State of New Hampshire v. Kenneth Coy

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2017-0405, State of New Hampshire v. Kenneth
Coy, the court on June 20, 2018, issued the following order:

Having considered the briefs and record submitted on appeal, we conclude
that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1). We affirm.

The defendant, Kenneth Coy, appeals an order of the Superior Court
(Howard, J.) denying his motion to dismiss criminal charges pending against
him. He contends that the trial court erred by not: (1) applying the “prisoner’s
mailbox rule” to certain letters that he alleges he wrote; and (2) finding implicit in
the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), see RSA ch. 606-A (2001), a right to
dismissal when “his attempt to exercise his rights [under the IAD] is thwarted
through the malice or the negligence of his jailer.”

We first address whether the trial court erred by not applying the
“prisoner’s mailbox rule.” The defendant appears to conflate several evidentiary
rules. The “prisoner’s mailbox rule,” established under the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, provides that notices of appeal filed by self-represented
prisoners are considered filed upon delivery to prison authorities for forwarding,
rather than upon receipt by the receiving court. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266,
268, 276 (1988). Furthermore, the defendant contends that this rule creates a
presumption that the letters that he alleges he wrote were received, when this
rule, in fact, addresses only the date on which an appeal is considered filed by a
self-represented incarcerated person. See id.

The defendant relies upon Rosenthal v. Walker, 111 U.S. 185, 193 (1884),
to argue that “the sending of a letter without return creates an evidentiary
presumption that the letter was received and read by the recipient.” However,
Rosenthal stated that, when the presumption “is opposed by evidence that the
letters never were received, [the evidence] must be weighed with all the other
circumstances of the case . . . in determining . . . whether the letters were
actually received.” Id. at 194; see Lee v. State, 182 P.3d 1169, 1171 (Ariz. 2008)
(stating “mail delivery rule” presumption that properly mailed letter will reach
addressee disappears if addressee denies receipt).

The defendant contends that we adopted this rule in Hogan v. Pat’s Peak
Skiing, LLC, 168 N.H. 71 (2015). However, Hogan merely held that the statutory
notification to a ski area of an injury, see RSA 225-A:25, IV (2011), is effective
upon mailing, rather than upon receipt. Hogan, 168 N.H. at 75; cf. Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 63, at 151 (1981) (stating contract acceptance effective
when mailed); Ayotte v. Department of Employ. Security, 114 N.H. 147, 148, 149
(1974) (finding appeal from administrative decision effective when received by
court, not when mailed). It did not address any presumption regarding whether
a letter was mailed and received. Furthermore, the trial court was not obliged to
accept the defendant’s testimony that he mailed the letters at issue. See State v.
Wills, 107 N.H. 107, 110 (1966). Accordingly, upon this record, we conclude that
the trial court did not err by declining to employ the prisoners’ mailbox rule.

We next address whether the trial court erred by not inferring a remedy
under the IAD. Article III(a) of the IAD requires that a prisoner be brought to trial
within 180 days after he has “caused to be delivered” a request for disposition of
charges pending against him in another jurisdiction. RSA 606-A:1, art. III(a);
State v. Dolbeare, 140 N.H. 84, 86 (1995). To initiate this process, the prisoner
must deliver a written notice and request to “the warden, commissioner of
corrections or other official having custody of him.” RSA 606-A:1, art. III(b). In
the absence of a waiver, the defendant’s inability to stand trial, or a proper
continuance, the pending charges must be dismissed with prejudice if a prisoner
is not brought to trial within the prescribed time period. RSA 606-A:1, art. V(c);
Dolbeare, 140 N.H. at 86.

The 180-day time period does not commence until the prisoner’s request
for final disposition of the charges against him has actually been delivered to the
court and prosecuting officer of the jurisdiction that lodged the detainer against
him. Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 52 (1993). The prisoner must establish that
the court and the prosecutor in the receiving State actually received the request.
See id. As the defendant acknowledges, the IAD “fails to establish any express
remedies when the failure to make a proper IAD request is the result of the
incarcerating institution.”

The denial of a defendant’s motion to dismiss an indictment under the IAD
presents a question of law, which we review de novo. State v. Nelson, 161 N.H.
58, 61 (2010). We review the factual findings underlying the decision on a clearly
erroneous standard. State v. Brown, 157 N.H. 555, 556-57 (2008). As a
congressionally sanctioned interstate compact, the IAD is a federal law subject to
federal construction. Nelson, 161 N.H. at 61.

In this case, the defendant asks us to “recognize that the IAD implicitly
provides a remedy of dismissal in the event of maliciousness or negligence on the
part of prison officials.” However, we need not address this issue because the
defendant failed to establish that he delivered the requisite request to “the
warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of him,” RSA
606-A:1, art. III(b), or that the prison officials acted maliciously or negligently.
See United States v. Henson, 945 F.2d 430, 434 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating prisoner
bears burden of demonstrating strict compliance with IAD procedures).

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 The defendant testified that, in December 2007, he placed a letter
addressed to “Records Officer” in the prison’s internal-mail receptacle. Even if
the trial court accepted this testimony, this letter was not addressed to the
“official having custody” of the defendant, nor did it request a disposition of the
pending New Hampshire charges against him. Instead, the letter merely
requested “help . . . [to] file the necessary paperwork to get a speedy trial, under
the Agreement on Detainers.” (Emphasis omitted.)

Upon receiving no response to this request for assistance, the defendant
took no further action at the prison to secure his rights under the IAD; he did not
repeat his request for assistance, attempt to contact the records officer or
another official through “staff access,” or write to the official in charge of the
prison. See id. at 435 (stating that prisoner who relies on default by prison
having custody of him must show that he substantially complied with IAD to the
extent possible); but see Fex, 507 U.S. at 52 (stating that IAD request does not
trigger time limit until received by court and prosecutor in State that issued
detainer).

Furthermore, the defendant offered no evidence that any prison official
acted negligently or maliciously. Cf. Bursque v. Moore, 227 A.2d 255, 256 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1966) (stating prisoner made more than 35 unsuccessful written
requests to jailer for IAD forms, at times averaging more than three written
requests per week), abrogated by Giardino v. Bourbeau, 475 A.2d 298 (Conn.
1984); Pittman v. State, 301 A.2d 509, 513 (Del. 1973) (stating prisoner
requested IAD forms from correct prison official and made demand for speedy
trial to receiving State prosecutor and court), superseded by statute, as
recognized in State v. Harris, 2017 WL 1550251, at *7 n.85 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr.
26, 2017).

On this record, we conclude that the trial court did not err by declining to
adopt the remedy advocated by the defendant.

Affirmed.

Lynn, C.J., and Hicks, Bassett, Hantz Marconi, and Donovan, JJ.,
concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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