In the Matter of Arnold Goddard and Racheal Goddard

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2019-0735, In the Matter of Arnold Goddard
and Racheal Goddard, the court on November 2, 2020, issued the
following order:

Having considered the briefs and record submitted on appeal, we
conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1).
We affirm.

The respondent, Racheal Goddard (wife), appeals a final decree of divorce
from the petitioner, Arnold Goddard (husband). She argues that the Circuit
Court (Forrest, J.) erred by upholding the validity of a prenuptial agreement.
She further argues that the Trial Court (DalPra, M., approved by Gleason, J.)
erred by not awarding the full amount of alimony she sought, and by denying
her requests for payment of certain expenses.

We first address the wife’s challenges to the validity of the prenuptial
agreement.

A prenuptial agreement is presumed valid unless the party seeking
the invalidation of the agreement proves that: (1) the agreement
was obtained through fraud, duress or mistake, or through
misrepresentation or nondisclosure of a material fact; (2) the
agreement is unconscionable; or (3) the facts and circumstances
have so changed since the agreement was executed as to make the
agreement unenforceable.

In the Matter of Nizhnikov & Nizhnikov, 168 N.H. 525, 528 (2016). We will not
disturb the court’s decree unless it is unsupported by the evidence or
erroneous as a matter of law. Id. We defer to the trial court’s findings of fact
unless they are so plainly erroneous that they could not be reasonably made.
Id.

The wife first argues that the prenuptial agreement is invalid because it
was obtained through duress. To establish duress, a party ordinarily must
show that the party “involuntarily accepted the other party’s terms, that the
coercive circumstances were the result of the other party’s acts, that the other
party exerted pressure wrongfully, and that under the circumstances the party
had no alternative but to accept the terms set out by the other party.” Id.
(quotation omitted).

The record shows that the parties had been married to each other
previously and that, after a 31-year marriage, they had divided their marital
assets equally pursuant to a stipulated divorce agreement. As a result of that
agreement, the husband retained the marital home, for which the wife received
an offsetting payment of $72,500. The wife also received a payment of
$16,923.82, which was half the value of the husband’s retirement account, and
an undeveloped parcel of real estate valued at $35,000. The record shows that,
by the time the parties entered into the prenuptial agreement, the wife had
depleted nearly all of the assets she had received in the first divorce, except for
the real estate. The husband testified that he sought a prenuptial agreement
before remarrying the wife because he was concerned about the possibility that
the wife would again seek half of the marital estate in the event of divorce.
He testified that he found a form prenuptial agreement on the internet, which
he used without consulting an attorney. He testified that he discussed the
agreement with the wife, that they had completed the form weeks before
signing it, and that they executed it in the presence of a notary, two days
before the marriage.

The wife argues that she had no opportunity to seek counsel and that
she signed the agreement because she was completely reliant upon the
husband for financial support. The trial court found that the parties had
discussed the agreement for several weeks, and that the wife was aware that,
under the agreement, she would not receive any of the husband’s assets if the
parties again divorced. The court found that the husband did not threaten to
make the wife leave the residence or otherwise pressure her to sign the
agreement. We conclude that the record supports the trial court’s finding that
the wife did not sign the agreement under duress. See In the Matter of
Nizhnikov, 168 N.H. at 528.

The wife next argues that the agreement is unconscionable. Provisions
in a prenuptial agreement may be invalidated if enforcement would cause
“unconscionable hardship” as a result of changed circumstances sufficient to
compel judicial reformation of the agreement. MacFarlane v. Rich
(MacFarlane), 132 N.H. 608, 616-17 (1989). The wife argues that such
circumstances exist in this case because she used proceeds from the sale of
her real estate to make improvements to the marital residence, which belongs
to the husband. The trial court found that the parties’ son converted a deck to
a three-season room at the cost of approximately $5,000.00. The court
concluded that, even if the funds for the project were derived from the sale of
the wife’s real estate, this circumstance does not render the prenuptial
agreement unconscionable. We conclude that the record supports the court’s
finding. See In the Matter of Nizhnikov, 168 N.H. at 528.

The wife also argues that the agreement is unconscionable because of
the disparity in the parties’ assets and income. When the parties signed the
agreement, the husband owned the former marital residence valued at

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$255,800 (subject to a $132,495 mortgage), retirement assets valued at
$56,331, and motor vehicles valued at $6,773. He was earning $42,118 per
year. The wife, by contrast, had real estate valued at $35,500 and $1,200 in
cash. She was receiving disability income of $6,792 per year. The court
concluded that the agreement was unconscionable to the extent that it
precluded the wife from receiving alimony. We conclude that the record
supports the court’s finding, and its implied determination that only the
alimony provision required judicial reformation. See MacFarlane, 132 N.H. at
616-17; see also Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728, 735 (Colo. 1982) (cited in
MacFarlane).

We next address the wife’s challenge to the alimony award. The trial
court is afforded broad discretion in awarding alimony. In the Matter of Nassar
& Nassar, 156 N.H. 769, 772 (2008). We will not overturn its decision unless it
is lacking in evidentiary support or legally erroneous. Id. Based upon its
review of the parties’ financial circumstances, the court found that the wife
needs alimony, and that the husband has the ability to pay $250 per month in
alimony for four years or until his retirement, whichever occurs earlier. The
wife argues that the court erred in denying her request for $500 per month in
alimony which, she asserts, the husband could pay with his assets. Based
upon this record, we find no error in the court’s alimony award. See id.

Finally, the wife argues that the trial court erred in denying her request
to be reimbursed for moving and dental expenses, and for $7,500 to purchase
a motor vehicle. We afford trial courts broad discretion in fashioning a final
divorce decree. In the Matter of Ramadan & Ramadan, 153 N.H. 226, 232
(2006). The court found that the wife’s request for $7,500 was a claim against
the marital estate, contrary to the terms of the prenuptial agreement. The
court also found that the wife’s request to be reimbursed for moving expenses
was not justified given her failure to timely vacate the residence. We conclude
that the wife has failed to demonstrate that the trial court unsustainably
exercised its discretion in denying her requests for reimbursement of expenses
and for funds to purchase a vehicle. See id.

Affirmed.

Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ., concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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