In re S.A. & a.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as well
as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports. Readers are
requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, One Charles
Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any editorial errors in order that
corrections may be made before the opinion goes to press. Errors may be
reported by e-mail at the following address: reporter@courts.state.nh.us.
Opinions are available on the Internet by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of their
release. The direct address of the court’s home page is:
http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme.

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

___________________________

1st Circuit-Berlin Family Division
Nos. 2020-0528
2020-0546
2020-0548

IN RE S.A. & a.

Argued: May 12, 2021
Opinion Issued: June 18, 2021

Office of the Attorney General, (Laura E. B. Lombardi, senior assistant
attorney general, on the memorandum of law and orally), for the New
Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families.

Maureen Soraghan, of Glen, on the brief and orally, for the mother.

Jorel V. Booker, of Dover, on the brief and orally, for the father of S.A.

The Young Law Firm, of Conway (Robert Young on the brief and orally),
for the father of A.G.

HANTZ MARCONI, J. In these consolidated appeals, the mother of S.A.,
B.T., and A.G., the father of A.G., and the father of S.A. appeal an order of the
Circuit Court (Greenhalgh, J.) terminating their parental rights over their
children because they each failed to correct the conditions that led to a finding
of neglect within twelve months of that finding. See RSA 170-C:5, III (2014).
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Before the trial court may terminate a parent’s rights on the petition of
the New Hampshire Division for Children, Youth and Families (DCYF), DCYF
must prove a statutory ground for terminating parental rights beyond a
reasonable doubt. In re Juvenile 2006-674, 156 N.H. 1, 4 (2007); RSA 170-
C:10 (Supp. 2020). One such ground is the parent’s failure, “subsequent to a
finding of child neglect . . . under RSA 169-C, . . . to correct the conditions
leading to [the] finding within 12 months of the finding despite reasonable
efforts under the direction of the [circuit] court to rectify the conditions.” RSA
170-C:5, III; see RSA 490-D:2, IX (2010) (granting judicial branch family
division jurisdiction to terminate parental rights); RSA 490-F:3 (Supp. 2020)
(granting circuit court jurisdiction conferred upon former judicial branch family
division and former district courts). Whether a parent has complied with
dispositional orders in a neglect case is a non-dispositive factor that the trial
court may consider in determining whether the parent has corrected the
conditions of neglect. In re Haley K., 163 N.H. 247, 251 (2012).

In assessing the State’s efforts to assist the parent in rectifying the
conditions, the trial court must consider whether the services provided have
been accessible, available, and appropriate. In re Juvenile 2006-833, 156 N.H.
482, 486 (2007). “However, we have recognized that the State’s ability to
provide adequate services is constrained by its staff and financial limitations.”
In re Michael E., 162 N.H. 520, 524 (2011). “Thus, the State must put forth
reasonable efforts given its available staff and financial resources to maintain
the legal bond between parent and child.” Id. (quotation omitted). “The word
reasonable is the linchpin on which [DCYF’s] efforts in a particular set of
circumstances are to be adjudged.” Id. at 524-25 (quotation omitted). DCYF’s
role in neglect cases is not to assume the full weight of the parent’s
responsibilities, but to provide the parent assistance to deal with and correct
problems. Id. at 525. “Reasonable efforts means doing everything reasonable,
not everything possible.” Juvenile 2006-833, 156 N.H. at 487 (quotation
omitted).

Once a statutory ground for termination of parental rights is established,
the court must then consider whether termination, or some alternative
dispositional order, is in the child’s best interest. In re Sophia-Marie H., 165
N.H. 332, 336 (2013). The dominant consideration is the welfare of the child,
which prevails over the interests of the parent. In re Adam R., 159 N.H. 788,
792 (2010).

We will not disturb the trial court’s findings unless they are unsupported
by the evidence or plainly erroneous as a matter of law. In re Zachary G., 159
N.H. 146, 153 (2009). In reviewing its findings, we are mindful that the trial
court “is in the best position to assess and weigh the evidence before it,” and

2
that “our task is not to determine whether we would have found differently[,]
. . . [but] whether a reasonable person could have found as the trial judge did.”
In re Juvenile 2005-426, 154 N.H. 336, 339 (2006).

I. Mother’s Appeal

A. Facts

The following facts relating specifically to the mother either were found
by the trial court or reflect the content of documents in the record. The
abuse/neglect proceedings related to S.A. and B.T. began in May 2018; the
abuse/neglect proceedings related to A.G began in August 2018. The
proceedings related to S.A. and B.T were separate from those related to A.G.
until the permanency hearing, when the proceedings were combined.

1. S.A. and B.T. – Pre-Permanency

On May 30, 2018, the trial court issued an ex parte order finding
reasonable cause to believe that S.A. and B.T. were in imminent danger
because they lived in unsanitary conditions, were at risk of losing their
housing, were without adequate nutrition and supervision, and had been
inappropriately and violently disciplined. That same day, DCYF brought a
petition for abuse/neglect against the mother. S.A. and B.T. were removed
from the mother’s home on May 31. On June 27, the court issued a consent
order, reviewing and approving the mother’s consent to a finding that she
neglected S.A. and B.T. because she had failed to “provide the proper parental
care and control . . . necessary for [their] physical, mental, or emotional
health.”

The court held a dispositional hearing on July 30, ruling that the
children would not be returned to the mother’s home because, at that time, she
was homeless and was “unable to provide for her children’s safety.” The court
ruled that the mother needed “to obtain appropriate housing,” become
employed if she were physically and mentally able to do so and to obtain
available benefits if she were unable to work, protect the children “from
excessive physical discipline,” adequately supervise them, “learn appropriate
non-violent discipline,” and “address her own unmet mental health needs.” To
address these problems, the mother was ordered to, among other things,
“obtain appropriate housing and an adequate income to support herself and
[her] children,” “meaningfully participate in mental health counseling,” and
“learn adequate parenting skills.” The mother was also ordered to “follow the
DCYF case plan and comply with all orders of the court.” To help the mother
achieve these goals, DCYF was ordered to provide the mother with “case
monitoring and management, individual and/or family counseling, referrals to

3
appropriate community services . . . , ancillary services (transportation
assistance, parent aide, facilitated visitation, . . .) as available and deemed
necessary by DCYF.”

At the three-month review hearing in October 2018, the mother was
found to have partially complied with the dispositional orders in that she had
moved into an apartment, had begun to cooperate with DCYF, attended and
prepared for visits with the children, was scheduled to undergo a psychological
evaluation, and had completed a 10-hour parenting training. However, DCYF
reported that the mother was not fully engaged with S.A., had an
“inappropriate idea of what is an age appropriate behavior,” and was
inconsistent in her phone communication with the children. As a result, the
court continued the children’s placement outside of the home.

In November 2018, the mother’s husband was joined as a party to the
abuse/neglect proceeding. At the six-month review hearing in February 2019,
the mother again was found to be in partial compliance with the dispositional
orders. The court found that, at the monthly home visits during the review
period, the mother’s home was observed “to be in disarray and dirty.” The
court further found that the mother’s visits with S.A. had been suspended as
recommended by medical and mental health providers. The mother’s visits
with S.A. resumed as of March 2019.

At the nine-month review hearing in May 2019, the mother was again
found to be in only partial compliance with the dispositional orders. DCYF
reported that the mother’s home was observed to be “increasingly deplorable
and nearly uninhabitable.” The court found that the mother did not
consistently cooperate with DCYF or service providers, was not participating in
parenting classes, and only attended counseling sporadically. In March 2019,
the mother reportedly told a DCYF caseworker that she “just took the parenting
class . . . to get [DCYF] off [her] back.” The court also found that she continued
to demonstrate “poor decision-making” as it related to the children.

The facilitated visits of the mother’s husband were suspended in April
2019 due to his ongoing emotional dysregulation, inappropriate behaviors,
threats, and involvement in a domestic violence incident with the mother. In
July 2019, a DCYF caseworker met with the mother’s husband so that he
could sign releases. He appeared emotionally dysregulated. His fists were
clenched and shaking, and his attorney had to intervene.

The court held a pre-permanency hearing in August 2019, at which the
court found that the mother remained in partial compliance with the
dispositional orders, having failed to consistently participate in counseling and
maintain an appropriate home environment for the children. The court found
that the mother was not consistently addressing her mental health issues and
that she lived with her husband, who also did not address his own mental

4
health issues. As a result, the court determined that the mother had “not yet
demonstrated that she [could] provide a safe and sanitary home environment
free from exposure to mentally unstable individuals.”

2. A.G. – Pre-Permanency

In May 2018, the trial court granted A.G.’s father sole residential
responsibility for the child and allowed the mother to have supervised visitation
with the child without her husband present. At the end of July 2018, a local
police department received a report that the mother and her husband had
unsupervised parenting time with A.G. On August 3, 2018, the mother
informed DCYF that the child had been staying with her and her husband.
That day, the trial court issued an ex parte order finding that, in leaving the
child with the mother, A.G.’s father had impermissibly allowed the mother to
have unsupervised time with A.G., which was contrary to the prior court order,
and that the mother had impermissibly allowed the child to be with her
husband. The court further found that because the mother had “failed to
protect her children from excessive, sometimes violent, physical discipline
inflicted by her husband,” and because she was homeless, there was
reasonable cause to believe that A.G. was in imminent danger if left in the care
of the mother. A.G. was then placed in an out-of-home placement.

A petition for abuse/neglect was brought against the mother on August
7, 2018. On September 18, 2018, the court found that the mother neglected
the child because of her “inability or unwillingness to protect her child from
[her husband’s] excessive, sometimes violent, physical discipline; inability or
unwillingness to provide adequate supervision and appropriate non-violent
discipline and a safe, sanitary stable home,” which “place[d] [A.G.]’s life, health
and welfare at risk of serious impairment.”

Following a dispositional hearing in October 2018, the court ordered the
mother to “participate in a psychological evaluation and consistently follow the
recommendations of the evaluator,” “maintain a home that is safe and
sanitary,” and “follow the DCYF case plan and work cooperatively with her
[caseworker] as well as her individual therapist, psychological evaluator, [and]
service providers.” To assist the mother, DCYF was ordered to provide her with
“case monitoring and management, individual and/or family counseling, drug
testing, referrals to appropriate community services, and ancillary services
(transportation assistance, parent aide, intensive in-home or other . . . services)
as available and deemed necessary by DCYF.”

At the three-month review hearing in February 2019, the mother was
found to be in partial compliance with the dispositional orders because she had
moved into an apartment and worked cooperatively with DCYF and service
providers. However, the mother’s home was observed to be “in disarray and
dirty,” and the parent educator expressed concerns about her visits with A.G.

5
As of the three-month review hearing, the mother had been evaluated by a
psychologist and was participating in individual therapy to address “her
emotions and other mental health needs.”

At the six-month review hearing in May 2019, the mother was again
found in partial compliance with the dispositional orders. During this review
time, her home was observed to be in “increasingly deplorable and nearly
uninhabitable” condition. The trial court found that the mother did not
consistently cooperate with DCYF and service providers, had not participated
in parenting classes, and attended counseling only sporadically. The trial
court further found that on April 30, 2019, the mother and her husband were
involved in a domestic dispute in which he threw a container of soda, in anger,
in the direction of her and their baby; this child is not the subject of this
appeal. At the nine-month review hearing in August 2019, the mother
remained in partial compliance with the dispositional orders.

3. Permanency and Termination As To All Three Children

The court held a permanency hearing regarding S.A., B.T., and A.G. in
November 2019. The court found that the mother was still only partially
compliant with the dispositional orders. Although the mother participated in
DCYF-facilitated visits, she had attended only one counseling session, failed to
participate in ongoing formal parent education as recommended, and
continued to struggle to maintain a clean home and supervise her children.
During one visit, a caseworker had to bring to the mother’s attention that A.G.,
who was then two years old, “was in the process of walking out the front door
onto a second story porch.” The trial court ordered DCYF to file a petition to
terminate the mother’s parental rights.

In its supplemental order issued after the permanency hearing, the court
declined to order a 90-day extension of the proceedings. The court reiterated
that the mother had never been in more than partial compliance with the
dispositional orders. The court further found that the mother was not fully
attentive to the children when visiting with them and that she needed
“continuous reminders to stay off her phone” during the visits. Although the
mother contended that DCYF failed to provide her reasonable services, the
court found, “to the contrary, a myriad of services were in place throughout the
case to assist [her] with addressing and completing the Case Plan.” Those
services included “months of services from the Family Resource Center staff,
modeling and directly educating her [with] regard to safety.” The court
acknowledged that the mother loves her children very much, but concluded
that she consistently prioritizes her own needs over their needs.

The hearing on the petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights was
held over two days in October 2020. Based upon the evidence at the hearing,
the trial court found that the mother had been “successful in some areas” of

6
her case plan, but had never been “able to sustain her progress” in
“maintaining a safe and clean home” or in consistently caring for her children
during visits. The court found that the mother never progressed to
unsupervised visits, despite receiving services including case management,
“supervised visitation, parenting instruction, counseling and a psychological
evaluation.” The court found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the mother
failed to correct the conditions that led to the neglect finding within twelve
months of that finding, despite DCYF’s reasonable efforts, under the court’s
direction. The court further found that terminating the mother’s parental
rights is in the best interest of all three children.

B. Reasonable Efforts

The mother first argues that the evidence was insufficient for the trial
court to have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that DCYF made reasonable
efforts to reunify her with her children. As noted above, the trial court found
that the mother had “a significant number of services to assist her in meeting
her case plan goals,” and the record supports its finding. Based upon our
review of the record, we conclude that the trial court reasonably could have
found that DCYF’s efforts were reasonable. See Zachary G., 159 N.H. at 153.

C. Best Interest

The mother next asserts that terminating her parental rights was not in
her children’s best interest. However, the record supports the trial court’s
determination to the contrary. As the trial court correctly observed, according
to the guardian ad litem (GAL) appointed for the children, the mother “lacks
insight regarding why [her] children were removed from her care and fails to
comprehend the needs of the children for a consistently safe and healthy
environment.” The GAL reported that the mother “minimizes or dismisses or
fails to grasp the concerns that led to the removal of her children.” The GAL
also reported that the mother “has been unable or unwilling to consistently
maintain the small apartment where she lives in a sustained clean and
organized state to make it safe and healthy for children to live there.” The
mother’s home “smelled of urine, smoke, feces and mold, has been cluttered
with piles of belongings and trash (attracting cockroaches).” Before police
removed the mother’s dog, the mother left the dog “crated in the kitchen,
malnourished and urinating on the kitchen floor.” “She also had a rabbit that
was permitted to run around the apartment uncaged,” which would defecate on
the floor. The GAL stated that the mother “appeared to place her own need to
keep . . . animals above the needs of the children to have a sanitary and safe
place to live and play.”

Additionally, as the trial court noted, the GAL opined that the mother
had not demonstrated that she was capable of providing for her children’s
needs. The GAL reported that, during visits with the children, the mother was

7
not fully engaged with them and “needed constant reminders to pay attention
to where the children were and what they were doing.” According to the GAL,
during visits, the mother discussed “inappropriate adult matters with the
children and [made] them promises that she [cannot] keep.” The mother
“appeared to be more focused on herself than the children when she spent time
with them.”

In addition, the GAL reported that the mother had demonstrated “very
little understanding” of her children’s need for safety by, for example, leaving
an electric razor in A.G.’s reach and refusing to move it when advised to do so,
allowing A.G. and B.T. to be out of her sight and near a road, and allowing the
dog to defecate on the kitchen floor where she fed the children because there
was no table for them.

At the termination of parental rights hearing, the caseworker opined that
terminating the mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interest. The
caseworker testified that S.A. was living in a “loving, consistent home” that was
“clean” and peaceful. The caseworker testified that B.T. was also in a “loving,
stable,” and “clean” home and that B.T. had a “wonderful bond” with the foster
mother. As to A.G., the caseworker testified that A.G., too, was in a “stable
home, a loving home, consistent home, protected and guarded home,” where
A.G.’s needs are being met. On the record before it, we cannot say that the
trial court erred by concluding that terminating the mother’s parental rights is
in the children’s best interest. See In re Sophia-Marie H., 165 N.H. at 338-39.

II. Appeal of the Father of S.A.

A. Facts

The father is incarcerated in Florida. According to DCYF, he has been
incarcerated since 2013, when S.A. was approximately two years old. The
father will not be eligible for release until 2038, when S.A. will be twenty-seven
years old. On June 27, 2018, the father was adjudicated to have neglected S.A.
because he “failed to provide proper parental care and control over [the child],”
having left the child in the mother’s care where the child was neglected. In its
order issued after the July 2018 dispositional hearing, the court stated that the
child was in need of “a safe, sanitary and stable home,” “adequate supervision,”
“appropriate non-violent discipline,” and protection “from excessive physical
discipline.” To correct the conditions that led to the neglect finding, the father
needed “to provide a safe and stable home” for the child and “to follow through
with his incarceration/probation requirements.” The father also had to follow
the DCYF case plan. DCYF was not ordered to provide any services to the
father, but was ordered to provide services to the child and to the mother.

8
 At the three-month review hearing held in October 2018, the father was
found not to be in compliance with the dispositional orders. At that time, he
remained incarcerated and had “made no effort to demonstrate any progress on
the Dispositional Orders or case plan.” The court found that DCYF had sent
letters to the father along with a social study form for him to complete, but that
he had “not yet returned the social study” or “provided any evidence of
participating in any parenting skill programs, behavior modification groups, or
any other training which may prepare him for parenting responsibilities and
life outside incarceration.” The court also found that the father had not
provided DCYF “with any information regarding his dates of incarceration or
release date.” The court determined that an out-of-home placement remained
required for S.A. because it was “not possible . . . for [the father] to provide a
safe and stable home for the [child].”

The father was also found not to be in compliance with the dispositional
orders at the six-month review hearing held in February 2019, because he
remained incarcerated in a Florida prison with a release date in 2038 and had
yet to provide “any evidence of participating in any parenting skill programs,
behavior modification groups, or any other training.” The trial court noted that
the father had mailed “a number of letters and cards” to the DCYF caseworker
to give to the child, but that the correspondence had “been set aside to be
provided to [the child] if and when it is recommended by [the child’s]
medical/mental health providers.” Based upon the evidence at the hearing, the
trial court found that the child’s continued placement outside the home was
necessary because the father will remain incarcerated until August 31, 2038,
had made no effort to demonstrate any progress on the dispositional orders or
case plan, and because it was not possible for him to provide the child with a
safe and stable home.

However, at the nine-month review hearing held in May 2019, the father
was found to be in partial compliance with the dispositional orders because he
had provided proof that he obtained his high school diploma and had
completed several correspondence classes through the “Set Free Prison
Ministries.” In addition, the father identified his sister as a potential placement
for the child. The court ordered that a home study “be conducted and
approved pursuant to the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children.”
The court ordered DCYF to “continue to provide the father . . . with updates
and the opportunity to avail himself of case monitoring and management, and
other services as available and deemed necessary by DCYF.”

The father’s sister was willing to act as a placement for the child. At
DCYF’s request, Florida authorities conducted a home study of the sister’s
home and found it to be acceptable. However, S.A. was not placed with the
father’s sister, but was, instead placed with the mother’s sister.

9
 At the pre-permanency hearing in August 2019, the court found that
DCYF had regularly provided the father with updates and information, and that
the father, who remained incarcerated, had “not been able to exhibit stable
housing or any measure of appropriate parenting skills outside of
incarceration.” The court found him in partial compliance with the
outstanding dispositional orders. DCYF was ordered to continue to provide the
father “with updates and the opportunity to avail himself of case monitoring
and management,” and any other services “as available and deemed necessary
by DCYF.”

The trial court held a permanency hearing in November 2019. In its
supplemental order issued thereafter, the trial court ordered DCYF to petition
to terminate the father’s parental rights finding that, although the father had
corresponded with DCYF consistently during the case, he had been “unable to
demonstrate that [the child] will not be endangered in the manner adjudicated
[in] the initial petition, if returned home to [him].” Accordingly, DCYF brought
a petition to terminate the father’s rights with respect to S.A. under RSA 170-
C:5, III.

In its narrative order issued after the October 2020 termination hearing,
the court credited testimony by the DCYF caseworker that the father’s “ability
to comply with the case plan” was “very limited by his long term incarceration.”
The trial court also credited the caseworker’s testimony that “he had not been
clear about what parental education he expected [the father] to acquire while in
prison,” that the father “had taken what educational courses were available to
him,” and that the father had done “all he could do to foster a relationship
with” the child.

Nonetheless, the trial court terminated the father’s parental rights,
finding that, although the father had “done what he could[] while in prison to
comply with the case plan” and had kept in contact with DCYF, “his efforts did
not lead to a correction of the conditions that led to [S.A.’s] neglect.” The court
also found that terminating the father’s parental rights is in the child’s best
interest, observing that he will not be released from prison until S.A. is an
adult, S.A. and he have no bond, and S.A. appeared “to be settled in a loving
stable home” with the maternal aunt.

On appeal, the father argues that the trial court erred by finding that he
failed to correct the conditions that led to the neglect finding. We agree.

We find Haley K. instructive, which, like this case, involved an
incarcerated parent whose parental rights were terminated pursuant to RSA
170-C:5, III on the ground that the parent had failed to correct the conditions
that led to the neglect finding. Haley K., 163 N.H. at 248-49. In Haley K., we
upheld the trial court’s finding that the incarcerated father had failed to correct
the conditions that led to the original neglect finding because he “failed to

10
make adequate provisions for his child’s care and support during his
incarceration.” Id. at 252. As we observed, “At the end of twelve months [he]
remained incarcerated, and Haley remained in foster care because there was
no other option for her placement.” Id. at 251. We explained, “Much like a
military parent who is deployed overseas, the [father’s] physical unavailability
did not absolve him of his parental obligation to provide for the care of his
child.” Id. at 252.

In contrast to Haley K.’s father, who “failed to make adequate provisions
for her care and support during his incarceration,” id., by the time of the nine-
month review hearing, S.A.’s father made those provisions by identifying a
suitable relative placement for S.A. While his incarceration was the result of
his own doing and contributed to S.A. being without proper parental care and
support, see id., S.A.’s father, unlike Haley K.’s father, provided his child with
an option for permanency during his incarceration within the statutorily-
mandated twelve-month period in which to correct the conditions that led to
the neglect finding. See RSA 170-C:5, III; RSA 169-C:24-b, II(b) (2014)
(providing that “[g]uardianship with a fit and willing relative” is an option for
permanency). Under these circumstances, we hold that the trial court erred by
finding that the father failed to correct the conditions that led to the neglect
finding within twelve months of that finding. See RSA 170-C:5, III. We,
therefore, reverse the trial court’s termination of the father’s parental rights.1

III. Appeal of the Father of A.G.

A. Facts

On August 7, 2018, DCYF brought a petition for abuse/neglect against
A.G.’s father. The trial court held an adjudicatory hearing on September 18,
2018, and found that the father had neglected A.G. because his “inability or
unwillingness to assure that his [child] is properly supervised and [has] a safe,
sanitary stable home places [A.G.’s] life, health and welfare at risk of serious
impairment.”

The dispositional hearing was held in October 2018. The trial court
found that the father needed “to establish an attachment/bond with his [child]
. . . so that he will be able to consistently care for [the child] and meet [the
child’s needs for] safety, stability and overall well-being.” The court ordered the
father “to participate in mental health counseling in a meaningful way so as to
gain skills to foster bonding” with his child, “follow recommendations made by
his therapist,” “maintain consistent contact[] and cooperate[] with his
[caseworker],” “sign requested releases of information,” “follow the DCYF Case

1 The father also argues that his “incarceration alone” may not form the basis for the termination

of his rights. This petition, however, was brought pursuant to Section III, not Section VI, where
that condition applies. Compare RSA 170-C:5, III with RSA 170-C:5, VI.

11
Plan,” and “comply with all court orders.” To assist the father, DCYF was
ordered to provide “case monitoring and management, individual and/or family
counseling, drug testing, referrals to appropriate community services, and
ancillary services (transportation assistance, parent aide, intensive in-home or
other . . . services, . . . ) as available and deemed necessary by DCYF.”

By the time of the three-month review hearing in February 2019, the
whereabouts of A.G.’s father were unknown to DCYF, although DCYF had
“reason to believe he [might] have relocated to Florida.” DCYF reported that it
had received no communication from the father since September 2018. DCYF
further reported that the father had “made no effort to comply with the DCYF
case plan.” The father had not completed the court-ordered social study or
otherwise participated in the case. The father did not appear at the three-
month review hearing, either in person or telephonically.

DCYF made the same report at the six-month review hearing in May
2019, at which the father participated telephonically. The father also
participated telephonically at the nine-month review hearing in August 2019.
The trial court found that the father still had made no efforts to comply with
the case plan. The court found that the father had not regularly
communicated with DCYF, was reportedly living in Florida, and had “chosen
not to participate in this matter” since moving from New Hampshire.

The father attended the November 2019 permanency hearing, testifying
that he never saw his case plan and did not know what it contained. The trial
court found that the father had not complied with any of the outstanding
dispositional orders. The court found that the father had “not been in touch
with DCYF” and had failed to respond “to repeated attempts, phone calls and
letters, to contact him.” The court further found that the father had not
provided support for A.G. and had not demonstrated putting A.G.’s needs
ahead of his own. The court observed that the father did not request to be
reunified with A.G, but rather that A.G. be placed with his stepmother, whom
A.G. met for the first time on the day of the permanency hearing. Based upon
the evidence at the permanency hearing, the trial court directed DCYF to file a
petition to terminate the father’s parental rights.

At the October 2020 hearing on the petition to terminate the father’s
parental rights, the father admitted that he had not been in contact with DCYF
during the abuse/neglect case because he lacked time and acknowledged that
he had not bonded well with A.G. and that it would be a challenge to do so.
The father also admitted that he once had a copy of the case plan, but that he
had since lost it. The father further admitted that, until the permanency
hearing in November, he had done nothing required in his case plan. The
father testified that he was unable to visit A.G. because he does not have time
to do so. Based upon the evidence before it, the trial court found, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the father had failed to correct the conditions that led to

12
the neglect finding despite DCYF’s reasonable efforts. The trial court also
found that terminating the father’s parental rights is in A.G.’s best interest,
noting that according to the GAL, the father had “made no effort to have a
relationship” with the child.

On appeal, the father challenges the trial court’s finding that DCYF made
reasonable efforts to reunify him with A.G. and its determination that
terminating his parental rights is in A.G.’s best interest. As the appealing
party, A.G.’s father has the burden of demonstrating reversible error. Gallo v.
Traina, 166 N.H. 737, 740 (2014). Based upon our review of the trial court’s
order, the father’s challenges to it, the relevant law, and the record submitted
on appeal, we conclude that he has not demonstrated reversible error. See id.

IV. Conclusion

For all of the foregoing reasons, we uphold the trial court’s decision to
terminate the mother’s parental rights over all three children and its decision
to terminate the parental rights of A.G.’s father over A.G. We reverse the trial
court’s decision to terminate the parental rights of S.A.’s father over S.A., and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part;
and remanded.

HICKS, BASSETT, and DONOVAN, JJ., concurred.

13