State of New Hampshire v. Paul Loukedes

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2022-0046, State of New Hampshire v. Paul
Loukedes, the court on October 20, 2023, issued the following
order:

The court has reviewed the written arguments and the record submitted on
appeal, and has determined to resolve the case by way of this order. See Sup. Ct.
R. 20(2). Following a jury trial, the defendant, Paul Loukedes, was convicted of
driving after certification as an habitual offender. See RSA 262:23 (Supp. 2022).
The defendant appeals his conviction, arguing that the Superior Court
(Schulman, J.) erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence derived from an
investigatory stop of his vehicle. Specifically, the defendant contends that the
police did not have reasonable suspicion to justify the investigatory stop, and
thus he argues that the trial court erred under Part I, Article 19 of the New
Hampshire Constitution, and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution, by not suppressing the evidence obtained as a result
of the stop. We affirm.

“When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept
the trial court’s factual findings unless they lack support in the record or are
clearly erroneous, and we review its legal conclusions de novo.” State v. Dalton, 165 N.H. 263, 264 (2013). Whether there existed reasonable suspicion to justify
an investigatory stop is a determination which we review de novo. State v.
McBreairty, 142 N.H. 12, 14 (1997). We first address the defendant’s arguments
under the State Constitution and rely upon federal law only to aid our analysis.
State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231-33 (1983).

“Part I, Article 19 of the State Constitution protects citizens from
unreasonable seizures.” Dalton, 165 N.H. at 265; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 19. “A
warrantless seizure is per se unreasonable unless it falls within a recognized
exception to the warrant requirement.” State v. Donovan, 175 N.H. 356, 360
(2022) (quotation omitted). “The State bears the burden of establishing that a
seizure falls within one of these exceptions.” Id. (quotation omitted). “An
investigatory stop based upon reasonable suspicion is such an exception.” Id.
(quotation omitted). “In order for a police officer to undertake an investigatory
stop, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific,
articulable facts taken together with rational inferences from those facts, that the
particular person stopped has been, is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal
activity.” Id. (quotation omitted); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968).
“To determine the sufficiency of an officer’s suspicion, we consider the articulable
facts in light of all surrounding circumstances, keeping in mind that a trained
officer may make inferences and draw conclusions from conduct that may seem
unremarkable to an untrained observer.” State v. Perez, 173 N.H. 251, 259
(2020). “Although we recognize that experienced officers’ perceptions are entitled
to deference, this deference should not be blind.” Id. “A reasonable suspicion
must be more than a hunch,” and “[t]he officer’s suspicion must have a
particularized and objective basis.” Id. “The articulable facts must lead to
something specific and not simply a general sense that this is probably a bad
person who may have committed some kind of crime.” Id. However, reasonable
suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, and may be
established with information that is less reliable, and different in quantity or
content, than that required to show probable cause. Id. at 260.

Here, the trial court found that “[t]here was abundant reasonable
suspicion for the stop,” which was based on a tip from an informant who
reported that the defendant, whom the informant identified by name, was
intoxicated, that his driver’s license was suspended, and that he was driving a
white Ford Econoline van from Tilton to the liquor store in Franklin. The
informant identified himself to police, and also provided the license plate number
for the van. While officers responded, the police dispatcher confirmed that the
defendant’s driver’s license was suspended as a result of being an habitual
offender with multiple prior DWI convictions, and also confirmed that the license
plate number provided by the informant was indeed registered to a white Ford
Econoline van. This information was relayed to the responding officers, who,
having arrived in the area of the liquor store in Franklin, observed a van
matching the description drive across the parking lot and pull into a parking spot
near the liquor store. One of the officers observed that the van was being
operated by a male driver. After confirming with the dispatcher that the license
plate of the van matched that which was reported by the informant, at least one
of the officers activated their emergency lights and they effectuated the
investigatory stop.

On appeal, the defendant argues that the police lacked reasonable
suspicion to justify the stop because the informant’s tip “lacked veracity and
provided no basis of knowledge.” He contends that “[t]he police corroborated only
mundane, innocent, and widely available facts,” and failed to corroborate the
informant’s claims “that the driver was Loukedes or that the driver was
intoxicated.” We disagree.

“When the facts upon which the officer relies to make the stop do not stem
from personal observation, but instead come from an informant, we must
examine the reliability and credibility of the informant, and his or her basis of
knowledge, and then make a final judgment according to the totality of the
circumstances.” State v. Gowen, 150 N.H. 286, 287-88 (2003) (quotation and
brackets omitted). However, unlike tips from anonymous informants, a tip from

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a known informant is subject to less scrutiny as their “reputation can be
assessed[,] and [they] can be held responsible if [their] allegations turn out to be
fabricated.” Id. at 288 (quotation and brackets omitted). Nonetheless, a tip from
a known informant must still “contain sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the
stop.” Id. at 289 (quotation and brackets omitted).

In this case, the informant, who identified himself to police, was not an
anonymous informant. See id. at 288 (holding that informant was an identifiable
witness, not an anonymous informant, when, even though she did not give her
name to police, her identity was ascertainable because she interacted with police
in person and they could easily have noted her license plate number or the name
of the company displayed on her vehicle). Thus, although the defendant relies
heavily upon cases involving anonymous informants, here, the informant’s tip is
not subject to that higher level of scrutiny.

Based upon our review of the totality of the circumstances established by
the evidence in the record, we conclude that the informant’s tip contained
sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the investigatory stop. Here, the
informant accurately reported the color, make, model, exact license plate
number, and specific destination of the van — all of which were corroborated by
police prior to initiating the stop. Further, the informant accurately reported that
the defendant’s license was suspended, a detail which is neither mundane,
innocent, nor widely available, and which was also corroborated by police prior to
initiating the stop. Although the defendant is correct that the police were unable
to corroborate the informant’s claim that the defendant was, in fact, the person
driving the van, the police did observe that the van was being operated by a male
driver. Given their observations, and the demonstrated accuracy of the
informant’s tip at that point, the officers had “a particularized and objective
basis,” which was “more than a hunch,” Perez, 173 N.H. at 259, to suspect that
the person driving the van was indeed the defendant, and that he was engaged in
criminal activity by operating a motor vehicle without a valid license.1

Accordingly, because the investigatory stop was justified by reasonable
suspicion based upon specific, articulable facts taken together with the rational
inferences therefrom, we conclude that the trial court did no err by denying the
defendant’s motion to suppress. See Dalton, 165 N.H. at 264-65; Donovan, 175
N.H. at 360; Gowen, 150 N.H. at 287-89. The Federal Constitution offers the
defendant no greater protection than that provided by the State Constitution

1 It is of no moment that, prior to initiating the investigatory stop, the police were unable to

corroborate the informant’s additional claim that the defendant was intoxicated. It was
sufficient to justify the stop that the police reasonably suspected the defendant of operating the
van without a valid license.

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under these circumstances. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000); Alabama v.
White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
Accordingly, we reach the same result under the Federal Constitution as we do
under the State Constitution.

Affirmed.

MacDonald, C.J., and Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ.,
concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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