Appeal of OL International Holdings, LLC

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2022-0223, Appeal of OL International
Holdings, LLC, the court on November 29, 2023, issued the
following order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted
on appeal, has considered the oral arguments of the parties, and has
determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See Sup. Ct. R. 20(2). The
petitioners, Utica National Insurance Company and OL International Holdings,
LLC, appeal a decision of the New Hampshire Compensation Appeals Board
(CAB) determining that Peter Dodier’s death by suicide was a result of work-
related anxiety and depression, and that the respondent, the Estate of Peter
Dodier (Estate), is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. We affirm.

I

This is the second appeal of this case. Many of the underlying facts and
the relevant procedural history are set forth in our prior decision and need not
be repeated here. See Appeal of Estate of Dodier, 174 N.H. 548 (2021). In that
opinion, we concluded as a matter of law that the Estate had “demonstrated
legal and medical causation as to [the decedent’s] anxiety and depression,” and
reversed the CAB’s decision to the contrary. Id. at 550, 556. We remanded for
the CAB to apply the test set forth in Appeal of Pelmac Industries, Inc. “to
determine whether [the decedent’s] death by suicide was a direct and natural
result of his initial compensable injury of anxiety and depression, such that the
suicide is compensable under RSA 281-A:26.” Id. at 562; see Appeal of Pelmac
Indus., 174 N.H. 528 (2021); RSA 281-A:26 (2023).

On remand, the CAB determined that the Estate satisfied its burden
under Pelmac by “prov[ing], by a preponderance of the evidence, that [the
decedent’s death] resulted from a disturbance of mind of such severity as to
override normal, rational [judgment] and that this disturbance of his mind
resulted directly from his work-related anxiety and depression.” Accordingly,
the CAB ruled that the decedent’s Estate is entitled to workers’ compensation
benefits “from the date of death and continuing.”

The petitioners moved for rehearing, to which the Estate objected. The
CAB denied the petitioners’ motion. This appeal followed.
 II

On appeal, the petitioners argue that the CAB erred: (1) “when it failed to
articulate and provide the basis for why it ignored the opinions of three treating
medical providers”; (2) “by not excluding the claimant’s suicide under the
definition of injury in RSA 281-A:2, XI when the causal chain of his depression
was broken based on the opinion of numerous treating providers”; and (3)
“when it did not consider non-medical facts” in considering the causal chain
legal test.

Our standard of review of CAB decisions is established by statute. See
Appeal of The Lawson Group, 175 N.H. 397, 399 (2022); RSA 541:13 (2021).
RSA 541:13 provides:

Upon the hearing the burden of proof shall be upon the party seeking to
set aside any order or decision of the [CAB] to show that the same is
clearly unreasonable or unlawful, and all findings of the [CAB] upon all
questions of fact properly before it shall be deemed to be prima facie
lawful and reasonable; and the order or decision appealed from shall not
be set aside or vacated except for errors of law, unless the court is
satisfied, by a clear preponderance of the evidence before it, that such
order is unjust or unreasonable.

In Pelmac, we held that “[a]n employee’s death by suicide is compensable
under RSA 281-A:26 if the claimant proves by a preponderance of the evidence
that the suicide resulted from a disturbance of mind of such severity as to
override normal, rational judgment, and that such disturbance of mind
resulted from the employee’s work-related injury and its consequences.”
Pelmac, 174 N.H. at 542-43. This chain-of-causation test essentially places the
burden on the claimant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there
was an unbroken chain of causation between the work-related injury, the
disturbance of mind, and the ultimate suicide. Id. at 542. We concluded that
an employee’s death by suicide is deemed to be the direct and natural result of
the prior work-related injury when this chain-of-causation test is satisfied. Id.
at 543; see RSA 281-A:2, XI (2023).

We first address the petitioners’ overarching argument that the record
did not support the CAB’s finding that the decedent’s “suicide is causally-
related to [his] work injury.” The petitioners emphasize the treating providers’
observations that the decedent’s suicidal ideation was considered “resolved” at
various points during treatment, and assert that this demonstrates a broken
chain of causation. In addition, the petitioners point to certain non-medical
evidence which, they argue, indicates he was not suffering from a severe
disturbance of mind.

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 In reviewing the CAB’s findings, our task is not to determine whether we
would have found differently than did the CAB, or to reweigh the evidence, but
rather to determine whether the findings are supported by competent evidence
in the record. Appeal of Dean Foods, 158 N.H. 467, 474 (2009). As long as
competent evidence supports the CAB’s decision, we will not reverse a finding
supported by expert evidence in the record even if other evidence would lead to
a contrary result. Appeal of Anheuser-Busch Co., 156 N.H. 677, 682 (2008).

The CAB specifically relied upon the medical opinion of the Estate’s
expert, Albert Drukteinis, which the CAB found “more convincing” than that of
the petitioners’ medical expert. Drukteinis opined that the decedent’s work-
related injury “distorted” the decedent’s reality, “diminished [the decedent’s]
capacity to make a willful decision about whether or not he should take his
own life,” and left him unable to “assess his situation realistically or consider
options besides suicide.” In forming that opinion, Drukteinis reviewed records
from numerous medical personnel, including the decedent’s treating providers;
interviewed the decedent’s wife for two hours; and examined notes and
journals, emails, text messages, personal financial information, and employee
personnel records. Based on Drukteinis’ expert opinion, the CAB concluded
that the Estate had met its burden of proof under the Pelmac test. We have
reviewed the record and determine that the CAB’s decision was supported by
competent evidence in the record.

The petitioners further assert that “the CAB’s decision does not provide
an adequate basis for its conclusions to allow this Court to conduct an
intelligent review” because it failed to articulate why it disregarded the treating
providers’ observations as well as certain non-medical evidence. See Appeal of
Walker, 144 N.H. 181, 184 (1999) (reasoning that “[w]hile the board may
reconcile conflicting evidence, or disbelieve unrefuted evidence, we are unable
to intelligently review its decision when it does not provide an adequate basis
for its conclusions” (citations omitted)). However, as set forth above, the CAB
expressly identified the basis for its decision, which was rooted in the opinion
of the Estate’s medical expert.

To the extent the petitioners argue that the CAB erred in failing to accord
the treating providers’ observations “substantial weight,” see Appeal of Morin,
140 N.H. 515, 519 (1995), we are unpersuaded. As the Estate points out, the
decedent’s “injury” is not his death by suicide, but rather his work-related
depression and anxiety. See RSA 281-A:26. Therefore, under these
circumstances, instances of “resolved” suicidal ideation as indicated by the
decedent’s treating providers do not compel a finding that the chain of
causation between his work-related depression and anxiety, his disturbance of
mind, and his death by suicide was broken. See Pelmac, 174 N.H. at 542.

Finally, the petitioners’ argument that the definition of “injury” in RSA
281-A:2, XI precluded a finding of compensability also fails. In defining

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“injury,” RSA 281-A:2, XI provides, in part, that “[n]o compensation shall be
allowed to an employee for injury proximately caused by the employee’s willful
intention to injure himself or injure another.” Based on this definition, the
petitioners contend that because there is “no medical evidence” of an unbroken
chain of causation and “no dispute” that the decedent “intended to end his
life,” his suicide is not compensable. However, as we concluded above, the
CAB’s determination that the decedent’s “suicide is causally-related to [his]
work injury” is supported by competent evidence in the record, including
Drukteinis’ expert opinion. Therefore, we disagree with the petitioners’
assertion that there is “no medical evidence” of an unbroken chain of
causation.

Accordingly, the decision of the CAB is affirmed.

Affirmed.

MACDONALD, C.J., and HICKS, BASSETT, HANTZ MARCONI, and
DONOVAN, JJ., concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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