Peter Fuller v. Concord General Mutual Insurance Company

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2016-0614, Peter Fuller v. Concord General
Mutual Insurance Company, the court on July 27, 2017, issued
the following order:

Having considered the briefs of the parties, the court concludes that a
formal written opinion is unnecessary in this case. The petitioner, Peter Fuller,
appeals an order of the Superior Court (Schulman, J.) granting summary
judgment to the respondent, Concord General Mutual Insurance Company
(CGM), and denying the petitioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment on his
petition seeking a declaratory judgment that he is entitled to uninsured
motorist coverage under the terms of his CGM policy. We affirm.

On April 3, 2015, the petitioner was driving his Harley Davidson
motorcycle when he was injured in a two-vehicle collision. The other driver
was at fault and lacked sufficient insurance coverage to provide full
compensation to the petitioner. At the time of the accident, the petitioner had
three automobile insurance policies for three different vehicles from three
separate companies. Two of these policies — a Markel Insurance Company
policy covering the motorcycle, and a Geico policy covering a personal vehicle
— extended underinsured motorist coverage to the petitioner following the
accident. The petitioner sought additional underinsured motorist coverage
under his CGM Business Auto Policy. The policy’s declarations page
designates that all coverages in the policy apply only to “specifically described
‘autos,’” listed on the policy, and the only such auto is a 1999 Chevrolet C
Series dump truck. The policy includes a New Hampshire Uninsured Motorist
Coverage (UIM) endorsement, which has an exclusion clause stating that UIM
coverage does not apply to injuries sustained by the insured while operating a
“vehicle owned by the Named Insured that is not an ‘insured motor vehicle’ for
Uninsured Motorist Coverage under this Coverage Form.” CGM denied
coverage, at which point the petitioner filed the present action.

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that
the exclusion clause applied to the petitioner, thereby rejecting his argument
that he should be provided coverage under the UIM endorsement. The court
interpreted the UIM exclusion clause as clearly excluding UIM coverage for
vehicles owned by the named insured and not insured under the CGM policy.
The trial court found that the petitioner’s motorcycle was not a “specifically
described auto” covered by the CGM policy and it was undisputed that he
owned the motorcycle. The trial court concluded, therefore, that the exclusion
to UIM coverage applied and granted summary judgment to CGM.

On appeal, the petitioner argues that the CGM policy is ambiguous and
that one reasonable interpretation of the policy favors coverage under the UIM
endorsement. Specifically, he argues that the UIM exclusion clause that the
trial court relied upon to preclude coverage can reasonably be read not to apply
to him because his motorcycle qualifies as an “insured motor vehicle” in that it
was insured at the time of the accident — albeit by another insurance
company. The petitioner also points to exclusion clauses in other places in the
policy which he finds less ambiguous to contend that the ambiguity in the UIM
endorsement could have been avoided, is intentional, and ought to be
construed in his favor.

As the appealing party, the petitioner has the burden of demonstrating
reversible error. Gallo v. Traina, 166 N.H. 737, 740 (2014). After a thorough
review of the well-reasoned trial court order, the petitioner’s challenges to it,
the relevant law, and the record submitted on appeal, we conclude that the
petitioner has not demonstrated reversible error. See id.

Affirmed.

HICKS, J., sat for oral argument but did not take part in the final vote;
DALIANIS, C.J., and LYNN and BASSETT, JJ., concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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