State of New Hampshire v. Michael Ciampa

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2022-0400, State of New Hampshire v. Michael
Ciampa, the court on November 9, 2023, issued the following
order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted on
appeal, and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See Sup. Ct.
R. 20(2). The defendant, Michael Ciampa, appeals his conviction, following a jury
trial in Superior Court (St. Hilaire, J.), on one felony count of second degree
assault. See RSA 631:2, I(a) (2016). He argues that the trial court erred by
admitting certain evidence as to the extent of the victim’s injuries, and contends
that had the trial court not so erred, the evidence would have been insufficient to
support his conviction. We affirm.

In this case, a grand jury indicted the defendant for second degree assault
under RSA 631:2, I(a), which provides that “[a] person is guilty of a class B felony
if he or she . . . [k]nowingly or recklessly causes serious bodily injury to another.”
RSA 631:2, I(a). Here, the indictment alleged that the defendant “knowingly . . .
caused serious bodily injury to [the victim], specifically a nasal bone fracture, . . .
by punching [the victim] in the face.” At trial, the victim testified regarding the
injuries he sustained as a result of being punched by the defendant, and, at one
point, stated that his nose had been “broken.” Defense counsel objected, arguing
that the victim’s statement that his nose had been “broken” constituted
impermissible opinion testimony by a lay witness. See N.H. R. Ev. 701. The trial
court overruled the objection, reasoning that a broken nose is not a “complex
disorder,” that it was “within the realm of [the victim’s] ability to testify that his
nose was broken,” and that the State had laid the foundation for such testimony.
The jury subsequently convicted the defendant, and this appeal followed.

The defendant argues that the trial court erred by permitting the victim’s
testimony that his nose had been “broken.” He contends that the victim “could
properly testify about what he experienced after he was punched, including that
he bled from his nose and suffered severe pain, and that he now has a bent nose
and difficulty breathing[,] [b]ut he could not properly testify that he suffered a
broken nose or nasal fracture,” which, the defendant argues, “required medical
expertise that [the victim] did not have.” See N.H. R. Ev. 701 (providing that a lay
witness may testify in the form of an opinion only if that opinion is “(a) rationally
based on the witness’s perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the
witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on
scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702”).
Although the State argues that the victim’s testimony was permissible under
Rule 701, we need not decide this issue because we agree with the State that,
even assuming that the trial court erred, such error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.

“[T]o establish harmless error, the State must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error did not affect the verdict[].” State v. Boudreau, 176 N.H. ___,
___ (decided June 7, 2023) (slip op. at 9) (quotation omitted). “This standard
applies to both the erroneous admission and exclusion of evidence.” Id. “We
consider the alternative evidence presented at trial as well as the character of the
erroneously admitted evidence itself.” Id. (quotation and brackets omitted). “To
determine whether the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that an error
did not affect the verdict, we must evaluate the totality of the circumstances at
trial.” Id. The factors that we have considered in assessing whether an error did
not affect the verdict include, but are not limited to:

(1) the strength of the State’s case; (2) whether the admitted or
excluded evidence is cumulative or inconsequential in relation to the
strength of the State’s case; (3) the frequency of the error; (4) the
presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the
erroneously admitted or excluded evidence; (5) the nature of the
defense; (6) the circumstances in which the evidence was introduced
at trial; (7) whether the court took any curative steps; (8) whether the
evidence is of an inflammatory nature; and (9) whether the other
evidence of the defendant’s guilt is of an overwhelming nature.

Id. at ___ (slip op. at 10) (citations omitted). “No one factor is dispositive.” Id.
“This court may consider factors not listed above, and not all factors may be
implicated in a given case.” Id.

Here, the defendant contends that the alleged error was not harmless
because, without the victim’s testimony that his nose had been “broken,” there
was no evidence to establish that the victim had suffered a nasal bone fracture,
and, therefore, the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. The crux
of the defendant’s argument, however, is that because the State alleged in the
indictment that the victim suffered a nasal bone fracture, the State was therefore
obligated to prove that fact. We disagree.

“This court has consistently held that immaterial or superfluous
allegations contained in a complaint or indictment need not be proven at trial.”
State v. LeClair, 126 N.H. 479, 480 (1985). “Averments in an indictment that are
in excess of those required by the statute defining the offense may be treated as
superfluous, and thus do not necessarily control the State’s burden of proof.” Id.
(quotation and brackets omitted). In this case, the statute setting forth the
charged variant of second degree assault requires only that the State prove that
the defendant “[k]nowingly . . . cause[d] serious bodily injury to another.” RSA

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631:2, I(a). “Serious bodily injury” is statutorily defined as “any harm to the body
which causes severe, permanent or protracted loss of or impairment to the health
or of the function of any part of the body.” RSA 625:11, VI (2016). Thus,
although the State was obligated to prove that the victim suffered serious bodily
injury, it was not obligated to specifically prove that the victim suffered a nasal
bone fracture. See LeClair, 126 N.H. at 480.1

Here, the jury was instructed accordingly, and, as the State contends,
there was ample evidence upon which the jury could have reasonably found that
the victim suffered severe, permanent, or protracted loss of or impairment to the
health or function of part of his body. See State v. Dorrance, 165 N.H. 162, 164
(2013) (“Whether the victim’s injuries constituted ‘serious bodily injury’ is a
question of fact for the jury to decide.” (quotation, brackets, and emphasis
omitted)). Among other things, the evidence demonstrates that, after the
defendant punched the victim in the face, the victim’s nose was “deformed,” that
he bled profusely, that he became tired, weak, and dizzy, and that he required
transport to a hospital for treatment. Further, the evidence demonstrates that
the victim suffered a black eye and swelling, that his injuries required additional
follow-up medical appointments with a specialist, and that, even at the time of
trial, his nose remained “crooked,” he had difficulty breathing at night, and he
could no longer blow his nose or use nasal spray to relieve his congestion without
causing his nose to bleed — both of which he could do, without issue, prior to
being punched by the defendant. Accordingly, because the other evidence of
serious bodily injury was overwhelming, and because the victim’s testimony that
his nose was “broken” was inconsequential — both in light of the strength of the
other evidence, and because the State was not obligated to prove that fact — we
conclude that any error in permitting the victim’s lay opinion testimony was,
based upon the totality of the circumstances, harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. See Boudreau, 176 N.H. at ___ (slip op. at 9-10).

Affirmed.

MacDonald, C.J., and Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ.,
concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

1 Furthermore, even if the allegation in the indictment that the defendant broke the victim’s

nose, although not an element of the offense, had “the effect of specifying and circumscribing
the scope of the allegations,” State v. French, 146 N.H. 97, 101 (2001) (quotation omitted), the
State was still not obligated to specifically prove that fact because the defendant was not
prejudiced “in his ability to understand properly the charges against him[,] or in his ability to
prepare his defense.” Id. (quotation omitted).

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