Phyllis Pike & a. v. Scott Wallace & a.

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2022-0354, Phyllis Pike & a. v. Scott Wallace
& a., the court on May 12, 2023, issued the following order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted
on appeal, and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See
Sup. Ct. R. 20(2). The defendants, Scott Wallace, Heidi Marr, and Braveheart
Realty, Inc. (landlords), appeal an order of the Circuit Court (Weaver, J.)
awarding the plaintiffs, Phyllis and Jeffrey Pike (tenants), double the amount of
their security deposit with interest less damages pursuant to RSA 540-A:8.
See RSA 540-A:8 (2021). We affirm.

The following facts either were found by the trial court or reflect the
content of documents in the appellate record. The tenants entered into a
residential lease with the landlords to rent a single family home from December
1, 2018, through June 30, 2019. Upon entering into the lease, the tenants
paid the landlords a security deposit of $2,300.00. After their lease expired,
the tenants remained in the home and continued paying monthly rent to the
landlords, which the landlords accepted. On November 6, 2020, the tenants
notified the landlords of their intent to vacate the property on November 30,
and they did so on that date.

On December 14, the tenants asked the landlords whether their new
address was needed for the return of their security deposit. The landlords
responded that the new address was needed, and the tenants provided it that
day.

On January 12, 2021, the landlords sent a letter to the tenants at their
new address, claiming damages that were nearly equal to the amount of the
security deposit and informing them that only $18.40 of the deposit would be
returned. The tenants sought return of their entire security deposit by filing a
small claim complaint against the landlords.

Following a bench trial, the trial court ruled that the tenants were
entitled to double the amount of their security deposit plus interest, less
certain damages awarded to the landlords, because the landlords failed to
return the security deposit with interest within 30 days of the termination of
the tenancy. The court found that the tenancy terminated on December 6,
20201, and that the landlords received the tenants’ address eight days later.
1 At trial, the parties stipulated that an additional 6 days’ rent was due for 30 days’ notice from

November 6, 2020 to December 6, 2020.
The landlords’ accounting of the security deposit was not provided to the
tenants until January 12, 2021, more than 30 days after December 6, 2020.
Because the landlords failed to return the security deposit to the tenants
within the statutory 30-day period, the trial court awarded the tenants
$3,098.30, which represents twice the amount of their $2,300.00 security
deposit, plus $11.93 in interest, less $1,525.56 in damages to the landlords.
The landlords unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, and this appeal
followed.

We will uphold the trial court’s factual findings unless they are
unsupported by the evidence or erroneous as a matter of law. Miller v. Slania
Enters., 150 N.H. 655, 659 (2004). We review questions of law de novo. Id.

Resolving the issues in this appeal requires that we engage in statutory
interpretation, “which presents a question of law subject to de novo review.” In
re J.S., 174 N.H. 375, 379 (2021) (quotation omitted). “We first look to the
language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according
to its plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. (quotation omitted). “We interpret
legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the
legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit
to include.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Absent an ambiguity, we need not look
beyond the language of the statute to discern legislative intent.” Id. (quotation
omitted).

Except under circumstances that do not apply in this case, RSA 540-A:7,
I, requires a landlord to “return a security deposit to a tenant and pay the
interest due, if any, within 30 days from the termination of the tenancy.” RSA
540-A:7, I (2021). “If there are any damages to the premises, excluding
reasonable wear and tear, the landlord may deduct the costs of the repair from
the security deposit.” Id. Under RSA 540-A:7, I, the landlord must “provide
the tenant with a written, itemized list of any damages for which the landlord
claims the tenant is liable.” Id.

If the landlord fails to comply with RSA 540-A:7, I, the landlord is
“liable to the tenant in damages in an amount equal to twice the sum of the
amount of the security deposit plus any interest due . . . , less any . . . charges
owing for damages, unpaid rent, or share of real estate taxes.” RSA 540-A:8,
I(b). “Notwithstanding . . . RSA 540-A:7[] and RSA 540-A:8, I, a landlord shall
not be liable” for the damages set forth in RSA 540-A:8, I(b) “if his failure to
comply with said sections . . . is due to the failure of the tenant to notify the
landlord of his new address upon termination of the tenancy.” RSA 540-A:8, II.

On appeal, the landlords suggest that the tenancy in this case
terminated on November 30, 2020, and contend that the tenants were
statutorily obligated to provide their new address to the landlords that day and

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that their failure to do so precludes their recovery of damages under RSA 540-
A:8, II. We disagree.

We first consider the landlords’ suggestion that the tenancy terminated
on November 30. The trial court found that the tenancy terminated on
December 6. We uphold this factual finding because there is record support
for it and it is not legally erroneous. See Miller, 150 N.H. at 659.

We next consider whether, as the landlords argue, the tenants were not
entitled to receive damages under RSA 540-A:8, II because they did not provide
their new address to the landlords until December 14. In considering this
argument, we find Dow v. Carter, 122 N.H. 395 (1982), instructive.

In Dow, 122 N.H. at 395-96, we interpreted the predecessor to RSA 540-
A:8, II. See RSA 477:48, VII(b), VIII (1983) (repealed by Laws 1985, 100:7).
Just as the current statute provides, the predecessor statute provided that a
landlord who failed to return a tenant’s security deposit with interest, less
damages, within 30 days from the tenancy’s termination was liable for twice
the amount of the security deposit. Compare RSA 477:48, VII(b), with RSA
540-A:8, I(b). Just as the current statute provides, the predecessor statute
also provided that a landlord was not liable for such damages if the landlord’s
“failure to comply” with this mandate was “due to the failure of the tenant to
notify the landlord” of the tenant’s new address “upon termination of the
tenancy.” RSA 477:48, VIII; see RSA 540-A:8, II.

In Dow, we ruled that, “[a]lthough the statute states no definite time
period after termination within which notification must be given,” we would
interpret “this period to be a reasonable time.” Dow, 122 N.H. at 396. In that
case, the tenant had terminated his tenancy on June 3, 1980, but had not
notified the landlord of his new address until July 8, 1980. Id. The landlord
was unaware that the tenant had moved out until June 3, and did not know of
the tenant’s new address until July 8. Id. Nonetheless, the trial court had
awarded the tenant “double damages, less rent due.” Id. We reversed, holding,
as a matter of law, that the tenant was not entitled to damages because his
“notice was unreasonably late.” Id.

Here, the tenants notified the landlords on November 6 of their intent to
vacate the premises on November 30 and provided their new address to the
landlords on December 14, only eight days after their tenancy terminated. This
was a reasonable period of time as a matter of law. There is no evidence that
the landlords were unable to comply with the 30-day statutory period because
the tenants provided their new address eight days after the tenancy
terminated.

To the extent that the landlords invite us to overrule Dow because, in
their view, it constitutes “bad law,” we decline their invitation to do so. “[W]hen

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asked to reconsider a holding, the question is not whether we would decide the
issue differently de novo, but whether the ruling has come to be seen so clearly
as error that its enforcement was for that very reason doomed.” State v.
Quintero, 162 N.H. 526, 539 (2011) (quotation omitted). Generally, we will
overrule a prior decision only after considering: (1) whether the rule has proven
to be intolerable simply by defying practical workability; (2) whether the rule is
subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the
consequence of overruling; (3) whether related principles of law have so far
developed as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned
doctrine; and (4) whether facts have so changed, or come to be seen so
differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or
justification. Maplevale Builders v. Town of Danville, 165 N.H. 99, 105 (2013).
“Principled application of stare decisis requires a court to adhere . . . to . . .
precedent in the absence of some special reason over and above the belief that
a prior case was wrongly decided.” Id. (quotation omitted). Having failed to
brief the four stare decisis factors, the landlords have not persuaded us that
Dow must be overruled. See id.

Alternatively, the landlords imply that their January 12, 2021 letter to
the tenants detailing the claimed damages and offering to return $18.40 of the
security deposit was timely because the letter was sent fewer than 30 days
after the tenants notified the landlords of their new address. In the trial court,
the landlords asserted that the statutory scheme required them to return the
security deposit “within 30 days of [their] receipt” of the tenants’ new address.

This assertion has no support in the statutory language. By statute, the
landlords were required to return the security deposit to the tenants with
interest “within 30 days from the termination of the tenancy,” here December
6. RSA 540-A:7, I. The landlords concede that they did not provide an
accounting to the tenants until January 12, 2021, which is more than 30 days
from December 6, 2020. The landlords do not claim that they were unable to
return the security deposit or provide the tenants with a detailed accounting of
claimed damages within the statutory time period because the tenants failed to
provide their address earlier. Rather, the landlords concede that the tenants
provided their address on December 14, 22 days before the 30-day period
expired. For all of the above reasons, therefore, we uphold the trial court’s
award of damages to the tenants pursuant to RSA 540-A:8.

Affirmed.

MACDONALD, C.J., and HICKS, BASSETT, HANTZ MARCONI, and
DONOVAN, JJ., concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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