State of New Hampshire v. Donald E. Mercer

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2018-0231, State of New Hampshire v. Donald
E. Mercer, the court on February 21, 2019, issued the following
order:

Having considered the opening brief and reply memorandum of law filed
by the defendant, Donald E. Mercer, the memorandum of law filed by the State,
and the record submitted on appeal, we conclude that oral argument is
unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1). We affirm.

Following a bench trial, the Circuit Court (Leary, J.) found the defendant
guilty of speeding, specifically traveling 76 miles per hour in a 40-mile-per-
hour zone, and of failing to stop at a red light. The defendant appeals, arguing
that the evidence was insufficient to support those findings. The defendant
was also found guilty of resisting arrest, but has not appealed that guilty
finding.

A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence raises a claim of legal error;
therefore, our standard of review is de novo. State v. Boutin, 168 N.H. 623,
627 (2016). In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we view the
evidence presented at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in
the light most favorable to the State and uphold the trial court’s verdict unless
no rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See
id. The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the evidence was
insufficient to prove guilt. Id.

To find the defendant guilty of speeding, the trial court had to find that
the defendant drove his vehicle “at a speed greater than [was] reasonable and
prudent under the conditions.” RSA 265:60, I (2017). By statute, any speed in
excess of the posted speed limit is prima facie evidence that the speed is
neither reasonable nor prudent and that it is unlawful. See RSA 265:60, II, :62
(Supp. 2018).

We first address whether the evidence was sufficient for the trial court to
have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was guilty of
speeding. The officer who issued the traffic citations to the defendant testified
that she observed his vehicle traveling northbound on the Daniel Webster
Highway at a high rate of speed through the intersection of that road with Spit
Brook Road. The posted speed limit for that portion of the Daniel Webster
Highway is 40 miles per hour. When she drove her police cruiser to catch up
to the defendant’s vehicle, the cruiser’s speedometer displayed 76 miles per
hour. At that rate of speed, the officer observed that the distance between her
cruiser and the defendant’s vehicle remained the same. From this observation,
she inferred that the defendant was traveling at the same rate of speed as her
cruiser (76 miles per hour). Viewing this evidence and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the State, we
conclude that it was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the defendant was guilty of speeding, specifically, that
he drove 76 miles per hour in a posted 40-mile-per-hour zone.

We next consider whether the evidence was sufficient for the trial court
to have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant failed to stop at
a red light. The officer testified that when she saw the defendant’s vehicle go
through the intersection of the Daniel Webster Highway and Spit Brook Road,
she was facing southbound on Daniel Webster Highway in the left turn only
lane and that the turn signal was green. She also testified that “if the left turn
. . . lane heading southbound has a green arrow, [the] northbound traffic on
the Daniel Webster Highway has a red traffic signal.” Viewing the evidence and
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
State, we conclude that it was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant failed to stop at a red light.

We have reviewed the defendant’s remaining arguments and conclude
that they do not warrant further discussion. See Vogel v. Vogel, 137 N.H. 321,
322 (1993).

Affirmed.

Lynn, C.J., and Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ.,
concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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