Li Wei Lin v. Stacey Sverker

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2018-0445, Li Wei Lin v. Stacey Sverker, the
court on May 30, 2019, issued the following order:

Having considered the briefs and record submitted on appeal, the court
concludes that a formal written opinion is unnecessary in this case. The
defendant, Stacey Sverker (tenant), appeals an order of the Circuit Court (Kent,
Referee, approved by Coughlin, J.) dismissing her counterclaim against the
plaintiff, Li Wei Lin (landlord). The tenant argues that the trial court erred
because: (1) the court was required to award her statutory damages, costs, and
attorney’s fees pursuant to RSA 540-A:4, IX(a) (Supp. 2018) because the court
found that the landlord committed an initial violation of RSA 540-A:2 (2007);
and (2) the court was required to award her statutory damages, costs, and
attorney’s fees for each day that the landlord’s RSA 540-A:2 violation continued
after the court issued a temporary order. We reverse the order dismissing the
counterclaim and remand.

The trial court found, or the record supports, the following facts. The
tenant has been the landlord’s tenant since December 2017. Since that time,
one of the tenant’s neighbors, who lives on the third floor of the tenant’s
building, has repeatedly engaged in disorderly and offensive conduct. The
Manchester Police Department has often responded to the property to
investigate complaints relating to this neighbor. The tenant reported her
neighbor’s conduct to the landlord on more than one occasion, and asked that
he take some action to remedy the situation. She also repeatedly asked the
landlord to repair her front door and window, neither of which could be
securely locked. In response to the tenant’s requests, the landlord authorized
her to install a surveillance camera in the building in order to capture footage
of the neighbor’s conduct. The landlord claimed he would use footage gathered
from the camera to evict the neighbor. He also authorized the tenant to
relocate the neighbor’s mailbox in an effort to eliminate contact between the
two.

When these efforts undertaken by the tenant failed to remedy the
situation, she once again met with the landlord to insist that he address the
safety concerns presented both by the neighbor’s conduct as well as the
tenant’s faulty window and door. This meeting occurred on May 8, 2018.
When the tenant returned to her apartment later that same day, she discovered
a notice of eviction posted to her door. In the notice, the landlord claimed that
eviction was appropriate due to the tenant’s installation of a camera in the
building as well as her relocation of the neighbor’s mailbox. The landlord then
brought this eviction action. The tenant filed an answer, as well as a
supplemental answer and counterclaim, arguing that the claimed grounds for
eviction were pretextual and that the landlord was using the eviction process in
retaliation for her repeated requests. Her counterclaim alleged that the
landlord violated RSA 540-A:2 by failing to address the neighbor’s conduct and
by bringing the retaliatory eviction proceeding, and sought damages pursuant
to RSA 540-A:4, IX(a).

The court held a hearing on June 8, 2018. Subsequently, it issued an
order entitled “Eviction and RSA 540-A Decision.” In that order, the court
denied the eviction “as retaliatory,” and ruled that the landlord “willfully
violated [the tenant’s] and her family’s right to quiet enjoyment of their
tenancy” because he failed to take any action to remedy the neighbor’s conduct
and because he initiated the instant retaliatory eviction. The court also issued
a temporary order pursuant to RSA 540-A:4 (Supp. 2018), wherein it found
that the tenant was “in immediate threat of irreparable harm due to the action
of the landlord,” and wherein it ordered the landlord to immediately remedy
“the issues of safety, the window, [and] the harassment by the 3rd floor
tenant.” The court scheduled a further hearing for June 29, 2018.

The trial court held a hearing on June 29, after which it sua sponte
dismissed the tenant’s counterclaim without awarding damages, attorney’s
fees, or costs. The trial court did so because it found that the landlord “made
repairs and remedied problems”; however, the court did not make a finding as
to the date when the landlord’s willful quiet enjoyment violation ceased. Nor
did it alter its earlier ruling that the landlord had willfully violated the tenant’s
right to quiet enjoyment.

The tenant moved for reconsideration, arguing that the court was
statutorily required to award her damages, costs, and attorney’s fees for the
landlord’s initial violation of her right to quiet enjoyment. See RSA 540-A:4,
IX(a). She also argued that the court was required to award her statutory
damages for each day that the landlord’s violation continued, which required
the court to make further factual findings as to the date when the landlord
remedied the violation. The trial court denied the tenant’s motion for
reconsideration. It stated that “[t]he court found at the June 29th hearing that
the repairs called for in the order of June 8th were completed as ordered.”
“Having found that the [landlord] fulfilled his duties under the temporary
order,” the court explained, “no damages are awarded.” This appeal followed.

The tenant argues that the trial court erred because: (1) the court was
required to award her statutory damages, costs, and attorney’s fees pursuant
to RSA 540-A:4, IX(a) because the court found that the landlord committed an
initial violation of RSA 540-A:2; and (2) the court was required to award her
statutory damages, costs, and attorney’s fees for each day that the landlord’s
RSA 540-A:2 violation continued after the court issued its temporary order.
These arguments require that we engage in statutory interpretation. In matters
of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiters of the legislature’s intent as

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expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole. Santos v. Metro.
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 171 N.H. 682, 689 (2019). When construing a statute,
we first examine the language found in the statute, and, where possible, we
ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to the words used. Id. We do not
consider words and phrases in isolation, but rather within the context of the
statute as a whole. Zorn v. Demetri, 158 N.H. 437, 438-39 (2009). We
interpret statutory provisions in the context of the overall statutory scheme.
Santos, 171 N.H. at 689. The interpretation of a statute presents a question of
law, which we review de novo. Zorn, 158 N.H. at 438.

The tenant’s arguments also require that we interpret the trial court’s
orders. The interpretation of a court order presents a question of law for this
court. Appeal of Langenfeld, 160 N.H. 85, 89 (2010). In construing a court
order, we look to the plain meaning of the words used in the document. Id.
We construe subsidiary clauses so as not to conflict with the primary purpose
of the trial court’s decree. Id. As a general matter, a court decree or judgment
is to be construed with reference to the issues it was meant to decide. Id.

RSA 540-A:2 states: “No landlord shall willfully violate a tenant’s right to
quiet enjoyment of his tenancy or attempt to circumvent lawful procedures for
eviction pursuant to RSA 540.”

RSA 540-A:4, IX(a) states:

Any landlord who violates RSA 540-A:2 . . . shall be subject to the
civil remedies set forth in RSA 358-A:10 for the initial violation,
including costs and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in the
proceedings. Each day that a violation continues after issuance of
a temporary order shall constitute a separate violation.

Finally, RSA 358-A:10, I (2009) states:

Any person injured by another’s use of any method, act or practice
declared unlawful under this chapter may bring an action for
damages . . . . If the court finds for the plaintiff, recovery shall be
in the amount of actual damages or $1,000, whichever is greater
. . . . In addition, a prevailing plaintiff shall be awarded the costs
of the suit and reasonable attorney’s fees, as determined by the
court.

Taken together, these provisions establish that a landlord who willfully
violates a tenant’s right to quiet enjoyment is liable to the tenant for at least
$1,000 in statutory damages, as well as costs and reasonable attorney’s fees,
for that initial violation. See RSA 540-A:2; RSA 540-A:4, IX(a); RSA 358-A:10,
I. The district court has no discretion once it finds that a landlord has violated
RSA 540-A:2: it is required to award damages, costs, and reasonable attorney’s
fees. See Wass v. Fuller, 158 N.H. 280, 283 (2009); see also Carter v.

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Lachance, 146 N.H. 11, 14 (2001). Because “[e]ach day that a violation
continues after issuance of a temporary order . . . constitute[s] a separate
violation,” RSA 540-A:4, IX(a), the trial court is required to award the tenant
$1,000 in damages for each day that an RSA 540-A:2 violation continues after
the issuance of a temporary order. See id.; RSA 358-A:10, I; Simpson, 153
N.H. at 478; Randall v. Abounaja, 164 N.H. 506, 510 (2013).

Here, in its “Eviction and RSA 540-A Decision” issued after the June 8
hearing, the trial court expressly concluded that the landlord “willfully violated
[the tenant’s] and her family’s right to quiet enjoyment of their tenancy by (1)
failing to take any action to stop the third-floor tenant . . . then by (2)
retaliating against” her by bringing the instant eviction action. Thus, the trial
court ruled that the landlord violated RSA 540-A:2. See RSA 540-A:2 (“No
landlord shall willfully violate a tenant’s right to quiet enjoyment . . . .”).
However, despite this ruling, the trial court failed to award the tenant any
damages, costs, or attorney’s fees. Because RSA 540-A:4, IX(a) requires the
trial court to award damages, costs, and attorney’s fees if the court finds that
the landlord violated RSA 540-A:2, the trial court erred. See Wass, 158 N.H. at
283; Carter, 146 N.H. at 14. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal of
the tenant’s counterclaim.

On remand, the court shall award the tenant the greater of: (1) her actual
damages; or (2) $1,000 for the landlord’s initial violation of RSA 540-A:2, plus
$1,000 for each day, if any, that the landlord’s violation continued after the
court issued its temporary order. See RSA 540-A:4, IX(a); RSA 358-A:10, I;
Randall, 164 N.H. at 510; Wass, 158 N.H. at 282. In order for the trial court to
determine whether the tenant is entitled to statutory damages for any days that
the violation continued to exist after the court issued its temporary order, the
court must make findings as to (1) the date when it issued its temporary
order,1 and (2) the date when the landlord’s violation of RSA 540-A:2 ceased.
In addition to damages, the court shall award the tenant her costs and
reasonable attorney’s fees. See RSA 540-A:4, IX(a).

Reversed and remanded.

LYNN, C.J., and HICKS, BASSETT, HANTZ MARCONI, and DONOVAN,
JJ., concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

1 The trial court issued a temporary order after the June 8 hearing. In that order, the landlord
was ordered to immediately remedy “the issues of safety, the window, [and] the harassment by the
3rd floor tenant.” However, the date of this order is unclear. Although the temporary order is
dated June 8, 2018, the “Eviction and RSA 540-A Decision,” which appears to have accompanied
the temporary order, bears two dates: June 8 and June 11. On remand, the trial court should
address this ambiguity. See RSA 540-A:4, IX(a).

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