Kathleen Kristiansen v. Glenn Erlandson

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2017-0348, Kathleen Kristiansen v. Glenn
Erlandson, the court on November 14, 2017, issued the following
order:

Having considered the briefs and record submitted on appeal, we
conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1).
We affirm.

The defendant, Glenn Erlandson, appeals the order of the Circuit Court
(Coughlin, J.) granting a request by the plaintiff, Kathleen Kristiansen, to
extend a final protective order for one year. See RSA 173-B:5, VI (2014). The
defendant argues that the trial court failed to properly assess whether there
was “good cause” to extend the protective order. See MacPherson v. Weiner, 158 N.H. 6, 10 (2008) (defining “good cause” in the context of stalking order
extension). He asserts that the trial court erred by refusing to review the
circumstances giving rise to the original protective order and the subsequent
history leading up to the extension hearing, contrary to our holding in
MacPherson.

“For a showing of ‘good cause’ the trial court must . . . assess whether
the current conditions are such that there is still a concern for the safety and
well-being of the plaintiff.” MacPherson v. Weiner, 158 N.H. 6, 10 (2008). In
its assessment, the trial court must review the circumstances giving rise to the
original protective order and any violation of the order. See id. “The trial court
should also take into account any present and reasonable fear by the plaintiff.”
Id. “Where the trial court determines that the circumstances are such that,
without a protective order, the plaintiff’s safety and well-being would be in
jeopardy, ‘good cause’ warrants an extension.” Id.

In this case, the plaintiff testified that the defendant sexually assaulted
her in 1977, when she was 13 years old and he was 31 years old, and that he
has remained obsessed with her since that time. She testified that the
unwanted contact “has been an ongoing situation” since 2003, when she filed
the first petition for a protective order, and that, in 2016, the defendant stated
that he was “overwhelmingly excited at the prospect of living with” her.

The defendant submitted a letter to the court which, he asserted,
explained the parties’ relationship over “the last 30 years.” The court reviewed
the defendant’s letter during the hearing and admitted it as an exhibit for
background purposes. In his letter, the defendant discusses the events in
1977, the parties’ contact in 2003, and subsequent events. Based upon this
record, we conclude that the court sufficiently reviewed the circumstances of
the original stalking and the subsequent history leading up to the extension
hearing before extending the protective order. See MacPherson, 158 N.H. at
10.

The defendant further argues that the court “repeatedly refused to allow
either party to talk about the circumstances surrounding the original stalking
or subsequent events.” We review the trial court’s decisions on the
admissibility of evidence under an unsustainable exercise of discretion
standard. State v. Ainsworth, 151 N.H. 691, 694 (2005). The record shows
that the court asked the plaintiff to focus her testimony on recent events that
would support her request for an extension of the protective order. Contrary to
the defendant’s assertion, the court did not refuse to allow the plaintiff to
testify about the circumstances of the original stalking. Rather, the defendant,
through his cross-examination of the plaintiff and in his own testimony, sought
to describe for the court “what happened in 1977.” He began his cross-
examination of the plaintiff by asking, “where did we meet in 1977?” The trial
court sustained the plaintiff’s objection, ruling that the question was not
relevant to the issue of whether to extend the protective order. The defendant
explained that he “was going to go back to 1977 to show how similar the way
she stalked me then is to the way she stalked me in 2003.” The trial court
asked the defendant to focus on recent events and on whether or not he “still
pose[d] a danger” to the plaintiff. The defendant replied that he has never
posed a danger to the plaintiff. Based upon this record, we cannot conclude
that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion in directing the
parties to focus their testimony on recent events. See MacPherson, 158 N.H. at
10; Ainsworth, 151 N.H. at 694.

In ruling on the defendant’s motion for reconsideration, the trial court
noted that the defendant “during his testimony attempted to relitigate prior
findings and rulings of the Court.” The court found that the defendant’s
demeanor while testifying was “strange and obsessive” toward the plaintiff, and
that he “clearly demonstrates a continuing obsession with” the plaintiff. The
court found that the defendant “presents a real, credible and serious threat to
the Plaintiff’s personal safety.” Based upon this record, we conclude that the
trial court could have reasonably found good cause to extend the protective
order. See MacPherson, 158 N.H. at 10-11.

Affirmed.

Dalianis, C.J., and Hicks, Lynn, Bassett, and Hantz Marconi, JJ.,
concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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