In the Matter of Robert Ansin and Christine Ansin

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2022-0023, In the Matter of Robert Ansin and
Christine Ansin, the court on October 18, 2022, issued the
following order:

Having considered the brief filed by the petitioner, Robert Ansin
(Husband), and the record submitted on appeal, we conclude that oral
argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1). Husband cross-
appeals temporary orders entered by the Circuit Court (Alfano, J.) in his
divorce from the respondent, Christine Ansin (Wife).1 On appeal, he argues
that the trial court erred as a matter of law by failing to enforce the parties’
prenuptial agreement in its temporary orders. We dismiss the cross-appeal as
moot.

RSA 460:2-a allows parties to enter into a written contract “in
contemplation of marriage.” RSA 460:2-a (2018). A prenuptial agreement is
presumed valid unless the party seeking invalidation of the agreement proves
that: (1) the agreement was obtained through fraud, duress, or mistake or
through misrepresentation or nondisclosure of a material fact; (2) the
agreement is unconscionable; or (3) the facts or circumstances have so
changed since the agreement was executed as to make the agreement
unenforceable. In the Matter of Nizhnikov & Nizhnikov, 168 N.H. 525, 528
(2016). We will not disturb a trial court’s decision regarding the enforceability
of a prenuptial agreement “unless it is unsupported by the evidence or plainly
erroneous as a matter of law.” Id.

In this case, the trial court issued temporary orders “while the parties
conduct[ed] discovery” on the issue of whether their prenuptial agreement was
enforceable. The court observed that “[n]either party [had] provided any legal
authority on whether the court [was] bound by the terms of the prenuptial
agreement when issuing temporary orders.” The court further observed that
there was a large “disparity of wealth between the parties.” The court issued
its temporary orders “[w]ithout making any decisions on the validity and
enforceability of the prenuptial agreement.” In its final decree, however, the
Circuit Court (Lemire, J.), ruled that the parties’ prenuptial agreement is valid
and enforceable and incorporated the prenuptial agreement into the parties’
final divorce decree.

1 Wife initially appealed the final decree of divorce issued by the Circuit Court (Lemire, J.), but

subsequently withdrew her appeal. Accordingly, we ordered the case to proceed on Husband’s
cross-appeal of the temporary orders only.
 Husband acknowledges that his appellate issue — whether the trial court
erred as a matter of law by ruling that it was not required to enforce the
prenuptial agreement when issuing temporary orders — could be “technically
moot” because the court “eventually enforced the prenuptial agreement.” He
urges us to decide the issue nonetheless because it is “an important issue of
public policy” that is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”

“The doctrine of mootness is designed to avoid deciding issues that have
become academic or dead.” LeBaron v. Wight, 156 N.H. 583, 585 (2007)
(quotation omitted)). “[T]he question of mootness is not subject to rigid rules,
but is instead regarded as a question of convenience and discretion.” Id.
(quotation omitted). We decline to exercise our discretion to decide Husband’s
cross-appeal. Although “we agree that this issue may come before us again, we
are not persuaded that it will necessarily evade our review.” In the Matter of
Jones and Jones, 146 N.H. 119, 121 (2001). Accordingly, we dismiss the
cross-appeal.

Dismissed.

Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ., concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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