State of New Hampshire v. Matthew Ryan Fritz

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2022-0498, State of New Hampshire v. Matthew
Ryan Fritz, the court on November 2, 2023, issued the following
order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted on
appeal, has considered the oral arguments of the parties, and has determined to
resolve the case by way of this order. See Sup. Ct. R. 20(2). The defendant,
Matthew Ryan Fritz, was charged with aggravated driving under the influence,
see RSA 265-A:3, III (2014), driving under the influence, see RSA 265-A:2 (2014),
and driving while intoxicated, see RSA 265-A:2, I(a). Following trial, the Circuit
Court (Stephen, J.) found the defendant guilty on all three charges but ruled that
it would sentence him on the “Aggravated charge only and procedurally dismiss
the underlying charges as lesser included offenses.”

The defendant then appealed to the superior court and filed a motion to
suppress his breath test, based on the State’s failure to provide him with a
second breath sample. At the hearing on the motion, the Trial Court (St. Hilaire,
J.) noticed that the State’s Intoxilyzer calibration certificate had expired two days
before the defendant’s arrest on June 22, 2018. The court denied the State’s
request for a brief recess, then granted the defendant’s motion to suppress and,
sua sponte, dismissed the State’s case. The State now appeals, arguing that the
trial court: (1) unsustainably exercised its discretion when it denied the State’s
request for a brief recess; (2) unsustainably exercised its discretion when it
suppressed all of the evidence related to all of the charges and then dismissed
them sua sponte; 1 and (3) erred when it denied the State’s motion to reconsider.
We reverse and remand.

The record before us contains the following information. The defendant’s
motion requested that his breath test results be suppressed “because a second
sample was not preserved, in violation of Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire
Constitution.” Prior to the hearing on the motion to suppress, the State notified
defense counsel that it intended to call an expert to testify “to the functionality of
the Intox[i]lyzer breath testing units used in the State of New Hampshire.” The

1 Although the State argues in its brief that the trial court “erred when it

concluded that all of the charges required proof of blood alcohol content,” at oral
argument, the State conceded that the only charge before the superior court was
the aggravated driving under the influence charge. See RSA 265-A:3, III
(requiring proof of blood alcohol concentration of 0.16 or more).
defendant filed a motion to exclude the expert witness, arguing in part: “The
functionality of the Intoxilyzer units has nothing to do with whether [the arresting
officer] was required to capture a second sample per statute or whether the State
can establish that capturing a second sample was unfeasible . . . .”

Two witnesses were present to testify on the State’s behalf at the
suppression hearing: the arresting officer and the previously-disclosed expert. At
the beginning of the hearing, the trial court described the motion: “[It] still seems
to only argue the legality of not getting the samples. I don’t see any other issue
in the motion to suppress unless I’m missing it.” Defense counsel confirmed that
this description was “correct.” The court went on to rule that it would proceed
with the hearing: “[I]t’s a simple legal issue. Either they’re required to by statute,
or they’re not, depending on how I decide that.”

During testimony by the State’s first witness, the arresting officer, the
Intoxilyzer calibration certificate was admitted without objection. As testimony
was continuing, the trial court stated: “So let me interrupt the testimony. So
State’s Number 2 is the calibration certificate, which expires June 20th. The
arrest is after June 20th?” The State agreed and offered that it may have
uploaded the wrong calibration certificate as its exhibit. After a short pause, the
State reported: “So it does appear that this is the only calibration certificate that
the State is in possession of currently.” The State then requested a 15-20 minute
recess to contact the Salem Police Department to determine whether it could
provide the updated calibration certificate and maintenance log. As part of its
ruling, the trial court observed that the case had been continued multiple times,
while also acknowledging that it was the defendant “who created [the]
continuances.” The court then denied the requested recess, expressing its
concern that it not set a precedent by giving the State “time to gather evidence in
the middle of a hearing that it should have had prior to the hearing. . . . Although
this is easy to get because it’s a fax.” The trial court concluded that it could not
find that the machine was certified on the date of the arrest; “[s]o given that, I’m
going to dismiss the case.”

The court allowed the State to argue that it should reconsider its ruling but
denied the motion, stating: “So I can’t even get to the issue of whether the sample
should have been provided or not if I can’t determine whether the machine was
certified, which is a requirement under the rules.”

The parties agree that the applicable standard of review of the trial court’s
ruling in this case is whether the court unsustainably exercised its discretion
when it denied the State’s request for a brief recess and dismissed the case.
When asked to determine whether a ruling made by the trial court is a proper
exercise of discretion, we review whether the record establishes an objective basis
sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made. State v. Lambert, 147

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N.H. 295, 296 (2001). To establish that the trial court’s ruling is unsustainable,
the appealing party must demonstrate that the court’s ruling was clearly
untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of its case. State v. Spaulding, 172
N.H. 205, 208 (2019).

The record before us indicates that the parties and the court understood
that the issue to be addressed at the suppression hearing was whether the State
was required to provide a second breath sample to the defendant. The answer to
that question did not turn on whether the Intoxilyzer used on the night of the
defendant’s arrest had been certified. The defendant did not object to the
certificate’s introduction into evidence or otherwise raise the issue of whether the
certificate was valid. Instead, the court, after reviewing the document, sua
sponte announced that the certificate appeared to have expired before the
defendant’s arrest. When the court did so, the State requested a brief recess of
“less than a 15-to-20 minute maximum continuance” in order to contact the
police department to ask whether they were able to provide the updated
certification. The trial court stated that it did not want to set a precedent,
although it further noted that, in this case, “this is easy to get because it’s a fax.”

On the facts of this case, we agree with the State that the trial court
unsustainably exercised its discretion by denying the State a brief recess to
contact the police department in an effort to obtain the correct certification
document. The contested issue at this preliminary hearing related to the failure
to provide a second breath sample to the defendant. Proof that the Intoxilyzer
had been certified was unnecessary in order to decide the issue presented in the
motion to suppress. Nothing in the record indicates that a brief recess to permit
the State to attempt to locate the correct certificate would have prejudiced the
defendant or disrupted the trial court’s schedule. Given our preference for
deciding cases on the merits, and based on the facts of this case, we conclude
that the trial court erred. The State has demonstrated that the trial court’s
ruling was clearly unreasonable to the prejudice of its case. See id. Given our
conclusion, we need not address the parties’ remaining arguments.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this order.
Reversed and remanded.

MACDONALD, C.J., and BASSETT, HANTZ MARCONI, and DONOVAN,
JJ., concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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