Wayne A. Sabato & a. v. Federal National Mortgage Association
Opinion text
THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
SUPREME COURT
In Case No. 2018-0133, Wayne A. Sabato & a. v. Federal
National Mortgage Association, the court on September 14,
2018, issued the following order:
Having considered the briefs and record submitted on appeal, we conclude
that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1). We affirm.
The plaintiffs, Wayne A. Sabato (husband) and Cheryl A. Sabato, appeal an
order of the Superior Court (Temple, J.) dismissing their action against the
defendant, Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA), for failure to state a
claim. They contend that, pursuant to RSA 480:3-a (2013), the husband’s
homestead interest entitles them to occupy the premises for his lifetime and
precludes their eviction, even though FNMA has foreclosed on the property and
holds title to it. In reviewing the trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, we
assume the truth of the facts alleged and construe all reasonable inferences in
the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Kurowski v. Town of Chester, 170 N.H.
307, 310 (2017). We will uphold the granting of the motion if the facts pleaded
do not constitute a basis for legal relief. Id.
RSA 480:1 (Supp. 2017) defines a homestead interest as a dollar amount.
This is reflected in RSA 529:20-a (Supp. 2017), which concerns the payment of a
homestead interest when property is levied upon. “RSA 480:3-a does not entitle
the [holder of a homestead interest] to occupy the marital premises . . . .”
Boissonnault v. Savage, 137 N.H. 229, 232-33 (1993). Instead, RSA 480:3-a,
which is titled “Duration,” “merely establishes the duration of the homestead
right; it does not define the nature of the right itself.” Id. at 232; see State v.
Fogg, 170 N.H. 234, 236 (2017) (stating that we interpret a statute in context of
overall statutory scheme, and not in isolation).
The plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Boissonnault because there the
purchaser of a tenancy in common at a sheriff’s sale petitioned to partition the
property, while here, the purchaser of the entire property at foreclosure seeks to
evict the plaintiffs. However, in both cases, the issue is whether a homestead
interest entitled the holder to remain on the property. The plaintiffs argue that
occupying the property is essential to establishing a homestead interest. See
Walbridge v. Estate of Beaudoin, 163 N.H. 804, 805 (2012). However, while
occupancy is necessary to establish the right to a dollar amount, this does not
mean that a homestead interest allows a party to remain on the property for life.
We conclude that the plaintiffs’ claim does not constitute a basis for legal
relief. See Kurowski, 170 N.H. at 310.
Affirmed.
Lynn, C.J., and Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ.,
concurred.
Eileen Fox,
Clerk
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