Petition of State of New Hampshire (State v. Karnes)

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2019-0022, Petition of State of New
Hampshire (State v. Karnes), the court on January 23, 2020,
issued the following order:

Having considered the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, the court
concludes that a formal written opinion is unnecessary in this case. In this
petition for a writ of certiorari, see Sup. Ct. R. 11, the State seeks review of two
orders issued by the Circuit Court (Sadler, J.). In its first order, the trial court
placed the negligent driving complaint issued against the defendant, Robert L.
Karnes, on file, with a finding, conditioned upon his good behavior for 12
months. See RSA 265:79-b (Supp. 2019). The trial court, however, neglected
to check a box indicating whether it found the defendant guilty or not guilty.
In its second order, the trial court clarified that its finding did not constitute a
conviction. The court also granted partial reconsideration of its initial order by
imposing a fine, suspending it “pending the [good behavior] period,” and stating
that it intended “to dismiss the case if [the defendant] is compliant during the
12 month period.” We accepted the State’s petition for original jurisdiction and
we now affirm the decision of the trial court.

The trial court could have found the following facts. In March 2018, the
defendant was pulled over by a police officer, who saw him drive by in a
commercial van “that had a large amount of snow on the roof.” When asked,
the defendant indicated that he was familiar with the law prohibiting driving a
vehicle with snow on its roof. The defendant explained to the officer that he
had done “the best [he] could” to remove the snow from his roof before “leaving
the driveway.” Upon being asked to do so, the defendant brushed snow off of
the van’s roof, and, after receiving the citation, was allowed to drive away.

The defendant was charged by complaint with negligent driving. The
complaint alleged that he drove a commercial van “negligently as defined in
RSA 626:2, II(d) or in a manner that endangers or is likely to endanger any
person or property[,] when he drove [it] with approximately two feet of snow on
top of [it].” Following the bench trial, the trial court issued an order that
placed the complaint on file with a finding, subject to the condition that the
defendant be of good behavior for 12 months. The order provided that if the
defendant complied with the condition, “then [the] case will be dismissed,” and
if he failed to comply with it, then a “sentencing hearing [will] be scheduled.”
However, the trial court did not check the box specifying whether it had found
the defendant guilty or not guilty.
 In response to the State’s motion to clarify and reconsider, the trial court
issued a second order that stated:

Request to clarify & reconsider granted in part. Court does not
consider this a conviction for which annulment & removal from the
record is prohibited. The court does grant reconsideration of a
sentence. So a $200 fine + $60 [penalty assessment] is imposed
but suspended pending the [good behavior] period. The court
intends to dismiss the case if [the defendant] is compliant during
the 12 month period.

This petition for a writ of certiorari followed.

Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy that is not granted as a matter of
right, but rather at the court’s discretion. Petition of State of N.H. (State v.
Lewandowski), 169 N.H. 340, 341 (2016); see Sup. Ct. R. 11. Certiorari review
entails examining whether the trial court acted illegally with respect to
jurisdiction, authority or observance of the law, or unsustainably exercised its
discretion or acted arbitrarily, unreasonably, or capriciously. See Petition of
State of N.H. (State v. Lewandowski), 169 N.H. at 341. We exercise our power
to grant such writs sparingly and only where to do otherwise would result in
substantial injustice. Petition of Chase Home for Children, 155 N.H. 528, 532
(2007).

Resolving the issues in this case requires that we engage in statutory
interpretation. We review the trial court’s statutory interpretation de novo.
Appeal of Local Gov’t Ctr., 165 N.H. 790, 804 (2014). “In matters of statutory
interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as
expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.” Id. “We first look
to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language
according to its plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. “We interpret legislative
intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature
might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include.”
Id. “We construe all parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose
and avoid an absurd or unjust result.” Id. Moreover, we do not consider words
and phrases in isolation, but rather within the context of the statute as a
whole. Id. “This enables us to better discern the legislature’s intent and to
interpret statutory language in light of the policy or purpose sought to be
advanced by the statutory scheme.” Id. “We construe provisions of the
Criminal Code according to the fair import of their terms and to promote
justice.” Wolfgram v. N.H. Department of Safety, 169 N.H. 32, 36 (2016)
(quotation omitted).

The State first argues that the trial court lacked authority to issue its
initial order “because there is no statute or court rule that expressly authorizes

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a court to place a conviction on file, withhold the finding of guilty, and then
continue the case for a fixed period of time, eventually to be dismissed over the
State’s objection.” (Emphases added.) We do not share the State’s
interpretation of the trial court’s initial order.

“The interpretation of a court order is a question of law, which we review
de novo.” In the Matter of Sheys & Blackburn, 168 N.H. 35, 39 (2015). “In
construing a court order, we look to the plain meaning of the words used in the
document.” Id. “We construe subsidiary clauses so as not to conflict with the
primary purpose of the trial court’s decree.” Id. at 39-40. “As a general matter,
a court decree or judgment is to be construed with reference to the issues it
was meant to decide.” Id. at 40.

Although the trial court neglected to check the appropriate box in its first
order, we conclude that the court found the defendant guilty and placed the
complaint and its guilty finding on file for a period of 12 months, conditioned
upon the defendant’s good behavior. As the amici curiae correctly point out,
the trial court had the authority to do just that pursuant to RSA 262:42 (2014).

RSA 262:42 provides, “Except as herein otherwise provided, a complaint
against a person for the violation of any provision of this title may be placed on
file at the discretion of the court, if the violation appears to have been
unintentional, or if no person or property could have been endangered
thereby.” The title to which RSA 262:42 refers is title XXI on vehicles. As the
negligent driving statute at issue is part of title XXI on vehicles, we hold that
RSA 262:42 applies, and authorized the trial court in this case to place the
complaint on file for a period of 12 months, conditioned upon the defendant’s
good behavior.

The State asserts that RSA 262:42 pertains only to the complaint, and
does not allow a court to place a guilty finding on file. We disagree. In the
context of RSA 262:42, the word “complaint” includes the issuance of a guilty
finding following a bench trial. We disagree with the State that a guilty finding
necessarily constitutes a final judgment of conviction. See Deal v. United
States, 508 U.S. 129, 131 (1993) (explaining that “the word ‘conviction’ can
mean either the finding of guilt or the entry of a final judgment on that
finding”), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in United States v.
Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2324 n.1 (2019). Instead, we agree with the amici that,
in its initial order, the trial court intended there to be a distinction between its
finding of guilt and its entry of a final judgment of conviction.

The State next contends that RSA 262:42 does not apply to this case
because, in order for it to apply, one of two conditions must be met, and,
according to the State, neither is met. The State asserts that in order for RSA
262:42 to apply, either the violation must not have been intentional or no

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person or property could have been endangered by it. The State argues that,
here, “[t]he only reasonable conclusions the trial court could have reached from
[the] evidence were that the defendant intentionally violated the statute, and
that doing so could have endangered persons and property.” Thus, the State
reasons, because neither of the statutory conditions set forth in RSA 262:42 is
met, “the trial court acted outside its authority” by placing the complaint with a
finding on file.

We disagree with the State’s assertion that the evidence compelled a
finding that the defendant intentionally violated the applicable statute. Rather,
in our view, the trial court reasonably could have found, based upon the
evidence presented, that the defendant did not act intentionally. The
defendant testified that he was “en route to a no-heat call” and that he “did . . .
the best [he] could to get the snow off [his] van with a shovel.” As amici
suggest, “the court sustainably could have found that [the defendant] exercised
a degree of inattention and blameworthiness consistent with criminal
negligence, but not amounting to intentional wrongdoing.” See State v. Dion, 164 N.H. 544, 548-49 (2013) (explaining criminal negligence standard). For all
of the above reasons, therefore, we hold that the trial court had the authority to
issue its initial order, which we interpret as placing the complaint and the
court’s guilty finding on file for a period of 12 months, conditioned upon the
defendant’s good behavior.

We interpret the trial court’s second order as revising its initial order only
insofar as the order sets forth the sentence that the trial court intends to
impose should the defendant fail to comply with the 12-month good behavior
condition. In all other respects, the trial court’s second order did not modify its
initial order. To the extent that the State argues that, in its second order, the
trial court intended to enter a final judgment of conviction and impose a
conditional discharge, we disagree. See RSA 651:2, III-a (2016) (“A person
convicted of a violation may be sentenced to a conditional or unconditional
discharge, or a fine.”). The trial court specifically stated that it did “not
consider this a conviction.” Given our interpretation of the trial court’s orders,
we need not consider the State’s remaining arguments.

Affirmed.

HICKS, BASSETT, HANTZ MARCONI, and DONOVAN, JJ., concurred.

Timothy A. Gudas,
Clerk

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