State of New Hampshire v. Travis Lewis

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2016-0248, State of New Hampshire v. Travis
Lewis, the court on May 11, 2017, issued the following order:

Having considered the briefs and record submitted on appeal, we
conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1).
We affirm.

The defendant, Travis Lewis, appeals his conviction of conspiracy to sell
a controlled drug, crack cocaine. See RSA 629:3 (2016); RSA 318-B:2, I (Supp.
2016); RSA 318-B:26, I(c) (Supp. 2016). He argues that the Superior Court
(Tucker, J.) erred in denying his motion to dismiss at the close of the State’s
case, and his motion to set aside the verdict, for insufficiency of the evidence.

To prevail upon his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the
defendant must demonstrate that no rational trier of fact, viewing all of the
evidence and all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the
State, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Collyns, 166
N.H. 514, 517 (2014). When the defendant presents evidence after having
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence at the close of the State’s case, we
consider the entirety of the evidence presented. State v. Hill, 163 N.H. 394, 395-
96 (2012). Our review is de novo. Collyns, 166 N.H. at 517.

Pursuant to RSA 629:3, “[a] person is guilty of conspiracy if, with a
purpose that a crime defined by statute be committed, he agrees with one or
more persons to commit or cause the commission of such crime, and an overt act
is committed by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy.” RSA
629:3, I. The defendant was convicted of conspiring to commit the sale of a
controlled drug. See RSA 318-B:2, I. He argues that the evidence was
insufficient to prove that he agreed with a conspirator to commit or cause the
commission of that crime.

The record shows that in July 2015, the defendant and his fiancée were
living together in Room 106 at the Newport Motel. They had two young
children, who were also living with them. On July 8, 2015, Newport police
officer Daniels arranged for a confidential informant to purchase crack cocaine
from the defendant’s fiancée. Newport police officer Gifford was parked across
the street from the motel. Gifford observed the defendant, his fiancée, and a
small child exit Room 106 and enter a black Dodge Durango vehicle that was
parked in front of the room. The defendant entered the driver’s seat, and his
fiancée entered the front passenger’s seat. Five minutes later, they drove 75 to
100 yards to a parking lot across the street from a service center. The
confidential informant, who was waiting nearby, recognized the vehicle as the
fiancée’s, approached it, and entered the back seat. The defendant moved a car
seat to make room for the informant. The informant testified that both children
were in the back seat. The informant handed $100 to the fiancée, who handed
him two packages of crack cocaine. Without saying anything, the defendant
watched the fiancée count the money. The defendant then drove the informant
to a bridge approximately one quarter of a mile from the parking lot. After
dropping off the informant at the bridge, the defendant drove back to the motel
room.

The State’s evidence that the defendant agreed with his fiancée to sell
drugs or cause the sale was solely circumstantial. To prevail on a sufficiency of
the evidence challenge when the evidence as to one or more elements of the
charged offense is solely circumstantial, the defendant must establish that the
evidence does not exclude all reasonable conclusions except guilt. State v.
Germain, 165 N.H. 350, 361 (2013), modified on other grounds by State v.
King, 168 N.H. 340, 345 (2015). The proper analysis is not whether every
possible conclusion consistent with innocence has been excluded, but, rather,
whether all reasonable conclusions based upon the evidence have been
excluded. Id. “Thus, we evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to
the State and determine whether the alternative conclusion is sufficiently
reasonable that a rational juror could not have found proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.” State v. Houghton, 168 N.H. 26, 271 (2015).

“To establish a prima facie case of conspiracy, the State is not required to
demonstrate an explicit agreement among the conspirators.” State v. Gilbert, 115 N.H. 665, 667 (1975). “A tacit understanding between the parties to
cooperate in an illegal course of conduct will warrant a conviction for
conspiracy.” Id. “Since direct evidence of a conspiracy is often difficult to
obtain, the existence of a conspiracy frequently must be proved, if at all, by
attendant circumstances.” Id. Thus, “the State was entitled to rely on
inferences drawn from the course of conduct of the alleged conspirators.” Id.
(quotation omitted).

The fiancée testified that, on July 8, 2015, prior to leaving the motel to
meet the informant, the defendant “had no clue what was going on,” and that
she told him only that “somebody owed [her] money.” The fiancée testified that
the defendant agreed to give her a ride only because the person who was
supposed to give her a ride never showed up. However, she did not explain why
the defendant would agree to drive her and the children 75 to 100 yards from the
motel if the only purpose of the trip was to meet someone who owed her money.
The fiancée admitted that she had sold drugs to the informant on three
occasions between April and May 2015, and that she had introduced the
defendant to the informant in April 2015. The informant testified that, prior to
July 8, 2015, he met the defendant at the motel when the fiancée was present

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and had spoken with him “[o]nce or twice.” Based upon the small size of the
living quarters, the jury could reasonably have found that the fiancée could not
have taken drugs from the room and brought them into the car without the
defendant’s knowledge. The jury also could reasonably find that the fiancée
would not have asked an innocent person to accompany her during the sale
and thereby become a witness to her unlawful conduct.

Based upon this evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that, before
leaving the motel on July 8, 2015, the defendant agreed with his fiancée to sell
or cause the sale of the drugs. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the State, we cannot conclude that the defendant’s alternative hypothesis —
that he did not know that the purpose of the trip was to sell drugs — was
sufficiently reasonable that a rational juror could not have found proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Germain, 165 N.H. at 361-62.

Affirmed.

Dalianis, C.J., and Hicks, Lynn, and Bassett, JJ., concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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