Melissa Allen v. Lawrence Holdsworth

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2017-0234, Melissa Allen v. Lawrence
Holdsworth, the court on August 15, 2017, issued the following
order:

Having considered the briefs and record submitted on appeal, we
conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1).
We affirm.

The defendant, Lawrence Holdsworth, appeals an order of the Circuit
Court (Geiger, Referee, approved by Gordon, J.), following a hearing, granting a
domestic violence final order of protection to the plaintiff, Melissa Allen. See
RSA 173-B:5 (Supp. 2016). The defendant argues that the evidence was
insufficient to support the court’s order and that the court erred in allowing
evidence of his prior conduct toward the plaintiff.

We review sufficiency of the evidence claims as a matter of law and
uphold the trial court’s findings and rulings unless they are lacking in
evidentiary support or tainted by error of law. Achille v. Achille, 167 N.H. 706,
715 (2015). We accord considerable weight to the trial court’s judgments on
the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given testimony. Id. at
715-16. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing
party, in this case, the plaintiff. See id. at 716.

To obtain relief under RSA chapter 173-B, the plaintiff must show
“abuse” by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. “Abuse” is defined in RSA
173-B:1 to include the commission or attempted commission of one or more of
several criminal acts constituting a credible present threat to the plaintiff’s
safety, including stalking as defined in RSA 633:3-a (2016). See RSA 173-B:1,
I(e) (Supp. 2016).

A person commits the offense of stalking if he purposely or knowingly
engages in a course of conduct targeted at a specific person which he knows
will place that person in fear for his or her personal safety. RSA 633:3-a, I(a).
“Course of conduct” is defined as two or more acts over a period of time,
however short, which evidence a continuity of purpose. RSA 633:3-a, II(a). A
course of conduct may include appearing in close proximity to the person’s
place of employment. RSA 633:3-a, II(a)(3).

The evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant purposely or
knowingly engaged in a course of conduct targeted at the plaintiff, which he
knew would place her in fear for her personal safety. The plaintiff testified that
the first incident occurred on January 21, 2017, two days after she received
this court’s decision in her divorce case from the defendant. See In the Matter
of Allen & Holdsworth, No. 2016-0107, 2017 WL 21852 (N.H. Jan. 18, 2017).
She testified that she observed the defendant’s truck parked five spaces from
the entrance to her business, in a small commercial park in Grantham. She
testified that she was concerned because the defendant lives in Andover, and
she knew of no reason why he needed to be in Grantham. She also testified
that he knew where she worked and that he previously placed her in fear by
appearing close to her employment.

The defendant and his wife testified that they were looking for real estate
in Grantham, and that their realtor told them that the best place to eat in town
was the restaurant in the commercial park where the plaintiff’s business was
located. Conflicts in testimony, questions about the credibility of witnesses,
and the weight to be given to testimony are matters for the trial court to
resolve. In the Matter of Aube & Aube, 158 N.H. 459, 465 (2009). We will
uphold the trial court’s credibility determinations unless no rational trier of
fact could have reached the same conclusion. State v. Carr, 167 N.H. 264, 275
(2015). Based upon this record, we cannot conclude that the court was
required to accept the testimony of the defendant and his wife. See id.

The plaintiff testified that the second incident occurred on February 15,
2017, when she observed the defendant’s truck parked five feet from the
entrance to her business. The defendant had reason to know that the plaintiff
was at work, based upon photographs introduced into evidence showing that
there was an “open” sign in the window of her business. The defendant
testified that he was traveling through the area and stopped at the convenience
store in the commercial park because it was nearby. However, the court was
not required to accept his testimony. See id.

The plaintiff testified, “[t]here’s about 50 parking places at my office
building. He could have parked in any one of them, other than the ones just
right outside my door.” She testified that she was in fear for her safety because
she knows the defendant keeps a gun in his truck, and because, she claims, he
previously attempted to drive her off the road. The defendant counters that the
plaintiff could not have been in fear for her safety because she exited her office
and took photographs of him and his vehicle, which placed her at additional
risk. This was a credibility issue for the trial court. See id. The court found
that “[t]here is a credible threat to [the plaintiff’s] safety, because of [the
defendant’s] erratic and obsessive behavior, which has continued over the
years.” The record supports the court’s findings. See Achille, 167 N.H. at 715.

The defendant argues that the police investigated the incidents and
concluded that that there was a legitimate purpose for his presence near the
plaintiff’s business. However, the record shows only that the police concluded
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that he was not violating “no trespass” orders. Because the trial court was not
required to accept his testimony, see id., it was not required to conclude that
his conduct was necessary to accomplish a legitimate purpose, or that it
constituted constitutionally protected activity.

The defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing evidence of his
earlier conduct toward the plaintiff, some of which supported a prior domestic
violence protective order. Although incidents that are “too distant in time and
non-specific” cannot support a finding of abuse, see Walker v. Walker, 158
N.H. 602, 608 (2009) (quotation omitted), the evidence was relevant to show
that the defendant previously placed the plaintiff in fear by appearing close to
her place of employment. Accordingly, we find no error.

We have considered the defendant’s remaining arguments, and have
concluded that they do not warrant further discussion. See Vogel v. Vogel, 137
N.H. 321, 322 (1993).

Affirmed.

Dalianis, C.J., and Hicks, Lynn, and Bassett, JJ., concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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