State of New Hampshire v. Ernest Justin Blanchette

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2016-0313, State of New Hampshire v. Ernest
Justin Blanchette, the court on May 15, 2017, issued the
following order:

Having considered the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, the court
concludes that a formal written opinion is unnecessary in this case. The
defendant, Ernest Justin Blanchette, appeals his conviction for aggravated
felonious sexual assault (AFSA). See RSA 632-A:2, I(n)(1) (2016). He argues,
among other things, that the Superior Court (Abramson, J.) erred by
concluding that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove that the
defendant was employed by a correctional institution for purposes of RSA 632-
A:2, I(n)(1). We reverse.

The jury could have found the following relevant facts. On July 2, 2015,
the victim was at the Belknap County Superior Court awaiting sentencing for a
probation violation. She had been in custody at the Belknap County jail
(county jail) for approximately one month following her arrest on the violation.
The victim was sentenced to a two-to-four-year term of imprisonment, and she
was thereafter taken to a holding cell so that she could be transported to the
New Hampshire State Prison for Women (state prison). The defendant, then a
Belknap County deputy sheriff, transported the victim to the state prison.

The defendant already knew the victim from two prior transports. In
September 2014, the defendant transported the victim from the county jail to a
dentist for the victim’s dental appointment. The defendant allowed the victim
to use a cell phone and smoke cigarettes. As the defendant and the victim
were returning from the appointment, the defendant drove the victim to a
secluded area, where they engaged in sexual intercourse. Later, in November
2014, as the defendant transported the victim to another dental appointment,
he gave her a cigarette and provided her with a cell phone. Although they
discussed making a “detour,” they did not engage in any sexual contact during
that trip.

Thus, the State contended at trial, by the time the defendant transported
the victim to the state prison on July 2, 2015, he had imposed a coercive set of
expectations on the victim: the exchange of privileges for sexual activity. While
en route to the state prison on July 2, the defendant again gave the victim
cigarettes and a cell phone to use to call friends and family. The defendant
also used his computer to determine whether the victim’s boyfriend had an
active arrest warrant in New Hampshire. Before bringing her to the state
prison, the defendant drove the victim to an abandoned house, and they
engaged in sexual intercourse.

The defendant was indicted on one count of AFSA for his conduct on
July 2, pursuant to RSA 632-A:2, I(n)(1). That provision provides:

I. A person is guilty of the felony of aggravated felonious sexual
assault if such person engages in sexual penetration with another
person under any of the following circumstances:

....

(n) When the actor is in a position of authority over the
victim and uses this authority to coerce the victim to submit
under any of the following circumstances:

(1) When the actor has direct supervisory or
disciplinary authority over the victim by virtue of the
victim being incarcerated in a correctional institution
. . . where the actor is employed . . . .

RSA 632-A:2, I(n)(1) (emphasis added).

The case proceeded to trial. At the end of the State’s case, the defendant
moved to dismiss the charge, arguing, in part, that the State had presented
insufficient evidence to prove that he was employed by a correctional
institution where the victim was incarcerated. See id.

The trial court denied the motion. The court ruled that an actor is
“employed” by a correctional institution if he is “entrusted with the
performance of acts or functions by the correctional institution.” In other
words, an actor is employed by a correctional institution if the correctional
institution directs the actor to carry out a task. The court then determined
that a reasonable trier of fact could find that the defendant “was ‘employed’ by
the [state prison] to carry out the task of transporting and delivering [the
victim]” to the state prison.

The jury found the defendant guilty, after which the defendant filed a
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the same ground raised in
the motion to dismiss. The trial court denied the motion, and this appeal
followed.

On appeal, the defendant raises a number of arguments challenging his
conviction and sentence. However, because it is dispositive, we need only
address one issue: whether the trial court erred by concluding that there was

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sufficient evidence to prove that the defendant was employed by a correctional
institution for purposes of RSA 632-A:2, I(n)(1).

The parties dispute whether the statute covers the defendant’s conduct
in light of the language that appears to limit liability to individuals whose
authority over the victim is derived from being “employed” by the correctional
institution where the victim is incarcerated. Id. On appeal, the State advances
the trial court’s interpretation — that an actor can be considered to be
employed by a correctional institution merely if that institution entrusts the
actor with the performance of an act or function. Based upon that
interpretation, the State asserts that it presented sufficient evidence to prove
that the defendant was entrusted with the task of transporting the victim by
either one of two correctional institutions: the county jail or the state prison.

The defendant argues that an individual is “employed” by a correctional
institution only if there is an “employer-employee relationship” between the
institution and the individual. He then observes that there was uncontroverted
evidence that, on July 2, 2015, he was an employee of the Belknap County
Sheriff’s Office.

In the alternative, the defendant argues that, even if we accept the
broader interpretation of subsection I(n)(1) urged by the State, there was
insufficient evidence to establish that he was acting at the direction of a
correctional institution. We agree. Consequently, we need not decide whether
the interpretation articulated by the trial court, and embraced on appeal by the
State, is correct. Even assuming that broader interpretation of the statute, we
conclude that the State presented insufficient evidence to establish that the
county jail or the state prison entrusted the defendant with the task of
transporting the victim for purposes of RSA 632-A:2, I(n)(1).

To prevail upon a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the
defendant must show that no rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, considering all of
the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable
to the State. State v. Craig, 167 N.H. 361, 369 (2015). The trier of fact may
draw reasonable inferences from facts proved and also inferences from facts
found as a result of other inferences, provided they can be reasonably drawn
therefrom. Id. at 369-70. We accord considerable weight to the judgments of
the trier of fact on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given
testimony. See Despres v. Hampsey, 162 N.H. 398, 401 (2011). Because a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence raises a claim of legal error, our
standard of review is de novo. Craig, 167 N.H. at 370.

The State argues that the following evidence demonstrates that the
county jail entrusted the defendant with the task of transporting the victim to
the state prison: (1) the defendant had transported the victim to two dental

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appointments while she was at the county jail; (2) the defendant was a county
employee; (3) the defendant worked in a building next to the county jail; (4)
before transporting the victim to prison, the defendant transported a different
inmate to the county jail; (5) “each mittimus signed by the courts” states that
the sheriff is “ordered to deliver the [inmate] to” the state prison; and (6) “under
the common law, a deputy sheriff is tasked with transporting prisoners.”
Alternatively, the State asserts that this same evidence supports the conclusion
that the state prison entrusted the task to the defendant. We are not
persuaded that the enumerated evidence supports either conclusion.

Even looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and
using the broad definition urged by the State, no rational trier of fact could
have found that either the county jail or the state prison entrusted the
defendant with the task of transporting the victim. Neither the evidence cited
by the State, nor the record as a whole, shows that an official, employee, or
administrator of either institution directed the county sheriff — or the
defendant specifically — to transport the victim to the state prison. Moreover,
there is no evidence of a general practice regarding prison transports from
which it could be reasonably inferred that the defendant was acting at the
direction of an official of either correctional institution. Although there may be,
in fact, a general practice regarding prison transports, no such evidence was
offered in this case.

Indeed, if anything, the evidence presented at trial establishes that it was
the trial court itself — rather than an official at the state prison or the county
jail — that directed the defendant to transport the victim to the state prison.
Significantly, at the close of the State’s case, the State asked the trial court to
take judicial notice that “pursuant to [RSA 622:8] . . . the sheriff transports
inmates to the state prison.” RSA 622:8 provides that “[w]henever any convict
shall be sentenced to confinement at hard labor the court shall order the
sheriff of the county to remove him to the state prisons and deliver him to the
commissioner of corrections.” RSA 622:8 (2001) (emphasis added). The court
granted the State’s request, and gave a jury instruction that “under the law the
Sheriff transports the [inmate] to the New Hampshire State Prison.”

Accordingly, we conclude that the State presented insufficient evidence
to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant had authority over the
victim “by virtue of the victim being incarcerated in a correctional institution
. . . where the [defendant] [was] employed.” RSA 632-A:2, I(n)(1). The trial
court therefore erred by denying the defendant’s motions to dismiss and for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and we reverse.

As we noted above, given our disposition of the case, we need not choose
between the proffered interpretations of RSA 632-A:2, I(n)(1). Nonetheless, we
observe that the parties have presented two facially plausible arguments, both
of which draw upon the legislative history of Laws 2003, 226:2, the law that

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amended subsection I(n)(1) to include the phrase “where the actor is
employed.” Although we have resolved the present appeal without addressing
the merits of the parties’ interpretations of the statutory language, the
disagreement persists: accordingly, we invite the legislature to amend the
language in RSA 632-A:2, I(n)(1) to clarify its intent with regard to the meaning
of the phrase at issue.

Reversed.

DALIANIS, C.J., and HICKS, LYNN, and BASSETT, JJ., concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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