Diethild M. Beckman v. Mark L. Faretra & a.

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2016-0579, Diethild M. Beckman v. Mark L.
Faretra & a., the court on May 12, 2017, issued the following
order:

Having considered the briefs, the memorandum of law, and the record
submitted on appeal, we conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this
case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1). We affirm.

The plaintiff, Diethild M. Beckman, appeals an order of the Superior Court
(Howard, J.), following a bench trial, in favor of defendants Mark L. Faretra and
Susan J. Faretra, on the parties’ cross-petitions to quiet title, and in favor of
defendant David W. Vincent and the Faretras on the plaintiff’s claim for slander
of title. The plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by: (1) finding the 1939
deed in her chain of title ambiguous and considering extrinsic evidence to
determine the disputed boundary; (2) finding that the grantor of the 1939 deed
mistakenly thought that the town and county line ran along a stone wall; (3)
finding that the 1939 misconception resulted in the disputed area belonging to
the Faretras; (4) not finding that the Faretras’ 1990 grantors were indispensable
parties; (5) not finding that the description in the 1990 deed to the Faretras
controlled whether the Faretras owned the disputed area; (6) incorrectly
construing various deeds; (7) not expunging the Faretras’ 1996 quitclaim deeds;
(8) dismissing her slander of title claim; (9) not rejecting, sua sponte, five days of
trial testimony when the defendants did not introduce certain historical deeds;
and (10) “transforming [her] 12 acre homestead triangle into an 11+ acre
trapezium.”

In an action to quiet title, each party bears the burden to prove good title to
the property at issue as against all other parties whose rights might be affected
by the trial court’s decree. Austin v. Silver, 162 N.H. 352, 353 (2011). The trial
court’s obligation is to determine the parties’ questions and disputes relative to
the property and to quiet and settle title to such property. See Sorenson v.
Wilson, 124 N.H. 751, 758 (1984); RSA 498:5-d (2010).

While the interpretation of deeds is ultimately for this court, we rely upon
the determination of the parties’ intentions when properly made by the trier of
fact. Chao v. The Richey Co., Inc., 122 N.H. 1115, 1119 (1982). It is well-
established that a mistaken term, course, or boundary, used inadvertently in a
deed, may be rejected when its effect would be to defeat the purpose of the
parties to the deed. Id. at 1118. The trial court may properly consider parol
evidence relating to the boundaries the grantor intended to convey, when the
deed itself is unclear. Cooper v. Barilone, 123 N.H. 203, 207 (1983).

The location of monuments and the determination of boundaries
conforming to a description in a deed is a question of fact for the trier of fact.
Chao, 122 N.H. at 1119. A town line is considered a monument. Id. at 1118.
We will not disturb the trial court’s determinations as to the location of
boundaries if they are supported by evidence. Id. at 1119.

It is the burden of the appealing party, here the plaintiff, to provide so
much of the record as is necessary to decide the issues she is raising. See Bean
v. Red Oak Prop. Mgmt., 151 N.H. 248, 250 (2004). When, as in this case, the
appealing party has not provided a transcript of trial, we assume that the
evidence supports the result reached by the trial court, id., and review its
decision for errors of law only, Atwood v. Owens, 142 N.H. 396, 396-97 (1997).

As the appealing party, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating
reversible error. Gallo v. Traina, 166 N.H. 737, 740 (2014). Based upon our
review of the trial court’s well-reasoned order, the plaintiff’s challenges to it, the
relevant law, and the limited portions of the record provided on appeal, we
conclude that the plaintiff has not demonstrated reversible error. See id.

Affirmed.

Dalianis, C.J., and Hicks, Lynn, and Bassett, JJ., concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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