Lancelot Court Condominium Association v. Judith Tompson

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2017-0117, Lancelot Court Condominium
Association v. Judith Tompson, the court on September 28,
2017, issued the following order:

Having considered the brief and record submitted on appeal, we conclude
that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1). We affirm.

The defendant, Judith Tompson, appeals orders of the Superior Court
(Anderson, J.), denying her “Motion Pleading Legal Title to Real Property” and
“Motion Responding to Sheriff Sale and Plaintiff’s Rent Demand” in an action by
the plaintiff, Lancelot Court Condominium Association (association), to collect
unpaid condominium assessments. Her brief sets forth 21 questions presented,
which we construe to include that: (1) she did not receive notice of the sheriff’s
sale of the condominium, see RSA 529:20 (2007); (2) the certificate of service was
improper because it was signed by a sergeant rather than by the deputy sheriff
who was represented as having served the notice; (3) she did not receive
statutorily required notice of her homestead rights, see RSA 529:20-a (Supp.
2016); (4) the amendment to RSA 480:4 (Supp. 2016) effective January 1, 2015,
exempting the enforcement of unpaid condominium assessments from
homestead rights, could not be applied “retroactively” to her homestead interest
and violates equal protection; (5) federal law governing homestead rights
supersedes RSA 480:4, IV and vests jurisdiction solely in the federal courts; (6)
the association’s liens on her condominium were unperfected and showed
“malice”; and (7) the association sought to “improperly ‘silence’” her by moving to
bring forward the trial court’s previous order that she “cease filing motions on
issues that are not before the court or involve factual disputes that will be
resolved by the jury” and that the order was “prejudicial and biased.”

We note that the defendant acknowledges that, after the sheriff’s deed was
recorded, “the bank chose to foreclose.” The association represents that “the
foreclosure takes priority over any claim [it has] to an interest in title arising out
of the Sheriff’s sale.”

It is a long-standing rule that parties may not have judicial review of issues
they did not raise in the trial court. Bean v. Red Oak Prop. Mgmt., 151 N.H. 248,
250 (2004). It is the appealing party’s burden on appeal to provide a record that
is sufficient to decide the issues she is raising and to demonstrate that she raised
those issues in the trial court. Id.; see Sup. Ct. R. 13(3), 15(3) (if appealing party
intends to argue that a ruling is unsupported by or contrary to the evidence, the
party shall include a transcript of all evidence relevant to such ruling).
 In this case, the trial court denied the defendant’s motions “for the reasons
stated by Plaintiff.” However, the defendant has not supplied any record
reflecting those reasons, such as a transcript of any hearing that might have
taken place or the plaintiff’s pleadings. Thus, we are unable to review the trial
court’s decision. Nor has the defendant supplied the mortgage or other
documents relating to the foreclosure. Accordingly, we assume that the evidence
was sufficient to support the result reached by the trial court. See Bean, 151
N.H. at 250. We review its order for errors of law only, see Atwood v. Owens, 142
N.H. 396, 397 (1997), and find none. These rules are not relaxed for self-
represented parties. See In the Matter of Birmingham & Birmingham, 154 N.H.
51, 56-57 (2006).

To the extent that the defendant’s brief raises additional arguments not
listed above, they either are not sufficiently developed, see State v. Blackmer, 149
N.H. 47, 49 (2003), or otherwise do not warrant further discussion, see Vogel v.
Vogel, 137 N.H. 321, 322 (1993).

In light of this conclusion, the association’s motion to dismiss the
defendant’s appeal is moot.

Affirmed.

Dalianis, C.J., and Hicks, Lynn, Bassett, and Hantz Marconi, JJ.,
concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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