State of New Hampshire v. Paul J. Pagliarulo

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2022-0572, State of New Hampshire v. Paul J.
Pagliarulo, the court on January 11, 2024, issued the following
order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted on
appeal, and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See Sup. Ct.
R. 20(2). The defendant, Paul J. Pagliarulo, appeals his conviction, following a
bench trial, of violation-level disorderly conduct. See RSA 644:2, III(b) (2016). He
argues that the Circuit Court (Greenhalgh, J.) erred by denying his motions to
dismiss the case on the ground that the State had failed to introduce sufficient
evidence to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We reverse.

“A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence presents a question of law;
our standard of review is therefore de novo.” State v. Cullen, 175 N.H. 628, 630
(2023). “To prevail upon this challenge, the defendant must prove that no
rational trier of fact, viewing all of the evidence and all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the State, could have found the
essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “Because the
defendant chose to present a case after his motion to dismiss was denied, we
review the entire trial record when evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence.” Id.

In this case, the defendant was charged with “purposely caus[ing] a breach
of the peace, public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, by disrupting the orderly
conduct of business at the Bartlett Jackson Transfer Station, a public or
governmental facility operated by the Town of Bartlett, by getting very close and
in the face of . . . an employee, all while yelling at [the employee] because [the
employee] questioned him about a dump sticker.” See RSA 644:2, III(b). At the
close of the State’s case, the defendant moved to dismiss the charges on the
ground that the State had failed to introduce sufficient evidence to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, the defendant argued that the State had
failed to prove (1) that he caused a breach of the peace, public inconvenience,
annoyance or alarm; (2) that he actually disrupted the orderly conduct of
business at the transfer station; and (3) that he acted purposely.

The State countered that the defendant caused a breach of the peace
because other customers heard the commotion and stopped to watch what was
taking place, and argued that the defendant purposely caused a disruption by
interfering with an employee and the employee’s supervisor’s ability to do their
jobs. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion from the bench.
 After the defendant presented his case, he renewed his motion to dismiss.
The trial court again denied the motion, reasoning that the evidence could
support findings that the defendant’s yelling and conduct during his interaction
with the employee reasonably caused alarm, and that, by attempting to use the
transfer station without a valid town sticker on the vehicle, the defendant had
disrupted the orderly conduct of business at the transfer station. Thereafter, the
parties made their closing arguments, and the trial court took the matter under
advisement. Subsequently, the trial court issued a narrative order finding the
defendant guilty of disorderly conduct, and this appeal followed.

We agree with the defendant that the evidence was insufficient to support
his conviction. Although it is undisputed that the defendant is a town resident
with town stickers on his vehicles, the evidence demonstrates that, on this
occasion, apparently due to a medical issue, he was driven to the transfer station
by his brother, who did not have a valid sticker on his vehicle. As a result, an
employee of the transfer station attempted to stop the defendant from dumping
his trash, and an argument ensued. Nevertheless, the evidence demonstrates
that the police were not called, and there is no evidence that any other customers
were blocked or hindered from dumping their trash. Additionally, the evidence
demonstrates that the employee’s supervisor, who heard the commotion, did not
find it necessary to interrupt his work helping a different customer in order to
address the situation. Moreover, once the supervisor finished with the other
customer, and the employee asked him to assist with the dispute, the issue was
quickly resolved, the defendant left, and the employee continued working his
shift for the day. In sum, although the evidence demonstrates that the employee
was “upset” about the argument, there is no evidence that the operation of the
transfer station was actually disrupted, even when the evidence is viewed in the
light most favorable to the State.

The State, however, argues otherwise, contending that the defendant
“briefly stalled the orderly operation of the transfer station” by creating a
commotion that other customers stopped to observe, and which caused the
employee to “abandon his job of managing the appropriate disposal of trash.” We
disagree. First, as noted above, although some customers may have stopped to
observe the argument, none were blocked or hindered from going about their
business at the transfer station. Second, we are not persuaded that, in dealing
with the defendant, the employee was forced to “abandon” his job, especially
given that he testified that the scope of his duties included interacting with
customers, and ensuring that vehicles entering the transfer station have the
appropriate town stickers. Indeed, he testified that, in the course of performing
his job, people yell at him “[o]ften.” Thus, based upon our review of the record,
we conclude that no rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant’s
actions, although perhaps not model behavior, amounted to disorderly conduct
within the meaning of RSA 644:2, III(b). See, e.g., State v. McCooey, 148 N.H. 86,
86-88 (2002) (stating that “[w]e will not presume that a defendant’s conduct

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caused a disruption when such a charge is unsupported by evidence,” and
holding that student’s class-time comment that he would “shoot up” school if
teacher did not hug him did not disrupt orderly operation of school despite
teacher’s concern that other students were affected, and despite subsequent
police presence and interviews); State v. Comley, 130 N.H. 688, 692-93 (1988)
(holding that defendant did disrupt orderly operation of State House when
evidence demonstrated that, in apparent protest of nuclear power plant,
“defendant voluntarily ran through Representatives Hall and yelled, that his
behavior necessitated his removal by security officers, and that the entire episode
interfered with the performance by the Sergeant-at-Arms of one of his duties in
the inaugural ceremonies”).

To the extent that the trial court also found the defendant guilty of
disorderly conduct under RSA 644:2, III(a), we note that he was not charged with
that variant of disorderly conduct. Even if he had been charged under RSA
644:2, III(a), based upon our review of the record, the evidence is insufficient to
support a finding that the defendant purposely caused a breach of the peace,
public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm. See RSA 626:2, II(a) (2016) (“A
person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when his
conscious object is to cause the result or engage in the conduct that comprises
the element.”); cf. State v. Laponsee, 115 N.H. 56, 58 (1975) (holding that
complaint alleging disorderly conduct was deficient for failing to allege that
defendant acted with the conscious object of causing public inconvenience,
annoyance or alarm).

Reversed.

MacDonald, C.J., and Bassett, Hantz Marconi, Donovan, and Countway,
JJ., concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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