Thomas S. Wood & a. v. Town of Raymond

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2021-0142, Thomas S. Wood & a. v. Town of
Raymond, the court on March 16, 2022, issued the following
order:

Having considered the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, the court
concludes that a formal written opinion is unnecessary in this case. The
plaintiffs, Thomas S. Wood and Donna A. Wood, appeal an order of the
Superior Court (Honigberg, J.) dismissing their petition for declaratory
judgment against the defendant, Town of Raymond (Town), for failure to state a
claim. The court ruled that an “Agreement and Release” (Agreement) recorded
with the plaintiffs’ deed barred them from bringing their petition. We vacate
and remand.

I. Background

The following facts are taken from the plaintiffs’ petition, which we accept
as true. See Buckingham v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 142 N.H. 822, 825
(1998) (explaining that in reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, we assume the truth of the facts
alleged in the plaintiffs’ pleadings and construe all reasonable inferences in the
light most favorable to them). The plaintiffs live on Audette Road in Raymond
in a residence they purchased in July 1998. In October 2020, they brought a
petition for declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that Audette Road is a
Class V highway based on prescription, or express and/or implied dedication
and acceptance. The plaintiffs’ petition alleges that: Audette Road appears on
both the Town’s and the New Hampshire Department of Transportation’s maps
as a Class V highway; the Town allocates and spends town funds on the
maintenance and repair of Audette Road; the Town receives State funds for the
maintenance and repair of Audette Road as a Class V highway; the
maintenance and repair of Audette Road has been exclusively paid for by
public funds and performed by the Town from 1977 through June of 1990; and
from the 1980s to 2019, the Town “consistently performed year-round
maintenance of, repairs to, and/or improvements to Audette Road, particularly
with regard to plowing snow, applying sand and/or salt, culvert maintenance
and replacement, surface runoff water draining matters, grading, clearing of
downed trees, repair of potholes, and the like.”

The Town moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, asserting that the
Agreement “constitutes an absolute extinguishment of any cause of action
related to maintenance of Audette Road or the status of Audette Road.” The
trial court agreed, determining that the plaintiffs “are bound by the terms” of
the Agreement and “are barred from bringing a claim that is contrary to that
agreement.” Accordingly, the court granted the Town’s motion and dismissed
the case. The trial court subsequently denied the plaintiffs’ motion for
reconsideration. This appeal followed.

II. Analysis

On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred as a matter of
law by dismissing their case based on the Agreement. The interpretation of a
written agreement is a question of law which we review de novo. Gen. Linen
Servs. v. Franconia Inv. Assocs., 150 N.H. 595, 597 (2004). When interpreting
a written agreement, we give the language used by the parties its reasonable
meaning, considering the circumstances and context in which the agreement
was negotiated, when reading the document as a whole. Id. Absent ambiguity,
the parties’ intent will be determined from the plain meaning of the language
used. Id.

The Agreement was originally entered into in June 1988 between Flora
Audette, the plaintiffs’ predecessor in title, and the Town. At that time, Flora
sought a building permit to construct a residence on land she owned on
Audette Road. The Agreement identified Audette Road as “a private road.” The
Town agreed that it would “issue a building permit for the construction of a
single family residence” on the property but that it “neither assume[d]
responsibility for maintenance, including snow plowing, nor liability for any
damages resulting from the use of Audette Road.” Flora agreed “on behalf of
herself, her heirs, legal representatives, successors and assigns,” that she
“shall be responsible for maintaining access to the subject property” and
“forever release[ed] and discharge[ed] the TOWN . . . from the obligation of
maintaining Audette Road.”

The Town argues that, because Audette Road was deemed a private road,
the Agreement was “explicitly required by RSA 674:41.” We note, however, that
the version of RSA 674:41 in effect in 1988 only required such agreements to
construct a building on a “class VI highway.” RSA 674:41, I(c) (1986). It was
not until 2002 that the statute also required such agreements to construct a
building on a “private road.” RSA 674:41, I(d) (Supp. 2002).

Nonetheless, we disagree with the Town that the language in the
Agreement bars the plaintiffs “from now claiming that Audette Road is not a
private road but a Town-owned road.” The plain language of the Agreement
releases the Town from maintaining a private road. However, there is no
language in the Agreement that precludes the plaintiffs’ claim that, due to the
actions of the Town over the subsequent decades, the status of Audette Road
has changed. Thus, we conclude that the trial court erred, as a matter of law,

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in dismissing the plaintiffs’ petition for declaratory judgment on grounds that
the Agreement bars the plaintiffs’ action. We express no opinion on the merits
of the plaintiffs’ petition in the first instance. Accordingly, we remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Vacated and remanded.

MACDONALD, C.J., and HICKS, BASSETT, HANTZ MARCONI, and
DONOVAN, JJ., concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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