State of New Hampshire v. Justin Alan Belanger

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2022-0307, State of New Hampshire v. Justin
Alan Belanger, the court on June 18, 2024, issued the
following order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted
on appeal, and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See
Sup. Ct. R. 20(2). The defendant, Justin Alan Belanger, appeals his
conviction, following a jury trial in Superior Court (Howard, J.), of second
degree murder. We affirm.

The jury could have found the following facts. On June 4, 2018, police
responded to an incident reported on Lafayette Street in Rochester. A man
named Lopez and a group of people, including the defendant, were taunting
each other and exchanging insults. The defendant called Lopez a “slob” and
Lopez called the defendant a “crab.” As the defendant and another person
attempted to cross the street to confront Lopez, one of the officers directed
them to stop or they would be arrested. Although the defendant stopped, the
officer overheard him tell the other man, “He just called me a crab, and if I see
him on the street, I’m going to dress him down.” The officer understood the
defendant to have been referring to Lopez.

The next evening, June 5, the defendant, Devin Giles, and another man
walked from Lafayette Street to downtown Rochester. On the way, the
defendant stopped at a friend’s house to retrieve his pistol and, according to
Giles’s testimony, said that “he was going to shoot that slob.” Once on South
Main Street, sometime around midnight, the group encountered Lopez, Lopez’s
wife, and the victim. As the two groups passed each other, the defendant said
to Lopez, “What’s all that sh*t you was talking, slob?” The defendant then
turned around, and with his arm extended out at shoulder level, pointed his
gun at Lopez and fired. The victim screamed and fell, and the defendant and
his companions started running. They returned to Lafayette Street, where,
according to Giles’s testimony, the defendant stated that he “got the wrong
person.”

The victim died later that morning, June 6, as a result of a gunshot
wound to the pelvis. The defendant was indicted on two alternative counts of
second degree murder. The first alleged that the defendant knowingly caused
the victim’s death by shooting her. See RSA 630:1-b, I(a) (2016). The second
alleged that the defendant recklessly caused the victim’s death “under
circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life
by shooting her.” See RSA 630:1-b, I(b) (2016). The jury returned guilty
verdicts on both counts, and the trial court sentenced the defendant on one
conviction for knowingly causing the victim’s death.

The defendant now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to dismiss at the close of the State’s case and in allowing Giles to
testify by video. We address each argument in turn.

The defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion
to dismiss because “[t]he evidence was legally insufficient to prove the mens
rea element of either indictment beyond a reasonable doubt.” “A challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence raises a claim of legal error; therefore, our
standard of review is de novo.” State v. Stanin, 170 N.H. 644, 648 (2018).

To prevail upon a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the
defendant must prove that no rational trier of fact, viewing all of
the evidence and all reasonable inferences from it in the light most
favorable to the State, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. When the evidence is solely circumstantial, it must exclude
all reasonable conclusions except guilt. Under this standard,
however, we still consider the evidence in the light most favorable
to the State and examine each evidentiary item in context, not in
isolation. We consider whether the circumstances presented are
consistent with guilt and inconsistent, on the whole, with any
reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The proper analysis is not
whether every possible conclusion consistent with innocence has
been excluded, but, rather, whether all reasonable conclusions
based upon the evidence have been excluded. The court does not
determine whether another possible hypothesis has been
suggested by the defendant which could explain the events in an
exculpatory fashion. Rather, the reviewing court evaluates the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and
determines whether the alternative hypothesis is sufficiently
reasonable that a rational juror could not have found proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Questions about the reasonableness
of theories of innocence are for the jury to decide in cases
predicated upon circumstantial evidence.

Id. (quotations and citations omitted). Notwithstanding the defendant’s
statement that he planned to shoot Lopez, we assume, without deciding, that
the evidence of mens rea in this case was, as the defendant argues, solely
circumstantial. See State v. Craig, 167 N.H. 361, 379 (2015) (“Because
persons rarely explain to others the inner workings of their minds or mental
processes, a culpable mental state must, in most cases, as here, be proven by
circumstantial evidence.” (quotation omitted)).

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 We first address whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that the
defendant acted knowingly. “A person acts knowingly with respect to conduct
or to a circumstance that is a material element of an offense when he is aware
that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstances exist.” RSA
626:2, II(b) (2016). Thus, the State was required to prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the defendant was aware that his conduct would cause
the death of another person. See RSA 630:1-b, I(a) (providing that a person is
guilty of second degree murder if he “knowingly causes the death of another”).

The defendant argues that the evidence taken in the light most favorable
to the State is that he fired a single shot. He posits two “reasonable
conclusions” other than guilt that could be drawn from the evidence. Stanin,
170 N.H. at 648. First, he argues that his “shot was not directed towards the
head or the center of mass,” but rather, “at a low trajectory, striking [the
victim] in the hip.” He therefore contends that it is reasonable to conclude
that he believed the shot would cause injury, but did not know it would cause
death. He also contends that it is reasonable to conclude that he “intended to
frighten Lopez” and “did not know the bullet he fired would hit anyone.”
Evaluating the evidence as a whole, in the light most favorable to the State, we
conclude that these “alternative hypothes[es]” are not “sufficiently reasonable
that a rational juror could not have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id. The evidence before the jury included the defendant’s statement
just prior to the murder, and after retrieving his pistol, that “he was going to
shoot [Lopez]” and his statement after the murder that he “got the wrong
person.” It also included Giles’s testimony that, after passing Lopez’s group,
the defendant turned around to look toward them, “had his gun out, pointed
at [Lopez],” and shot. The defendant’s alternative theories — that he intended
only to injure or frighten — are not sufficiently reasonable to preclude a
rational juror from finding that he acted knowingly. In light of this
conclusion, we need not address the defendant’s sufficiency challenge to the
verdict finding him guilty of recklessly causing the victim’s death under
circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life.

The defendant next contends that the trial court “erred in permitting
Giles to testify by video stream when he could have been transported [and]
been subject to face-to-face confrontation in the courtroom.” He argues that
this procedure violated his confrontation rights under the State and Federal
Constitutions. Under both our own and the United States Supreme Court’s
precedent, “the confrontation clause reflects a preference for face-to-face
confrontation at trial, which must occasionally give way to considerations of
public policy and the necessities of the case.” State v. Hernandez, 159 N.H.
394, 403 (2009) (quotations omitted). “[I]n order to sustain an exception to a
defendant’s confrontation rights there must be an individualized finding that
the witness in a particular case is unavailable to testify at trial.” State v.
Peters, 133 N.H. 791, 794 (1991). Here, the defendant challenges the trial
court’s finding that Giles was unavailable to testify at trial.

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 The trial court found that “both public policy and necessity support the
use of a two-way livestream video feed to present Devin Giles’ testimony at
trial.” The court noted that Giles “sustained truly life-altering injuries” in an
accident in 2020. The court further found:

He is paralyzed from the waist down and experiences significant
pain and discomfort in attempting to move, or simply being
touched. There is no doubt that it would require a full medical
transport to bring Devin to the courtroom, and based on his
current condition, he would likely have to remain in his hospital
bed during live courtroom testimony.

The court concluded that “[t]he pain he would have to endure, and risk of
potential aggravating injury to him, are too great to force him to go through
the transportation process.”

The defendant argues that there was no evidence that transporting Giles
to court would potentially aggravate his injuries or cause him to endure pain.
Thus, the defendant’s constitutional challenge solely consists of a challenge to
the trial court’s factual findings. We will sustain the trial court’s “factual
findings unless they lack support in the record or are clearly erroneous.”
State v. Michelson, 160 N.H. 270, 272 (2010).

Giles’s father, who lived with Giles, was his primary caregiver, and was
familiar with his medical condition, testified that he was “1,000 percent”
concerned for Giles’s “medical safety” if he were to be transported to court for
trial. He testified that “if you can get him here without killing him, then I -- I
guess that’s fine, but good luck trying to find somebody . . . that’s going to be
able to safely transport him from there to here.”

The court also heard testimony from Giles and his father as to the
significant pain Giles feels during attempts to be moved. In particular, Giles’s
legs are hypersensitive to the slightest touch, causing him to “feel[] pain right
away.” In addition, the court watched a video taken when law enforcement
served Giles and his father with subpoenas related to this case and admitted
the police reports documenting that encounter. The officer’s report states that
he encountered Giles laying in a bed similar to a hospital bed. It further
states: “Devin showed me that the only way he could move his legs was to
raise the bed. While moving the bed he appeared to be in pain. . . . Devin’s
condition and reaction to pain seemed genuine and legitimate.”

The defendant cites isolated portions of the hearing testimony that, he
contends, contradict the trial court’s findings. The trial court, however, was
entitled to consider the witnesses’ testimony as a whole. Reviewing that
testimony in its entirety, we conclude that it supports the court’s findings. Cf.
State v. Cote, 143 N.H. 368, 372 (1999) (upholding trial court determination

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regarding witness recollection considering testimony as a whole, not in
isolation).

We conclude that the trial court’s factual findings regarding Giles’s
unavailability to testify in person at trial are supported by the record and are
not clearly erroneous. See Michelson, 160 N.H. at 272. Accordingly, the
defendant’s confrontation clause challenge fails.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

Affirmed.

BASSETT, DONOVAN, and COUNTWAY, JJ., concurred; HANTZ
MARCONI, J., did not participate in further review of the case after she
disqualified herself.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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