Lise Mahoney & a. v. Samantha L. Anderson & a.

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2021-0271, Lise Mahoney & a. v. Samantha L.
Anderson & a., the court on October 18, 2022, issued the
following order:

Having considered the briefs of the parties and the record submitted on
appeal, the court concludes that a formal written opinion is unnecessary in
this case. The defendants, Beau McHugh and Samantha McHugh (formerly
Samantha Anderson), appeal orders of the Superior Court (St. Hilaire, J.),
which: (1) entered default against them on the complaint of the plaintiffs, Lise
and Peter Mahoney, to quiet title and for injunctive relief; (2) denied the
defendants’ motion to strike the default; (3) entered a final decree against them
based on their default; (4) dismissed their counterclaim following entry of the
final decree; and (5) denied their “Motion to Inform” the court of certain
conduct by the plaintiffs that they contended warranted entry of a restraining
order. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.

I. Facts

The following facts relate the content of documents in the appellate
record. The plaintiffs filed their complaint on December 4, 2020. The matter
was set for a January 7, 2021 hearing. On January 4, 2021, the defendants
filed a motion requesting additional time to answer the complaint. The
plaintiffs objected in part, but agreed to continue the January 7 hearing to
January 28 and to allow the defendants until February 27 to file their answer.
The trial court held a brief hearing on January 7 at which the defendants
explained that they intended to file a counterclaim but were having difficulty
doing so electronically. The trial court continued the matter until March 3 and
gave the defendants until February 27 to answer the complaint.

On February 25, rather than file an answer to the complaint, the
defendants filed a counterclaim to quiet title and for injunctive relief. On
March 1, the plaintiffs moved for default because the defendants had not filed
an answer to the complaint. The plaintiffs also moved to strike the defendants’
counterclaim because it had not been filed electronically.

The trial court held a hearing on the plaintiffs’ motions on March 3.
Regarding the plaintiffs’ motion for default, the defendants expressed confusion
about how to answer the complaint electronically and offered to answer it at
the hearing. They explained that they spoke “with the clerks in the court” and
“ask[ed] [the clerks] what [the defendants] needed to submit.” The defendants
said they “were unaware [they] needed [to file] anything other than the
counterclaim.” They further explained that they “thought the counterclaim was
the answer.”

The trial court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for default.1 The trial court
then denied the plaintiffs’ motion to strike the defendants’ counterclaim, ruling
that the failure to file it electronically was a “minor” defect that did not warrant
dismissal. In its narrative order, the court explained that the defendants
“substantially complied with the filing requirement and no prejudice has been
placed upon the plaintiff[s].”

On March 9, the plaintiffs filed a motion pursuant to Superior Court Rule
42(d) for entry of a final decree quieting title to the subject property in the
plaintiffs. On March 15, the defendants, with their newly retained counsel,
filed a motion to strike the default and a motion to treat their counterclaim as
an answer. Accompanying their motion were affidavits of defense and
documents setting forth the defendants’ specific responses to each factual
allegation contained in the plaintiffs’ complaint.

On March 25, the trial court granted the plaintiffs’ motion and denied the
defendants’ motions. In granting the plaintiffs’ motion, the trial court found
“that a sanction short of default would not be sufficient to remedy the
Defendants’ noncompliance” with Superior Court Rule 9 (governing responses
to complaints) and the court’s January 7, 2021 order. As a result of the
default, the court deemed the facts as alleged in the plaintiffs’ complaint to be
admitted, and based upon those facts, decreed that the plaintiffs own the
subject property in fee simple absolute, free and clear of any adverse claims by
the defendants or any other person. In denying the defendants’ motions, the
trial court stated that the counterclaim “did not answer the complaint” and
that the court “extended time for an answer,” but that the defendants had filed
a counterclaim instead.

The next day, March 26, the plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the
defendants’ counterclaim, asserting that the court’s final decree collaterally
estopped the defendants “from pursuing their counterclaims for quiet title and
injunctive relief.” The trial court granted this motion, over the defendants’
objection.

The defendants subsequently filed a “Motion to Inform,” asking the court
to “permanently enjoin” the plaintiffs from trespassing on the defendants’
property and from “contacting, stalking, or harassing” them. The court denied

1 In granting the plaintiffs’ motion, which was filed pursuant to Superior Court Rule 42(b), the

trial court erroneously characterized it as a motion requesting default judgment.

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the motion because of a separate action between the parties pending in the
circuit court. The defendants unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, and
this appeal followed.

II. Analysis

On appeal, the defendants first argue that the trial court erred by
finding them in default. We will uphold a trial court’s default ruling unless the
trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion or erred as a matter of law.
See Brito v. Ryan, 151 N.H. 635, 637 (2005); State v. Lambert, 147 N.H. 295,
296 (2001).

The defendants assert that they were not in default because their
counterclaim, filed on February 25, 2021, “met the criteria of Superior Court
Rule 9(a).” They contend that the trial court erred by failing to accept their
counterclaim “as an answer” to the plaintiffs’ complaint. The plaintiffs counter
that “the record clearly demonstrates that the Counterclaim was not, and was
not intended to be, an Answer.”

Superior Court Rule 9(a) requires that an answer “or other responsive
pleading . . . be filed with the court within 30 days” after a person is served
with the complaint. Super. Ct. R. 9(a). Rule 9(a) sets forth certain requisites
for an answer, including that it must state the defendants’ “defenses to each
claim asserted” and must “admit or deny the allegations upon which the
adverse party relies.” Id. Under Rule 9(a), “[t]he pleader may not generally
deny all the allegations” but must “make the denials as specific denials of
designated allegations or paragraphs.” Id. We agree with the plaintiffs that the
defendants’ counterclaim did not constitute an “answer” within the meaning of
Rule 9(a). It neither set forth the defendants’ “defenses to each claim asserted,”
nor admitted or denied all of the allegations upon which the plaintiffs relied.
Id. (emphasis added). Moreover, the defendants’ denials were not specific
denials of designated allegations or paragraphs. Id. Accordingly, we uphold
the trial court’s determination that the defendants were in default.

The defendants next argue that the trial court erred by denying their
motion to strike the default. We will not disturb a decision denying a motion to
vacate a default, unless the trial court erred as a matter of law or
unsustainably exercised its discretion. See Lakeview Homeowners Assoc. v.
Moulton Constr., 141 N.H. 789, 791 (1997).

Superior Court Rule 42 governs default and provides, in pertinent part:

When a party against whom a Complaint . . . has been filed fails
to timely Answer or otherwise defend, the party shall be defaulted.
No such default shall be stricken off, except by agreement, or by
order of the court upon such terms as justice may require. The

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 court shall strike the default only upon motion and affidavit of
defense, specifically setting forth the defense and the facts on
which the defense is based.

Super. Ct. R. 42(a). When considering whether a motion to strike a default
complies with Rule 42(a), we are mindful that, in this jurisdiction, “pleadings
are construed liberally.” In the Matter of St. Pierre & Thatcher, 172 N.H. 209,
217 (2019) (quotation omitted); see Whitaker v. L.A. Drew, Inc., 149 N.H. 55,
59 (2003) (noting “our emphasis on justice over procedural technicalities”).

Construing their motion to strike and attachments liberally, we conclude
that the defendants met the requirements of Rule 42(a). The record on appeal
establishes that the defendants filed their motion to strike and two affidavits of
defense with a document entitled, “Unified Document Incorporating Factual
Allegations From Plaintiffs’ Petition to Quiet Title Together with Defendants’
Responses.” (Capitalization omitted.) In that document, the defendants listed
the factual allegations in the plaintiffs’ complaint, their contrary view of those
allegations, and where in their counterclaim their counter allegations could be
found. For instance, in paragraph 10 of the complaint, the plaintiffs alleged
that the defendants owned certain real property “as tenants in common.” In
their “Unified Document,” the defendants responded that they own that
property as “joint tenants with rights of survivorship.” (Bolding omitted.)

Based upon this record, we conclude that the trial court erred as a
matter of law by denying the defendants’ motion to strike the default entered
against them. Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s denial of the defendants’
motion to strike the default. Because the trial court based its dismissal of the
defendants’ counterclaim upon its entry of a final decree following default, and
because we have vacated the court’s denial of the motion to strike the default,
we necessarily also vacate the final decree and the court’s dismissal of the
counterclaim.

Finally, the defendants argue that the trial court erred when it denied
their “Motion to Inform.” In that motion, the defendants referenced a
temporary order of protection against one of the plaintiffs, which had been
issued in a circuit court case between the parties. The trial court denied the
relief the defendants sought in their “Motion to Inform” because of the pending
circuit court matter. As the appealing parties, the defendants have the burden
of demonstrating reversible error. Gallo v. Traina, 166 N.H. 737, 740 (2014).
Based upon our review of the trial court’s margin order denying the defendants’
“Motion to Inform,” the defendants’ challenges to that order, the relevant law,
and the record submitted on appeal, we conclude that they have not
demonstrated reversible error. See id.

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III. Conclusion

In sum, we affirm the trial court’s determination that the defendants
were in default and its denial of their “Motion to Inform,” and vacate the court’s
denial of their motion to strike the default, its entry of the final decree, and its
dismissal of their counterclaim.

Affirmed in part; vacated in
part; and remanded.

MACDONALD, C.J., and HICKS, BASSETT, HANTZ MARCONI, and
DONOVAN, JJ., concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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