In the Matter of Satas & Crabtree-Satas

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THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

___________________________

2nd Circuit Court-Plymouth Family Division
Case No. 2021-0419
Citation: In the Matter of Satas & Crabtree-Satas, 2024 N.H. 4

IN THE MATTER OF ALDEN SATAS AND COURTNEY CRABTREE-SATAS

Argued: September 14, 2023
Opinion Issued: January 24, 2024

Schwartzberg Law, of Plymouth (John T. Katsirebas, Jr. on the brief and
orally), for the petitioner.

Normandin, Cheney & O’Neil, PLLC, of Laconia (William D. Woodbury on
the brief and orally), for the respondent.

HANTZ MARCONI, J.

¶1 The respondent, Courtney Crabtree-Satas, brings this interlocutory
appeal challenging orders of the Circuit Court (Boyle, J.) granting parenting
time with the respondent’s biological child to the petitioner, Alden Satas. We
vacate and remand.

¶2 We accept the statement of facts as presented in the interlocutory
appeal statement and rely upon the record for additional facts as necessary.
See In the Matter of Liquidation of Home Ins. Co., 175 N.H. 363, 364 (2022).
The petitioner and the respondent married in May 2012, when the respondent’s
biological child was approximately two and a half years old. The parties
separated in April 2016 and the petitioner filed for divorce in August of that
year. A final divorce decree issued in February 2017, along with a parenting
plan that referenced only a different child born to the parties during their
marriage and contained no provision regarding the respondent’s child (the
child). The petitioner never adopted the child, nor was he ever granted
guardianship of the child. No court orders regarding the petitioner’s alleged
parenting rights with respect to the child were issued during the parties’
marriage or divorce. Nevertheless, the child continued to reside with the
petitioner for some time after the divorce until discord between the parties
resulted in the child going to live with the respondent.

¶3 In December 2020, the petitioner filed a parenting petition seeking,
as the child’s stepfather, a parenting plan concerning the child. The
respondent moved to dismiss, arguing, among other things, that the petitioner
did not have standing to file a parenting petition because his status as the
child’s stepparent ended when the parties divorced. The petitioner filed an
objection, and, after addressing the matter at a temporary hearing, the trial
court issued two orders finding that the petitioner had standing to request
parenting rights and responsibilities and ordering parenting time with both
parties on a temporary basis.

¶4 The respondent filed a motion to, in relevant part, clarify and
reconsider, to which the petitioner objected. The court issued an order
granting in part, and denying in part, the respondent’s motion. As relevant to
this appeal, the court reaffirmed its finding that the petitioner had standing to
seek parental rights and responsibilities with respect to the child.

¶5 The respondent requested an interlocutory transfer of three
questions to this court, which the trial court approved. The questions
transferred on interlocutory appeal are as follows:

I. Did the trial court err when it found that [the petitioner] “is
the stepparent” of [the child], pursuant to RSA 461-A:6(V),
which allows for reasonable visitation privileges to a party
“who is a stepparent” if the same is in the best interests of the
children, given that the definition of stepparent cited by the
trial court specifies that a stepparent is “the spouse of one’s
. . . mother” and [the petitioner] and [the respondent] have
been divorced since 2017 and the [respondent] is now
remarried?

II. Did the Court err when it held that the [petitioner] had
standing to bring a petition for parenting rights and

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 responsibilities with respect to . . . [the respondent’s child]
from a prior relationship, by adopting Petitioner’s theory that
[he] “established the status of in loco parentis between himself
and [the child]” when the Parties divorced more than three
years and eight months prior to the [petitioner’s] petition, no
parenting order regarding [the child] was ever proposed or
pursued by either Party, and [the petitioner] ousted [the child]
from his home in May of 2020, nearly six months prior to the
filing of [the petitioner’s] petition?

III. Did the trial court violate the [respondent’s] Constitutional
rights under Part I, Article 2, of the New Hampshire
Constitution, as well as under the due process clause of the
14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, when it
held that the [petitioner] had standing to bring a petition for
parenting rights and responsibilities with respect to . . . [the
respondent’s child] from a prior relationship, by adopting
Petitioner’s theory that [he] “established the status of in loco
parentis between himself and [the child]” when the Parties
divorced more than three years and eight months prior to the
[petitioner’s] petition, no parenting order regarding [the child]
was ever proposed or pursued by either Party and [the
petitioner] ousted [the child] from his home in May of 2020,
nearly six months prior to the filing of [the petitioner’s]
petition?

We answer the first question in the affirmative and need not address the
second or third.

¶6 The first transferred question requires us to interpret RSA 461-A:6,
V, which provides:

If the court determines that it is in the best interest of the children,
it shall in its decree grant reasonable visitation privileges to a party
who is a stepparent of the children or to the grandparents of the
children pursuant to RSA 461-A:13. Nothing in this paragraph
shall be construed to prohibit or require an award of parental
rights and responsibilities to a stepparent or grandparent if the
court determines that such an award is in the best interest of the
child.

RSA 461-A:6, V (2018).

¶7 Statutory interpretation “presents a question of law subject to de
novo review.” In re J.P.S., 175 N.H. 621, 624 (2023) (quotation omitted). “We

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first look to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that
language according to its plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. (quotation omitted).
“We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider
what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did
not see fit to include.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Absent an ambiguity, we need
not look beyond the language of the statute to discern legislative intent.” Id.
(quotation omitted).

¶8 The respondent argues that the petitioner is not a stepparent for
purposes of RSA 461-A:6, V because the “statutory references to the rights of
non-parents refer to individuals who have a current stepparent relationship.”
We agree. Notably, the statute uses the present tense, referring to “a party who
is a stepparent.” RSA 461-A:6, V (emphasis added). Employing the definition
of stepparent as “[t]he spouse of one’s mother or father by a later marriage,”
Black’s Law Dictionary 1341 (11th ed. 2019), we conclude that a stepparent for
purposes of RSA 461-A:6, V must be the current spouse of the child’s mother
or father.

¶9 The petitioner nevertheless asserts that “[s]tepparent status is a
relationship, not a legal status that is extinguished upon divorce.” The
petitioner’s contention cannot stand, however, in light of Ruben v. Ruben, 123
N.H. 358 (1983), in which we observed that “the stepparent relationship ceases
upon dissolution of the marriage.” Ruben, 123 N.H. at 362. To the extent the
petitioner contends that Ruben is inapposite because it dealt with support
rather than parenting rights and responsibilities, we disagree. Ruben
concluded that “absent a valid adoption, a stepparent’s duty to support a
stepchild pursuant to RSA chapter 546-A ceases” upon divorce “because the
stepparent relationship ceases upon dissolution of the marriage.” Id. In other
words, termination of the stepparent relationship was the general proposition
upon which our narrower holding regarding the duty to support was based.
That general proposition is equally applicable here.

¶10 The petitioner further contends that this interpretation would lead
to an absurd result, contrary to our canons of statutory construction. See Doe
v. Attorney General, 175 N.H. 349, 352 (2022) (“We construe all parts of a
statute together to effectuate its overall purpose and avoid an absurd or unjust
result.”). He argues that if “stepparent status is terminated upon divorce, then
all awards made by the Court granting parenting rights and responsibilities to
stepparents . . . [would terminate] by the same stroke of the judicial officer’s
pen” that grants the divorce, and such stepparents “must be immediately
divested of all such rights and responsibilities the moment they become,
‘former stepparents.’”

¶11 We disagree that our interpretation compels the “absurd result”
posited by the petitioner. A party seeking stepparent visitation as part of a

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divorce would still be married to the other party during the proceedings, and,
thus, “is a stepparent” for purposes of RSA 461-A:6, V. Nothing in RSA 461-
A:6, V provides for the revocation of visitation privileges otherwise authorized
by that section upon issuance of the divorce and we will not add language that
the legislature did not see fit to include. In re J.P.S., 175 N.H. at 624. Our
interpretation merely precludes a former stepparent from petitioning for
visitation privileges after a divorce decree becomes final.

¶12 For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the petitioner is
not a stepparent for purposes of RSA 461-A:6, V because he was no longer
married to the respondent at the time that he filed his petition for visitation
privileges. The trial court erred in ruling to the contrary and, accordingly, we
answer the first transferred question affirmatively.

¶13 The second transferred question asks whether the trial court erred
in finding that the petitioner had standing to bring a petition for parenting
rights and responsibilities on a theory that he had established an in loco
parentis status with respect to the child. At oral argument, however, counsel
for the petitioner contended that both stepparent and in loco parentis status
were required and conceded that if the petitioner is not a stepparent, “[he’s]
out, [he’s] done.” Accordingly, because we conclude that the petitioner is not a
stepparent under RSA 461-A:6, V, we need not address the second transferred
question. Having concluded that the petitioner lacks standing, we vacate the
trial court’s order and remand with instructions to dismiss the petitioner’s
petition. See Carlson, Tr. v. Latvian Lutheran Exile Church of Boston and
Vicinity Patrons, 170 N.H. 299, 305 (2017). Having resolved this appeal on
statutory grounds, we need not answer the third transferred question.

Vacated and remanded.

MACDONALD, C.J., and BASSETT and DONOVAN, JJ., concurred.

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