Julia McLaughlin v. Leonard Jones, III

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2020-0177, Julia McLaughlin v. Leonard Jones,
III, the court on February 17, 2021, issued the following order:

Having considered the brief, memorandum of law, and record submitted
on appeal, we conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See
Sup. Ct. R. 18(1). The defendant, Leonard Jones, III, appeals the order of the
Circuit Court (Kelly, J.), following a hearing, entering judgment for the plaintiff,
Julia McLaughlin, in a small claims action to recover the balance due on a
$7,000 loan. The defendant argues that the trial court erred in: (1) denying his
motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations, see RSA 508:4, I (Supp.
2020), and the statute of frauds, see RSA 506:2 (2010); and (2) not finding that
the plaintiff forgave the debt. We affirm.

The defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to dismiss the complaint based upon the statute of limitations. In
reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss, we examine whether
the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint are reasonably susceptible of a
construction that would permit recovery. Pro Done, Inc. v. Basham, 172 N.H.
138, 141 (2019). RSA chapter 503 establishes a “simple, speedy, and informal
procedure” for the determination of small claims. RSA 503:2 (2010); see
Thomas v. Crete, 141 N.H. 708, 709 (1997). A small claim complaint need only
provide “a description setting forth with specificity the reason(s) the plaintiff
believes that the defendant owes money to the plaintiff” and “[t]he amount that
the plaintiff claims that the defendant owes.” Dist. Div. R. 4.1. In this case,
the plaintiff alleged that the defendant “asked [her] for a personal loan to payoff
credit card debt.” She alleged that she “agreed to loan [the defendant] $7,000
and wrote him a per[s]onal check on 5/16/2012.” She also alleged that the
defendant “promised to pay the loan back.” We conclude that these
allegations, particularly in a small claim complaint, are reasonably susceptible
of a construction that would permit recovery. See Pro Done, Inc., 172 N.H. at
141.

The defendant’s initial argument that the complaint was time-barred is
based upon his erroneous assertion that the statute of limitations began to run
on May 16, 2012, the date on which he borrowed the money. In a contract
action, the statute of limitations begins to run when the breach occurs. Coyle
v. Battles, 147 N.H. 98, 100 (2001). Thus, a contract claim must be brought
within three years of breach. Id.; RSA 508:4, I. Given that the complaint was
reasonably susceptible of a construction that would permit recovery, the trial
court did not err in conducting a hearing on the defendant’s motion in order to
determine the timeliness of the complaint. See In the Matter of Conner &
Conner, 156 N.H. 250, 252 (2007) (trial court has broad discretion in managing
proceedings before it). Following the hearing, the court found that the
complaint, filed on January 11, 2018, was timely because the breach occurred
on November 30, 2017, when the plaintiff, through her attorney, made a formal
demand for repayment.

The defendant argues, in the alternative, that the breach occurred no
later than May 11, 2013, the date of his last payment on the loan. Whether a
delay in payments is a material breach is a question for the trier of fact to
determine from the facts and circumstances of the case. Fitz v. Coutinho, 136
N.H. 721, 725 (1993). We will uphold the trial court’s findings if there is
support for them in the record. Behrens v. S.P. Constr. Co., 153 N.H. 498,
500-01 (2006). The plaintiff testified that repayment of the loan was due when
the defendant “got on his feet” financially, which she anticipated would take
three to four years. More than five years after the loan was made, the balance
due remained largely unpaid. We conclude that the record supports the trial
court’s factual determination that the breach did not occur until November 30,
2017.

The defendant next argues that the trial court erred by not dismissing
the complaint based upon the statute of frauds. The statute of frauds, RSA
506:2, requires all agreements not to be performed within one year to be in
writing and signed by the party to be charged. Phillips v. Verax Corp., 138
N.H. 240, 245 (1994). However, the statute does not apply when the agreement
can be performed within one year without breach by either party. Proctor v.
Macdonald, 141 N.H. 621, 624 (1997). “Likewise, when certain factors, such
as fraud, part performance or other equitable considerations, are present,” the
trial court may dispense with the need for a written agreement.” Byblos Corp.
v. Salem Farm Realty Trust, 141 N.H. 726, 731 (1997) (quotation omitted). The
plaintiff’s exhibit one at the merits hearing was a copy of a personal check for
$7,000 from the plaintiff to the defendant for a “loan.” The check was endorsed
by the defendant, whose signature appears on the reverse side. The court
found that the defendant paid $1,832.50 toward the loan balance between
June 15, 2012 and May 11, 2013. Assuming, without deciding, that the
endorsed check was insufficient, by itself, to satisfy the statute of frauds, we
assume that the trial court found that the statute of frauds did not apply,
either because the agreement could have been performed within one year, or
because the defendant partially performed. See Nordic Inn Condo. Owners’
Assoc. v. Ventullo, 151 N.H. 571, 586 (2004) (we assume trial court made all
findings necessary to support its decision). We conclude that the record
supports the trial court’s assumed findings. See Behrens, 153 N.H. at 500-01.

Finally, the defendant argues that the court erred in not finding that the
plaintiff forgave the debt. He argues that the plaintiff’s contrary testimony on
this point was not credible, and that his testimony, and that of his other

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witnesses, carried more weight. We defer to a trial court’s judgment on such
issues as resolving conflicts in testimony, measuring the credibility of
witnesses, and determining the weight to be given evidence. O’Malley v. Little, 170 N.H. 272, 275 (2017). We will uphold the trial court’s credibility
determinations unless no rational trier of fact could have reached the same
conclusion. Rancourt v. Town of Barnstead, 129 N.H. 45, 50 (1986). The trial
court found that the plaintiff, while “she may have been considering it, or
musing about it,” did not forgive the debt. We conclude that the record
supports the trial court’s finding. See id.

Affirmed.

Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ., concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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