In the Matter of Jennifer Juri and Michael Juri

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2021-0008, In the Matter of Jennifer Juri and
Michael Juri, the court on October 12, 2021, issued the
following order:

Having considered the briefs and record submitted on appeal, we conclude
that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1). The
petitioner, Jennifer Juri (wife), appeals a final decree issued by the Circuit Court
(Boyle, J.), following a hearing, in her divorce from the respondent, Michael Juri
(husband). On appeal, the wife challenges the trial court’s decision to adopt a
parenting plan that provides the husband with certain unsupervised parenting
time of their son. We affirm.

In determining parental rights and responsibilities, the trial court is guided
by the best interest of the child, and is afforded wide discretion. See RSA 461-
A:2, :6 (2018 & Supp. 2020). Accordingly, “[w]hen reviewing a trial court’s
decision on parenting rights and responsibilities, our role is limited to
determining whether it clearly appears that the trial court engaged in an
unsustainable exercise of discretion.” In the Matter of Kurowski & Kurowski,
161 N.H. 578, 585 (2011). “We consider only whether the record establishes an
objective basis sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made, and we will
not disturb the trial court’s determination if it could reasonably have been made.”
Id. (quotation omitted). “The trial court’s discretion necessarily extends to
matters such as assigning weight to evidence and assessing the credibility and
demeanor of witnesses.” Id. “Conflicts in the testimony, questions about the
credibility of witnesses, and the weight assigned to testimony are matters for the
trial court to resolve.” Id. “Indeed, resolution of the best interests of a child
depends to a large extent upon the firsthand assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, and the findings of the trial court are binding upon this court if
supported by the evidence.” Id. “To the extent an appealing party argues that
the trial court committed error involving questions of law, we review such issues
de novo.” Id.

We first consider the wife’s argument that, in adopting the parenting plan,
the trial court erred by finding that she suffered from an addiction to marijuana.
She contends that, because this finding is not supported by evidence in the
record, the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion by considering it.
We disagree.

Contrary to the wife’s argument, the trial court did not find that she
suffered from an “addiction” to marijuana. Rather, the trial court found that she
“has substance abuse issues of her own,” and that she “uses marijuana.” This
finding is consistent with the wife’s testimony, in which she stated that she uses
marijuana, that she “will have some in the evening to unwind sometimes,” that
she does so while her son is asleep in the home, and that she “see[s] no problem
with that.” She also acknowledged that she had used cocaine when she was
younger, but has not done so since.

Although the wife also argues that the trial court erred because it
“rebuked” only her for using marijuana, and “overlooked” the husband’s
substance abuse, the record demonstrates that this was not the case. Indeed,
the bulk of the hearing was devoted to issues related to the husband’s substance
abuse, and, in its narrative order, the trial court recognized that those issues are
central to the dispute. Moreover, at the hearing, and again in its narrative order,
the trial court admonished both parties — not only the wife — for their substance
abuse:

As was mentioned by the Court near the end of the Hearing, the
Court has concerns about both parents’ habits with regard to
drinking, using marijuana, and smoking cigarettes in front of or near
[the child]. These habits are unhealthy for the parents and non-
conducive to a healthy living environment for [the child]. The Court
will not order it now, but each parent should seek some counseling
for their respective issues. Otherwise, as [husband’s counsel]
suggested, Ex Parte or Contempt Hearings could be in their futures,
and possibly, [New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and
Families] issues or even criminal charges.

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it found that the
wife “has substance abuse issues of her own,” nor when it considered both
parties’ substance abuse issues in adopting the parenting plan. See RSA 461-
A:6, I(m) (providing that, when determining parental rights and responsibilities,
courts may consider any factor deemed relevant).

Next, we consider the wife’s argument that the trial court unsustainably
exercised its discretion by adopting a parenting plan that provided for “an equal
parenting schedule,” without “safeguards for the child’s [well-being] while in the
care of an individual with a documented history of alcohol abuse.” She contends
that the plan “does not so much as prohibit [the husband] from consuming
alcohol while the child is in his care.” We disagree.

The wife’s arguments notwithstanding, the trial court did not order equal
parenting time, and did provide safeguards in order to protect the child’s well-
being. With respect to parenting time, the plan provides that the husband has
parenting time “every Tuesday and Thursday evening from 5:00 PM to 7:00 PM,”
with “the option of having overnight parenting time from 5:00 PM until the
beginning of school[,] provided he gives [the wife] 24 hours’ notice that he is going

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to be exercising overnight parenting time.” The plan also provides that the
husband has parenting time “every other weekend from 8:00 AM on Saturday
until 5:00 PM on Sunday.” Although the parenting plan provides for
approximately equal parenting time during holidays and vacations, it is clear, as
a general matter, that the wife was awarded the majority of the parenting time.
With respect to safeguards, the parenting plan contains an order that “[n]either
parent shall permit the child[] to be subjected to persons abusing alcohol or
using illegal drugs,” which “includes the abuse of alcohol or illegal drugs by the
parent.” Further, the plan also contains an order that “[n]either parent shall
excessively consume alcohol or consume illicit drugs, including marijuana.”

Although the wife proposed placing numerous additional conditions upon
the husband’s entitlement to, and exercise of, his parenting time — many of
which would have vested her with considerable authority and discretion — the
trial court was not obligated to adopt those conditions. As explained above, the
trial court is afforded wide discretion in developing a parenting plan that is in the
child’s best interest. See RSA 461-A:2, :6; Kurowski, 161 N.H. at 585. Moreover,
in so doing, the court’s discretion “necessarily extends to matters such as
assigning weight to evidence and assessing the credibility and demeanor of
witnesses.” Kurowski, 161 N.H. at 585. In this case, the trial court may well
have credited the husband’s testimony that he has moderated his drinking, that
he is capable of abstaining during his parenting time, and that the parties need
finality in the form of a set parenting schedule and established boundaries. Cf.
In re J.H., 171 N.H. 40, 51 (2018) (observing that “parents are presumed fit until
they are found to be abusive, neglectful, or otherwise unfit to perform their
parental duties”).

In any event, the trial court observed that it “has no doubt that both
parents love [the child] and vice-versa,” and found that “it will be in [the child’s]
best interest to enjoy as much parenting time as possible with each of his
parents.” This finding is not only supported by the evidence, but it is also
consistent with the principle, codified in RSA chapter 461-A, that “children do
best when both parents have a stable and meaningful involvement in their lives.”
RSA 461-A:2, I. Indeed, the stated policy underlying RSA chapter 461-A is to,
among other things, “[s]upport frequent and continuing contact between each
child and both parents,” and “[e]ncourage parents to share in the rights and
responsibilities of raising their children after the parents have separated or
divorced.” Id. at I(a), (b).

Accordingly, based upon our review of the record, and for the reasons set
forth above, we conclude that the trial court did not unsustainably exercise its

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discretion in making the disputed factual findings, and in adopting the parenting
plan. See Kurowski, 161 N.H. at 585.

Affirmed.

MacDonald, C.J., and Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ.,
concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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