In re J.S.

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THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

___________________________

2d Circuit Court–Plymouth Family Division
No. 2020-0502

IN RE J.S.

Argued: June 17, 2021
Opinion Issued: July 30, 2021

Office of the Attorney General, (Weston R. Sager, attorney, on the brief
and orally), for the State.

Christopher M. Johnson, chief appellate defender, of Concord, on the
brief and orally, for the juvenile.

HICKS, J. The juvenile, J.S., appeals a finding of delinquency made by
the Circuit Court (Boyle, J.) based upon petitions alleging criminal mischief,
simple assault, and attempted simple assault. We affirm.

The trial court could have found the following facts. On September 29,
2020, Chief Foss of the Campton Police Department filed seven delinquency
petitions against the juvenile arising out of incidents alleged to have occurred
at Mount Prospect Academy (Mount Prospect) on September 11, 17, and 29.
Mount Prospect is part of the Becket Family of Services, where the juvenile was
placed at the time of the alleged incidents.1

1 The exact relationship between Mount Prospect and Becket Family of Services is not clear from

the record. We note that witnesses and counsel at the adjudicatory hearing appeared to refer to
“Mount Prospect Academy,” “Becket,” and “Becket School” interchangeably, and the trial court
appears to have considered these terms to refer to the same entity. In addition, the juvenile’s brief
 At the close of the State’s case at the adjudicatory hearing, the court
granted the juvenile’s motion to dismiss one of the petitions for insufficiency of
evidence, and denied his motions to dismiss the remaining petitions for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. The latter motions argued that the court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction because the State failed to comply with RSA 169-
B:6, III and IV, which provide:

III. Absent serious threats to school safety, when a delinquency
petition is filed by a school official, including a school resource
officer assigned to a school district pursuant to a contract
agreement with the local police department, or when a petition is
filed by a local police department as a result of a report made by a
school official or school resource officer, based upon acts
committed on school grounds during the school day, information
shall be included in the petition which shows that the legally liable
school district has sought to resolve the expressed problem
through available educational approaches, including the school
discipline process, if appropriate, that the school has sought to
engage the parents or guardian in solving the problem but they
have been unwilling or unable to do so, that the minor has not
responded to such approaches and continues to engage in
delinquent behavior, and that court intervention is needed.

IV. When a school official, including a school resource officer
assigned to a school district pursuant to a contract agreement with
the local police department, or a local police department as a result
of a report made by a school official or school resource officer, files
a petition involving a minor with a disability pursuant to RSA 186-
C, upon submission of a juvenile petition, but prior to the child’s
initial appearance, the legally liable school district shall provide
assurance that prior to its filing:
(a) It was determined whether or not the child is a child with
a disability according to RSA 186-C:2, I.
(b) If the school district has determined that the child is a
child with a disability, a manifestation review pursuant to 20
U.S.C. section 1415(k)(1)(E) occurred.
(c) If the child’s conduct was determined to be a
manifestation of the child’s disability, the school district
followed the process set forth in 20 U.S.C. section 1415(k)(1)(F).
(d) It has reviewed for appropriateness the minor’s current
individualized education program (IEP), behavior intervention

refers to “Mount Prospect Academy, also called the ‘Becket School.’” We similarly assume that all
references to “Becket” quoted in this opinion denote the same entity we have defined to be “Mount
Prospect.”

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 plan, and placement, and has made modifications where
appropriate.

RSA 169-B:6, III, IV (2014). The juvenile argued that, according to Chief Foss’s
testimony, “these petitions were filed as a result of information provided by
school officials.” Specifically, Chief Foss testified that he had spoken to certain
“members of the Becket staff . . . and other faculty.”

The State countered that “Becket is not a ‘school,’ by definition,” but,
rather, constitutes a non-secure detention facility under RSA 169-B:2. See
RSA 169-B:2, VII (2014) (defining “[n]on-secure detention” to mean “the care of
a minor in a facility where physical restriction of movement or activity is
provided solely through facility staff”). The court denied the motion,
concluding that “Becket and Mount Prospect Academy are . . . not a school.”
The court explained: “It’s nonsecure placement, and . . . the reason children
are placed there and not going to a conventional school is because of
behavioral issues.”

The juvenile presented his case, eliciting further testimony from a Mount
Prospect employee on the nature of its operations. The witness, Ian Detamore,
stated that he was “employed with Mount Prospect Academy, Campton facility,
which is the enhanced residential treatment . . . and shelter care facilities,” as
“executive director of the Campton campus.” Detamore testified that Mount
Prospect has a contract with the New Hampshire Department of Education and
that the services Mount Prospect provides are subject to approval by the State
Board of Education.

The court specifically inquired: “Is Mount Prospect Academy a school?” to
which Detamore responded: “Mount Prospect Academy has an educational
component with . . . in-home services, academic services, therapeutic
residential milieu services. We do have a component that is absolutely a
school, yes.” The State then inquired:

Q Would you say Mount Prospect Academy is solely a
school?
A No. Absolutely not.
Q And would you compare it to -- would it be more
comparable to a school or a nonsecure detention facility?
A I would define it as a residential treatment setting for at-
risk youth.

Detamore described the “enhanced residential treatment program” as a
“contracted program[]” providing “a high level of services to youth as an
alternative to community services or detention settings. So it is contracted to
provide services to youth at risk of being detained or committed.”

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 Following Detamore’s testimony, the juvenile renewed his motion
to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds, which the court again denied. The
court dismissed four of the petitions on other grounds and entered
findings of true on three petitions alleging criminal mischief, simple
assault, and attempted simple assault, respectively. The court then
made a finding of delinquency and ordered the juvenile committed to the
John H. Sununu Youth Services Center for the remainder of his
minority.

On appeal, the juvenile argues that the trial court “erred as a matter of
law in determining that, on the undisputed facts in the record here, Mount
Prospect Academy is not a school.” Accordingly, he contends that the court
erred by failing to dismiss the delinquency petitions.

Determining whether Mount Prospect is a “school” within the meaning of
RSA 169-B:6, III and IV requires that we engage in statutory interpretation,
“which presents a question of law subject to de novo review.” Petition of N.H.
Div. for Children, Youth & Families, 173 N.H. 781, 785 (2020).

In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter
of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of the
statute considered as a whole. We first look to the language of the
statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to
its plain and ordinary meaning. We interpret legislative intent
from the statute as written and will not consider what the
legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did
not see fit to include. We construe all parts of a statute together to
effectuate its overall purpose and to avoid an absurd or unjust
result. Furthermore, we interpret statutes in the context of the
overall statutory scheme and not in isolation. Our goal is to apply
statutes in light of the legislature’s intent in enacting them and in
light of the policy sought to be advanced by the entire statutory
scheme. Absent an ambiguity, we need not look beyond the
language of the statute to discern legislative intent.

N. New England Tel. Operations v. Town of Acworth, 173 N.H. 660, 667 (2020)
(citations omitted).

Noting that RSA chapter 169-B does not define “school,” the juvenile
argues that Mount Prospect falls within various dictionary definitions of that
term, as it is “an organized source of education and training of children, and
. . . an institution or place for instruction or education.” See, e.g., Webster’s
Third New International Dictionary 2031 (unabridged ed. 2002). The State, on
the other hand, argues that RSA 169-B:6, III must be read in the context of the
“overall statutory scheme[,] . . . [which] confirms that [Mount Prospect] is a

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‘facility’ and not a ‘school.’” The State specifically looks to RSA chapter 126-U,
which defines the terms “facility” and “school”:
In this chapter:
....
III. “Facility” includes any of the following when used for the
placement, custody, or treatment of children:
(a) The youth services center maintained by the department
of health and human services, or any other setting established
for the commitment or detention of children pursuant to RSA
169-B, RSA 169-C, or RSA 169-D.
....
(c) Any foster home, group home, crisis home, or shelter care
setting used for the placement of children at any stage of
proceedings under RSA 169-B, RSA 169-C, or RSA 169-D or
following disposition under those chapters.
....
V. “School” means:
(a) A school operated by a school district.
(b) A chartered public school governed by RSA 194-B.
(c) A public academy as defined in RSA 194:23, II.
(d) A nonpublic school subject to the approval authority of
the state board of education under RSA 186:11, XXIX.
(e) A private or public provider of any component of a child’s
individualized education program under RSA 186-C.

RSA 126-U:1, III, V (2021).

Our settled rules of statutory interpretation instruct that “[a]ll statutes
dealing with the same subject matter are to be considered in interpreting any
one of them” and, “[w]here reasonably possible, statutes should be construed
as consistent with each other.” In the Matter of Liquidation of Home Ins. Co.,
166 N.H. 84, 88-89 (2014) (quotation omitted). Accordingly, “[w]hen
interpreting two statutes which deal with a similar subject matter, we will
construe them so that they do not contradict each other, and so that they will
lead to reasonable results and effectuate the legislative purpose of the statute.”
Id. at 89 (quotation omitted).

The juvenile contends that “[b]ecause RSA [chapter] 126-U and RSA
[chapter] 169-B are not in the same chapter or even in the same title, that
canon of interpretation has less weight, if it applies at all.” He further asserts:
“RSA Chapter 126-U governs and limits the use of child restraint practices in
schools and treatment facilities. RSA Chapter 169-B governs the proceedings
in delinquency cases. There is, therefore, no reason to extrapolate definitional
principles from one context to the other.” We disagree. Both RSA chapter 126-
U and RSA chapter 169-B address juveniles whose behavior warrants

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intervention, whether it be restraint or delinquency proceedings. In addition,
RSA chapter 169-B is specifically referenced in RSA 126-U:1, III. See 126-U:1,
III (a), (c). We conclude that the subject matter of both statutes is sufficiently
similar that we may look to the provisions of RSA chapter 126-U in construing
RSA 169-B:6, III and IV.

The juvenile, nevertheless, points out that RSA chapter 126-U defines
the term “school” specifically for purposes of that chapter. See RSA 126-U:1
(2021) (setting forth the meanings of terms “[i]n this chapter”). We do not,
however, read wholesale into RSA chapter 169-B the definitions contained in
RSA 126-U:1; rather, we consider RSA chapter 126-U and RSA chapter 169-B
together in interpreting the latter statute, see In the Matter of Liquidation of
Home Ins. Co., 166 N.H. at 88-89, which uses both the terms “school” and
“facility” but defines neither. See, e.g., RSA 169-B:6, III, IV (containing term
“school”); :2, VII (“‘Non-secure detention’ means the care of a minor in a facility
where physical restriction of movement or activity is provided solely through
facility staff” (emphasis added)).

Considering both statutes together, we conclude that the legislature
intended to distinguish between schools, on the one hand, and facilities for the
placement of juveniles, on the other. We note that all of the statutory
references in RSA 126-U:1’s definition of “facility” fall within the titles
governing public health (Title X) and public safety and welfare (Title XII), while
those in its definition of “school” fall within Title XV, governing education. See
RSA 126-U:1, III (referring to RSA 126-A:19, RSA 135-C:3, :7, RSA 171-A:2, :4
and RSA chapters 169-B, 169-C, 169-D, 170-E, 171-A, and 171-B), V (referring
to RSA 186:11, XXIX, RSA chapter 186-C, RSA 194:23, II, and RSA chapter
194-B). We conclude that the term “school” in RSA 169-B:6, III and IV denotes
an institution whose primary purpose is the education of juveniles, and
excludes any facility whose primary purpose is the placement of juveniles, even
though the latter may provide educational services as an adjunct to its primary
purpose of placement. We therefore reject the juvenile’s contention that
“[i]nsofar as some ‘placements’ provide ‘educational services’ in lieu of a child’s
home school district, those placements function as a ‘school.’”

We also reject the juvenile’s contention that nothing in RSA chapter 169-
B indicates that “the legislature contemplated a mutually exclusive, categorical
distinction between a ‘school’ and a ‘non-secure detention’ facility” so as to
preclude Mount Prospect from being a “school” for purposes of RSA 169-B:6, III
and IV merely because it “also fits the description of a facility for ‘non-secure
detention’” in RSA 169-B:2, VII. Considering RSA 169-B:6, III and IV together
with RSA chapter 126-U, we conclude that an institution cannot be both a
“school” and a “non-secure detention” facility under RSA chapter 169-B. We
note that RSA chapter 126-U does establish “a mutually exclusive, categorical
distinction” between “schools” and “facilities.” It separately defines those terms

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and uses both terms in the same provision. See, e.g., RSA 126-U:2 (2021)
(“[e]ach facility and school”), :4 (2021) (“[n]o school or facility”). Because we
interpret statutes so as to “give effect to all words” therein, and we “presume
that the legislature did not enact superfluous or redundant words,” this usage
demonstrates that the two terms cannot mean the same thing. State v.
Czekalski, 169 N.H. 732, 739 (2017) (quotations omitted) (noting that where
the terms “chapter” and “paragraph,” were both used in RSA 570-A:9, VII(a),
“we must presume that the legislature intended [those] words . . . to have
different meanings”). In addition, RSA chapter 126-U subjects schools and
facilities to different rules. See RSA 126-U:6 (2021) (limiting the types of
restraint schools are permitted to use), :10 (2021) (providing different reporting
requirements for facilities and schools when serious injury or death occurs to
child subject to restraint or seclusion). We conclude, therefore, that the terms
are similarly mutually exclusive in RSA chapter 169-B, a statute “deal[ing] with
a similar subject matter.” In the Matter of Liquidation of Home Ins. Co., 166
N.H. at 89 (quotation omitted).

The juvenile also argues that “there is nothing irreconcilable or
contradictory in defining ‘school’ broadly for purposes of RSA Chapter 169-B so
that some entities can be both a ‘school’ and a ‘non-secure detention,’ while
treating ‘schools’ and ‘facilities’ as separate categories in RSA Chapter 126-U.”
Similarly, he asserts that “the requirements imposed by [RSA chapter 169-B]
on a school and on school officials are not of such a nature as to make it
absurd to apply them to Mount Prospect Academy.” However, even if those
assertions were true, a statutory interpretation need not be irreconcilable,
contradictory, or absurd to be rejected because it does not express the
legislature’s intent. Indeed, choosing among alternatives that are neither
irreconcilable, contradictory, nor absurd is a quintessential legislative function.
Cf. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665, 683 (Cal. 1985) (noting,
in context of rejecting claim that statute was unconstitutional because
legislature could have attained its goal another way, that “[t]he choice between
reasonable alternative methods for achieving a given objective is generally for
the Legislature, and there are a number of reasons why the Legislature may
have made the choice it did”).

Finally, the juvenile argues that “[i]f there is any unifying principle
underlying” RSA chapters 126-U and 169-B, it is child protection and narrowly
interpreting the term “school” in RSA 169-B:6, III and IV so as to exclude
Mount Prospect contravenes that intent “because it makes easier the
attachment of the label ‘delinquent’ to a child, by relieving the State of the need
to prove non-judicial efforts to resolve the behavioral issue.” We disagree.
Even if RSA chapters 126-U and 169-B share a goal of protecting children, RSA
chapter 169-B’s purpose is broader and it is to be construed and administered
“[c]onsistent[ly] with the protection of the public interest” and taking into
account “the interests of public safety,” 169-B:1, II, III (2014). The legislature

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reasonably could have concluded that the out-of-court interventions that the
juvenile contends should have been provided and alleged in the petitions, such
as efforts “to resolve the expressed problem through available educational
approaches, including the school discipline process,” RSA 169-B:6, III, would
be superfluous when a juvenile’s behavior had already warranted placement in
a facility providing physical restriction of the juvenile’s movement or activity.
See RSA 169-B:2, VII.

For the foregoing reasons, we uphold the trial court’s
determination, on the facts presented in this case, that Mount Prospect
is not a “school” for purposes of RSA 169-B:6, III and IV. Accordingly, we
uphold the trial court’s denial of the motions to dismiss and affirm the
finding of delinquency.
Affirmed.

BASSETT, HANTZ MARCONI, and DONOVAN, JJ., concurred.

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