State of New Hampshire v. Devon R. Dukelow

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2022-0245, State of New Hampshire v. Devon R.
Dukelow, the court on December 29, 2022, issued the following
order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted
on appeal, and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See
Sup. Ct. R. 20(2). The defendant, Devon R. Dukelow, appeals his conviction,
following a bench trial in the Circuit Court (Quigley, J.), on a charge of
misdemeanor criminal trespass. On appeal, the defendant argues that the
evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. We affirm.

To prevail upon a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the
defendant must demonstrate that no rational trier of fact, viewing all of the
evidence and all of the reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable
to the State, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Cable, 168 N.H. 673, 677 (2016). In such a challenge, we objectively review the record
to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Because a challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence raises a claim of legal error, our standard of
review is de novo. Id.

We are unable to address the merits of the defendant’s challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence because he has failed to provide a sufficient record
for our review. As the appealing party, the defendant had the burden of
providing this court with a record sufficient to decide his issues on appeal. See
Bean v. Red Oak Prop. Mgmt., 151 N.H. 248, 250 (2004); Sup. Ct. R. 13. In the
absence of a trial transcript, we assume that the evidence at trial supports the
trial court’s findings. Bean, 151 N.H. at 250.

The record submitted on appeal does not include an official transcript of
the bench trial in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 15. Although the defendant’s
appendix includes a document that purports to be a transcript, the defendant
did not request that a transcript be prepared in accordance with Supreme
Court Rule 15, and the document included in the appendix is not an official
transcript prepared by “the transcriber designated by the court to prepare the
transcript.” Sup. Ct. R. 15(2)(a), (4) (deeming the “electronic version of the
transcript” prepared for the court by “the transcriber” to be “the official
transcript”). Nor has the State stipulated that the document in the defendant’s
appendix is an accurate accounting of the bench trial. See Sup. Ct. R. 15(1)
(“The parties shall attempt to enter into stipulations, such as an agreed
statement of facts, that will reduce the size of transcripts or avoid them
completely.”). To the contrary, the State expressly declines to concede the
accuracy or reliability of the purported transcript included in the defendant’s
appendix, observing that it was neither prepared by the court’s designated
transcriber nor accompanied by a certificate as to its accuracy.

Because the purported transcript included in the defendant’s appendix is
not an official transcript, it is not properly part of the record in this appeal.
See Sup. Ct. R. 13(1) (defining “the record” to include “the transcript of the
proceedings, if any”); 15(2) (describing the process by which the appealing
party may obtain trial transcripts). Without an official transcript, we must
assume that the evidence supported the trial court’s guilty finding. See Bean,
151 N.H. at 250; see also Town of Nottingham v. Newman, 147 N.H. 131, 137
(2001) (explaining that the rules of appellate practice are not relaxed for self-
represented litigants). Even if the purported transcript were an official
transcript, however, we note that it supports the defendant’s conviction. Any
remaining arguments in the defendant’s brief either are insufficiently
developed, or otherwise do not warrant further discussion. See State v.
Blackmer, 149 N.H. 48, 49 (2003); Vogel v. Vogel, 137 N.H. 321, 322 (1993).

Affirmed.

MacDonald, C.J., and Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ.,
concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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