David Goolgasian v. Shannon Tripp & a.

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2018-0209, David Goolgasian v. Shannon Tripp
& a., the court on January 22, 2019, issued the following order:

The defendants’ “Motion of Notice to Vacate” and “Motion to Inform the
Court of a New Violation” contain information that was not submitted to the trial
court in connection with the order on appeal and, accordingly, is not part of the
record before us. See Sup. Ct. R. 13(1).

Having considered the briefs and the record properly submitted on appeal,
we conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R.
18(1). We affirm.

The defendants, Shannon Tripp and History Repeats (tenant), appeal an
order of the Circuit Court (Carroll, Referee, approved by Garner, J.) dismissing
their counterclaims against the plaintiff, David Goolgasian (landlord), in a
possessory action. See RSA 540:2 (Supp. 2018). We construe the tenant’s brief
to argue that the trial court committed plain error by not finding that: (1) a prior
eviction proceeding, in which the tenant paid the past due rent, was “the catalyst
for the financial hardship that led to the second eviction”; (2) the tenant’s
financial hardship was the result of the landlord’s actions; (3) the landlord
breached the tenant’s right to quiet enjoyment of the commercial space she
leased and behaved unethically and unfairly; (4) the landlord was liable for
negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED); (5) the trial court had jurisdiction
to consider an NIED claim; (6) sometime previously, the tenant and the landlord
had a “constructive agreement” that the tenant could withhold a portion of her
rent, which she subsequently paid to avoid the prior eviction; (7) the eviction was
“retaliatory and punitive”; (8) the landlord breached the lease; (9) the collateral
source rule made the tenant’s insurance recovery immaterial; and (10) the tenant
was entitled to daily and enhanced damages under the Consumer Protection Act.
The tenant further argues that the trial court committed plain error by: (1)
“belie[ving] that the initial eviction had been revoked”; (2) denying her effort to
supplement the record after the hearing ended; (3) misunderstanding the facts
and an exhibit; (4) not allowing her to cross-examine the landlord’s property
manager regarding an issue that had been resolved; and (5) not transforming her
action into a small claim sua sponte.

The tenant requests us to consider her arguments under the plain error
doctrine. See Sup. Ct. R. 16-A. However, she provides no plain error analysis.
See Aranosian Oil Co. v. State of N.H., 168 N.H. 322, 331 (2015) (describing plain
error review). Any issues raised in an appellant’s brief, but not fully developed,
are deemed waived. State v. Blackmer, 149 N.H. 47, 49 (2003). Self-represented
parties are bound by the same procedural rules that govern parties represented
by counsel. In the Matter of Birmingham & Birmingham, 154 N.H. 51, 56 (2006).

As the appealing party, the tenant has the burden of demonstrating
reversible error. Gallo v. Traina, 166 N.H. 737, 740 (2014). Based upon our
review of the trial court’s order, the tenant’s challenges to it, the relevant law, and
the record submitted on appeal, we conclude that the tenant has not
demonstrated reversible error. See id.

Affirmed.

Lynn, C.J., and Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ.,
concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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