Activity Logs), 176 N.H. 806, 815-16 (2024), in which we announced a new standard for determining when an officer’s conduct is potentially exculpatory for the purposes of RSA 105:13-d.

trial court found the information in the plaintiff’s personnel file potentially exculpatory because “a trial court might admit the findings of untruthfulness as acts probative of [the plaintiff’s] general credibility and character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.” The trial court’s ruling preceded our decision in Doe v. New Hampshire Attorney General (Activity Logs), 176 N.H. 806, 814 (2024),.

3 Recently, in Doe v. New Hampshire Attorney General (Activity Logs), 176 N.H. ____, ____ (2024), we discussed the background of the EES and examined the meaning and scope of the term “potentially exculpatory” within the context of RSA 105:13-d.

We addressed the same argument in a recent opinion, in which we held that “within the context of RSA 105:13-d, ‘potentially exculpatory evidence’ is evidence, including impeachment evidence, that is reasonably capable of being material to guilt or to punishment.” Doe v. N.H. Attorney Gen.

We recently determined that, “within the context of RSA 105:13-d, ‘potentially exculpatory evidence’ is evidence, including impeachment evidence, that is reasonably capable of being material to guilt or to punishment.” Doe v. N.H. Attorney Gen.

We recently held that “within the context of RSA 105:13-d, ‘potentially exculpatory evidence’ is evidence, including impeachment evidence, that is reasonably capable of being material to guilt or to punishment.” Doe v. N.H. Attorney Gen.

osed in a future case, the conviction itself is ‘potentially exculpatory’ and the plaintiff’s placement on the EES is proper under RSA 105:13-d, I.” We recently determined that, “within the context of RSA 105:13-d, ‘potentially exculpatory evidence’ is evidence, including impeachment evidence, that is reasonably capable of being material to guilt or to punishment.” Doe v. N.H. Attorney Gen.