State of New Hampshire v. Scott Knowles

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2018-0119, State of New Hampshire v. Scott
Knowles, the court on February 21, 2019, issued the following
order:

Having considered the briefs and the record submitted on appeal, we
conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1).
We affirm.

The defendant, Scott Knowles, appeals his convictions for criminal
restraint and felon in possession of a deadly weapon. See RSA 633:2, I (2016);
RSA 159:3 (2014). He argues that the Trial Court (Delker, J.) erred in denying
his motion to suppress. He also contends that the Trial Court (Schulman, J.)
erred in denying his motion to set aside the verdict on the felon in possession of a
deadly weapon charge.

We first address the defendant’s challenge to the trial court’s order denying
his motion to suppress. The following summary of the evidence is drawn from
that order. On July 20, 2017, at approximately 1:30 a.m., Seabrook Police were
dispatched to 120 Lower Collins Street following a report of a “woman screaming
for her life.” The police were familiar with the defendant and had previously
responded to the residence for, inter alia, domestic disturbances and noise
complaints. When they arrived at the multi-unit residence, the police walked to
the back of the building where the defendant’s apartment was located. The
responding officers attempted to make contact with the occupants by knocking
on windows and walls. The upstairs tenant appeared, gesturing “frantically”
down to the defendant’s apartment, but repeatedly refused to come to her door
saying, “I’m just a tenant.”

One of the officers called out to the defendant, advising him that the police
had responded to make sure that everyone in the home was “okay” and asking
him to exit the home. Despite repeated requests from the police to come outside,
the defendant refused, stating “f**k you: I’m not coming out; go the f**k away.”
The defendant then turned off the television and lights which darkened the room
and “obscured the officers’ already limited view of the interior.”

After approximately fifteen minutes of unsuccessful attempts to make
contact with the defendant, the police decided to enter the home. They based
this decision on the nature of the call, the defendant’s erratic behavior, which
was “atypical of his prior conduct towards police,” and the lack of any response
from the female occupant of the home. When they entered the home, they found
no one in the immediately visible area. They observed that the door to a back
bedroom, where they had previously heard the defendant, was closed. They
again attempted to make contact with the defendant. When they received no
response, they had to force the door open because, as they discovered upon entry
into the room, a dresser had been placed in front of the door as a barricade. The
record supports these factual findings.

On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in finding that
the emergency aid exception permitted the warrantless entry by the police into
his home. When we review a trial court’s rulings on a motion to suppress, we
accept its factual findings unless they lack support in the record or are clearly
erroneous; our review of the court’s legal conclusions is de novo. State v. Gay, 169 N.H. 232, 240 (2016). Warrantless entries are per se unreasonable and
illegal unless they fall within the narrow confines of a judicially crafted exception
to the warrant requirement. Id.; see N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 19. The State bears
the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a warrantless
entry falls within one of these exceptions. Gay, 169 N.H. at 240.

The emergency aid exception is part of the community caretaking function
of police and involves duties such as assisting and protecting citizens in need.
State v. MacElman, 149 N.H. 795, 798 (2003). In MacElman, we adopted the
following three-part test to determine whether the emergency aid exception
applies: (1) the police have objectively reasonable grounds to believe that there is
an emergency at hand and immediate need for their assistance for the protection
of life or property; (2) there is an objectively reasonable basis, approximating
probable cause, to associate the emergency with the place to be searched; and (3)
the search is not primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence. Id.;
see People v. Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d 607, 609 (N.Y. 1976).

The defendant argues that the State failed to satisfy the first and third
prongs of this test. He cites the anonymous nature of the report of the “woman
screaming for her life” and posits that it could have been “a couple merely having
noisy sex.”

We have held that “reasonable grounds” is a lower standard than the
probable cause required for an ordinary search or seizure, and that the
“reasonable grounds” inquiry depends solely on the facts available to the police at
the time of the intrusion. MacElman, 149 N.H. at 799. The report of a woman
screaming for her life, the neighbor’s frantic gesturing to the defendant’s
apartment, the defendant’s agitated state, the past history of police interaction at
the residence, and the defendant’s refusal to come to the door after the police
explained the reason for their presence provided objectively reasonable grounds
for the police to believe that there was an emergency at hand and that there was
an immediate need for their assistance to protect the unidentified female.

The defendant also asserts that the police “throughout their time at the
defendant’s house, were looking to gather evidence and arrest the defendant.”

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Although the record does not support his assertion, we note that the coexistence
of caretaking and investigatory motives does not invalidate a seizure as long as
the caretaking is not “‘a mere subterfuge for investigation.’” State v. D’Amour,
150 N.H. 122, 127 (2003). The separation of the community caretaking function
from investigation of a criminal matter need only relate to a sound and
independent basis for each role. Id. at 126.

The record demonstrates that the police entered the defendant’s home to
check on the well-being of a woman who had been heard “screaming for her life.”
The officers’ concerns for the woman’s well-being and the likelihood that she was
still in the home provided an independent basis for their entry into the home.
Accordingly, the entry was justified under the emergency aid exception to the
warrant requirement.

The defendant also argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion
to set aside the verdict on the felon in possession of a deadly weapon charge.
Prior to trial, the defendant stipulated that he was a felon. Accordingly, the felon
in possession charge stated that the defendant “knowingly, while being a person
prohibited from possessing a deadly weapon, had in his possession or under his
control a machete . . . as defined in RSA 625:11 V, in that in the manner that the
machete was used, intended to be used, or threatened to be used is known to be
capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.” The defendant argues that
the State presented no evidence that he “‘used, intended to use or threatened to
use the machete’ in any manner” and that the trial court’s order denying his
motion focused only on the appearance of the machete rather than its “role in the
case.”

To prevail on his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the defendant
must show that no rational trier of fact, viewing all of the evidence and all
reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the State, could have
found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Noucas, 165 N.H. 146, 151
(2013). Where the evidence does not consist solely of circumstantial evidence, it
need not exclude all rational conclusions other than guilt. Id.

“Threat” has been defined as “‘any menace of such a nature and extent as
to unsettle the mind of the person on whom it operates, and to take away from
her acts that free and voluntary action that alone constitutes consent.’” State v.
Johnson, 130 N.H. 578, 581 (1988) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 234 (5th ed.
1979)) (brackets omitted). “[A] threat can be verbal or nonverbal, i.e., ‘something
that by its very nature or relation to another threatens the welfare of the latter.’”
Id. (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2382 (1961)).

We note at the outset that the jury found that the defendant unlawfully
confined the victim in the room where the machete was found. The defendant
does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting this finding on
appeal. Accordingly, the only issue before us is whether, during the victim’s

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confinement, the defendant used, intended to use, or threatened to use the
machete in a manner that was known to be capable of producing death or
serious bodily injury. The evidence in this case included the machete, which was
admitted as an exhibit at trial. No other tools were found in the bedroom. In its
order denying the defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict, the trial court
described the machete as “large” and further:

It appears to be new and unused. One side of the machete
includes a serrated blade. The other side is a sharp blade. The
weight of the machete is considerable. If put to use as a weapon, the
machete could easily sever a victim’s limbs and cause other grievous
bodily injuries. If used to threaten harm, the machete would instill
enormous fear of mayhem and possible death.

The court described the victim’s demeanor during her testimony as “quite
extraordinary and emotional.” She testified that: (1) when the police arrived, she
was “being held” in the bedroom where she was found; (2) she had not seen the
machete before July 20; (3) she was unable to call out to the police as they were
trying to gain entry to the room because the defendant had his hand over her
mouth and told her to be quiet; and (4) she was “in fear for [her] life.” The jury
also heard that the machete was located between the bed and the nightstand and
that the police found a cooking pot in the bedroom that appeared to have been
used by the victim as a chamber pot. As the trial court observed: “From these
uncontested facts, the jury could infer that the defendant used some form of
coercion to confine the victim for several hours.”

Viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light
most favorable to the State, we conclude that the State presented sufficient
evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
offense of felon in possession of a dangerous weapon on July 20, 2017.

Affirmed.

Lynn, C.J., and Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ.,
concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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