In the Matter of Erica de Vries and Edward de Vries
In the Matter of Erica de Vries and Edward de Vries, No. 2019-0570 (N.H. May 8, 2020).
The holding in the court’s own words
THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE SUPREME COURT In Case No. 2019-0570, In the Matter of Erica de Vries and Edward de Vries, the court on May 8, 2020, issued the following order: Having considered the briefs and record submitted on appeal, we conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See id. We conclude that the evidence supports the trial court’s findings.
Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we work.
Opinion text
THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
SUPREME COURT
In Case No. 2019-0570, In the Matter of Erica de Vries and
Edward de Vries, the court on May 8, 2020, issued the following
order:
Having considered the briefs and record submitted on appeal, we
conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1).
We affirm.
The petitioner, Erica de Vries, appeals the order of the Circuit Court
(Hall, J.), following a trial, denying her petition for annulment of her marriage
to the respondent, Edward de Vries, and approving the parties’ alternative
stipulated divorce decree. She argues that the trial court erred in denying her
petition because, she claims, the respondent induced her to marry him with
fraudulent intent.
“[A]nnulment of a marriage for fraud is granted only with extreme
caution.” In the Matter of Geraghty & Geraghty, 169 N.H. 404, 412 (2016)
(quotation omitted). To obtain an annulment, the petitioner must demonstrate
that the respondent’s alleged fraud concerned something essential to the
marriage. Id. at 416. The petitioner asserts that the respondent represented to
her that he wanted to marry her and conceive a child with her but that, in fact,
he only wanted to obtain permanent resident status in the United States.
The petitioner is a United States citizen, and the respondent is from the
Netherlands. They met in January 2014 in London, where they both were
living and working. They quickly developed a romantic relationship. The
petitioner testified that in late September or early October 2014, she gave
notice to her employer that she would be returning to the United States by the
end of the year. She testified that she was interested in conceiving a child with
the respondent, but that he became interested in conceiving a child with her
only after learning that she was returning to the United States. The parties
became engaged in July 2015, and were married on October 18, 2015. The
petitioner testified that, after marriage, sex became infrequent and that, after
she testified in support of his application for permanent residency, it became
even less frequent.
The respondent testified that he married the petitioner because he loves
her. He testified that it had never been his goal, prior to meeting her, to live in
the United States, and that he moved to the United States for her. He testified
that the parties started to experience trouble early in their marriage, and that
he believed that they should work out their differences before continuing to try
to conceive a child.
The petitioner admitted that the parties had a volatile relationship and
that they fought after the marriage. She admitted that, three months into the
marriage, things were not going well, and that she suggested divorce. The
parties had a major fight on New Year’s Eve, after which they started couples
counseling, which continued through June 2016. The respondent moved out
of the marital home in September, less than a year after the marriage.
Based upon this testimony, and the other evidence introduced at trial,
the trial court concluded that the petitioner had failed to show that the
respondent had induced her to marry him with fraudulent intent. We will
affirm the findings and rulings of the trial court unless they are unsupported
by the evidence or are legally erroneous. In the Matter of Nyhan and Nyhan,
147 N.H. 768, 770 (2002). We defer to a trial court’s judgment on such issues
as resolving conflicts in testimony, measuring the credibility of witnesses, and
determining the weight to be given evidence. In the Matter of Aube & Aube,
158 N.H. 459, 465 (2009). Although the petitioner’s testimony conflicted with
the respondent’s in many respects, the trial court was not required to resolve
the conflicts in her favor. See id. We conclude that the evidence supports the
trial court’s findings. Accordingly, we find no error. See Nyhan, 147 N.H. at
770.
The petitioner’s remaining arguments challenge a number of the trial
court’s specific factual findings, made primarily in response to her written
requests for findings and rulings. We see no reason to address each challenged
finding separately. We conclude that evidence supports the court’s findings.
See id.
Affirmed.
Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ., concurred.
Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk
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