Joseph J. Nugent, III v. New Hampshire Department of Safety

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2017-0499, Joseph J. Nugent, III v. New
Hampshire Department of Safety, the court on May 15, 2018,
issued the following order:

Having considered the petitioner’s brief, the respondent’s memorandum
of law, and the record submitted on appeal, we conclude that oral argument is
unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1). We affirm.

The petitioner, Joseph J. Nugent, III, appeals an order of the Superior
Court (Ignatius, J.), following a hearing, upholding a decision of a hearings
examiner for the Bureau of Hearings of the respondent, the New Hampshire
Department of Safety (department), see RSA 21-P:13 (Supp. 2017), to take no
action on his appeal from the denial of his application for a driver’s license.
See RSA 263:76 (2014) (governing appeals to superior court from a decision to
deny an application for a New Hampshire driver’s license). The petitioner’s
application was denied because his license has been suspended by the State of
Maine for his failure to appear at two separate court hearings. The hearings
examiner ruled that the petitioner was not eligible for a New Hampshire license
until he had restored his license in the State of Maine. The petitioner suggests
that the Maine court appearances for which he defaulted were related to a
criminal matter that resulted in his conviction. See State v. Nugent, 917 A.2d
127 (Me. 2007). He further suggests that he was deprived of fundamental
constitutional rights in that criminal case, that his conviction was wrongful,
and that returning to Maine to address the license suspension would subject
him to arrest and other potentially harmful consequences.

In upholding the hearings examiner’s decision, the trial court ruled that
the denial was authorized by the Driver License Compact (compact), which is
codified in RSA 263:77 (2014), and by N.H. Admin. Rules, Safe-C 204.01. The
trial court further ruled that it had no authority to vacate the Maine default
orders, to address issues concerning the Maine case, to order the Maine
Department of Motor Vehicles or the New Hampshire Division of Motor Vehicles
(division) to grant or restore the petitioner’s driving privileges, or to grant the
petitioner a temporary license pending resolution of his legal issues in Maine.
Finally, the trial court ruled that, even if it had authority to grant the petitioner
a temporary license, the facts of the case did not warrant such relief.

On appeal, although the petitioner frames his issues in twenty-eight
separately-numbered questions presented for review, we construe his brief to
argue that the trial court erred by relying upon the compact, and by not
concluding that it had authority to order the division to grant him a license
because he was deprived of fundamental constitutional rights in the Maine
criminal matter, and because he otherwise is not a “problem driver.” He
additionally argues that he has been deprived of fundamental constitutional
rights in this case, including the right to a trial by jury. We note that the
petitioner has not provided a transcript of the hearing before the superior
court. See Bean v. Red Oak Prop. Mgmt., 151 N.H. 248, 250 (2004) (appealing
party bears burden of providing record sufficient both to demonstrate that his
issues are preserved and to decide such issues). We also note that any
constitutional arguments are not sufficiently developed to warrant further
review. See State v. Blackmer, 149 N.H. 47, 49 (2003).

In an appeal to superior court from the denial of an application for a
driver’s license, “[a]ll findings of the director [of the division] upon all questions
of fact properly before [her] shall be deemed prima facie lawful and reasonable.”
RSA 263:76. “The decision appealed from shall not be set aside or vacated [by
the superior court] except for errors of law, unless the court is satisfied, by a
clear preponderance of the evidence before it, that such order is unjust or
unreasonable.” Id. We, in turn, will uphold the trial court’s order unless it is
unsupported by the evidence or legally erroneous. See Kerouac v. Dir., N.H.
Div. of Motor Vehicles, 158 N.H. 353, 355 (2009).

A New Hampshire driver’s license is subject to regulation under the
police power. See State v. Severance, 108 N.H. 404, 408 (1968). Under the
compact, the division is required to deny an application for a driver’s license if
the applicant has held a license issued by another party state, the license “has
been suspended by reason, in whole or in part, of a violation[,] and . . . such
suspension period has not terminated.” Compact art. V(a). Similarly, under
Saf-C 204.01, if the department learns that a New Hampshire resident who has
applied for a license “is under suspension . . . for . . . court defaults . . . in
another jurisdiction,” the department is required to “give the same effect to the
offense or conduct reported . . . as [it] would if the offense or conduct had
occurred in New Hampshire,” and “to deny or suspend the person’s license or
driving privileges until the person furnishes evidence of compliance with the
law of such other jurisdiction.” N.H. Admin. Rules, Safe-C 204.01(a)-(c). In
New Hampshire, when a criminal defendant “[d]efaults on an arraignment or
other scheduled court appearance in connection with a charge or conviction of
any offense,” the defendant’s license is generally suspended or revoked until
the defendant cures the default. RSA 263:56-a, I(a), II(a), III (2014).

As the appealing party, the petitioner has the burden of demonstrating
reversible error. Gallo v. Traina, 166 N.H. 737, 740 (2014). Based upon our
review of the trial court’s order, the petitioner’s challenges to it, the relevant

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law, and the record submitted on appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has
not demonstrated reversible error. See id.

Affirmed.

Lynn, C.J., and Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ.,
concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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