John W. Weeden & a. v. City of Rochester

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2017-0120, John W. Weeden & a. v. City of
Rochester, the court on June 4, 2018, issued the following
order:

Having considered the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, the court
concludes that a formal written opinion is unnecessary in this case. The
defendants, the City of Rochester and the City of Rochester Department of
Building, Zoning and Licensing Services (City), appeal an order of the Superior
Court (Howard, J.) awarding a declaratory judgment to John W. Weeden and
Debra J. Weeden, d/b/a Amazon Park (the Weedens or Amazon Park). We
affirm.

In July 2015, the City threatened legal action to stop the Weedens from
permitting occupants to maintain permanent residency at Amazon Park, a
year-round campground located in the City. The Weedens filed a petition
seeking declaratory relief.

Following a three-day bench trial, the trial court found the following
facts. Amazon Park is currently owned by the Weedens. It was previously
owned and operated by John Weeden’s father, Warren Weeden (Warren).
Amazon Park has 95 trailer-occupied sites, each of which is fitted with a three-
way hook-up to water, electric, and sewer. Trailers are rented on a month-to-
month basis, generally without written leases, but occupants are normally
permitted to stay as long as they wish so long as they pay rent and abide by
park rules. Some tenants have stayed at Amazon Park for many years.

In 1976, Warren applied to the City planning board for approval to
develop and operate Amazon Park as a campground for “three months during
summer.” In 1977, the planning board approved the plan “for a camping area”
and placed no conditions on the type of unit allowed on the site. In 1981,
Warren requested and received two special exceptions so he could add cabins
at Amazon Park because “cabins would give the ability to have winter use of
the facilities.” According to the trial court, “[t]he approval clearly contemplated
year round use, and did not expressly limit the duration of stay.”

In 1983, the City’s building inspector demanded that Warren stop
advertising his facility as a year-round campground because Amazon Park had
originally been approved “on the condition that [it was] open from Memorial
Day to Labor Day only.” The inspector also stated that Warren would need a
variance to change the use of the property. Accordingly, even though Warren
believed Amazon Park was approved for year-long use because of the 1981
special exception, he applied for a variance to operate a year-round camping
area. Warren’s variance application was initially rejected by the zoning board
of adjustment and the planning board. However, shortly thereafter, in 1984,
the City issued a letter stating that it had “no further objection to the year-
round use of the campground.” In 1988 and 1991, the City code enforcement
officer wrote letters to Weeden confirming that year-round use of the
campground was permitted, but stating that the campground was to be used
for “temporary occupancy” and “recreational purposes,” not “as a permanent
residence.”

In 1991, the code enforcement officer wrote a memorandum to the city
manager that stated: “Amazon Campground is currently operating on a year
round basis. The Planning Board’s approval limits people from living in the
campground on a permanent basis, and from using an address within the park
as a permanent residence.” However, as the trial court found, “[d]espite the
issue being expressly raised by City leaders, and being reflected in an internal
memorandum, no action was taken against Amazon Park on this issue of
permanent residency.”

In 2013, the Weedens worked with the City and the State to have
municipal water service extended to Amazon Park. The Weedens borrowed
$261,000 to finance this project. As the trial court found, the City was aware
that the Weedens would be responsible for the “extensive anticipated costs of
the project,” yet did not “question the legality of the use of the property.”
Instead, on a “Department Sign Off” checklist completed as part of the approval
process, the City zoning division — when asked if there were “any concerns”
with regard to “Use” requirements — checked “No.” Further, the code
enforcement department — when asked if there were any “particular concerns”
regarding “[c]urrent Zoning or code violations” — wrote “None.” The municipal
water project was approved and the improvements were completed in 2014.
The trial court observed that “[b]etween 1984, when the City represented to
Warren Weeden that it had no objection to year-round use, and 2015, a period
of over 30 years, the City did not seek to enjoin or enforce the nature of the
Weedens’ use of the property.”

In July 2015, the City issued a written notice of violations and
threatened legal action if the Weedens continued to unlawfully permit
occupants to maintain permanent residency at Amazon Park. Shortly
thereafter, the Weedens petitioned the court seeking declaratory relief. The
trial court granted the Weedens’ petition, finding that the doctrine of laches
precludes the City from bringing an enforcement action. The trial court also
found that (1) Amazon Park’s existing use, although now non-conforming, is
permitted under the original City approvals; (2) the City is estopped under the
doctrine of municipal estoppel from asserting a claim that Amazon Park is
approved for only seasonal, recreational use; and (3) RSA 216-I:1, VIII (c)

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(2011) is not a statutory prohibition on the use of a recreational trailer as a
permanent dwelling. The trial court concluded that “the City is barred from
bringing an enforcement action to enjoin or terminate the Weedens’ use of
Amazon Park.” This appeal followed.

The City raises many issues in its notice of appeal. Our decision on
laches is dispositive of this appeal, and thus, we need not address the other
issues raised by the City.

“Laches is an equitable doctrine that bars litigation when a potential
plaintiff has slept on his rights.” Thayer v. Town of Tilton, 151 N.H. 483, 485
(2004) (quotation omitted). Ascertaining whether the doctrine of laches applies
is not a mere matter of time, but is principally a question of the inequity of
permitting the claim to be enforced. Id. at 485-86.

The trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether the
circumstances justify the application of the doctrine of laches. Miner v. A & C
Tire Co., 146 N.H. 631, 633 (2001). It “may be appropriate where a suit has
been unreasonably delayed and the delay has resulted in unfair prejudice.”
Id. “Unless we find that the trial court’s decision is unsupported by the
evidence or erroneous as a matter of law, we will not overturn it.” Id.

The trial court properly identified and analyzed each of the four factors
relevant to whether laches applies; namely: (1) the plaintiff’s knowledge; (2) the
defendant’s conduct; (3) the interests to be vindicated; and (4) the resulting
prejudice. See id. The trial court concluded that “there is not likely a more
clear case for the application of laches.”

With regard to the first two factors, the trial court found that the
Weedens’ use of the park had been “open and obvious.” The court also found
that the City had “been aware for decades of the occupants’ use of Amazon
Park as a residence . . . as far back as the early 1980’s and 1990’s,” as
evidenced by, among other things: rent payments from the City’s welfare
department to Amazon Park for indigent citizens; annual health, safety, and
fire inspections conducted by the City on the property; and the fact that “many
people at Amazon Park . . . registered their vehicles through, and paid taxes on
their vehicles to the City for years.” The trial court observed, “the City fully
participated in and approved a several hundred thousand dollar water system
improvement to Amazon Park in 2012 and 2013, with full knowledge of the
nature of the occupancies at Amazon Park.” The court noted that “[t]he City
did absolutely nothing at that time to address the issue of permanent residency
even though it had full knowledge of the facts,” and reasoned that “[i]t would be
. . . grossly inequitable to permit the City now to force an abrupt and radical
change in the use of the property after it not only encouraged but expressly
approved a major capital expenditure by the property owner.”

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 With regard to the interests to be vindicated, the court concluded that
“the public’s interest in preventing the continued use of Amazon Park in the
manner that it has operated for decades is ephemeral at best.” Finally, with
regard to the resulting prejudice, the court found:

a radical and abrupt change in the decades-long use of the
property, especially in light of the significant capital investment
that the [Weedens] have made with the full knowledge,
participation and approval of the City, would result in
unacceptable and inequitable prejudice to the [Weedens].

Thus, the trial court concluded that “the City is barred from bringing any
potential action or claim based on the use of the property.”

As the appealing party, the City has the burden of demonstrating
reversible error. Gallo v. Traina, 166 N.H. 737, 740 (2014). Based upon our
review of the trial court’s well-reasoned order, the City’s challenges to it, the
relevant law, and the record submitted on appeal, we conclude that the City
has not demonstrated reversible error. See id.

Because the issue arose during briefing and argument, we observe that
there is nothing in the trial court order that we are affirming that would
preclude enforcement of fire and life safety codes. See Fischer v. N.H. State
Bldg. Code Review Bd., 154 N.H. 585, 587 (2006). Notably, at oral argument,
the Weedens’ counsel acknowledged that “if there is a genuine issue of life
safety with respect with any one of the units, [that issue] can be addressed
through any number of departments at the City.”

In light of our decision with respect to laches, we need not address the
parties’ remaining arguments.

Affirmed.

LYNN, C.J., and HICKS, BASSETT, and HANTZ MARCONI, JJ.,
concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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