2016-0230 Nonprecedential Processed

Town of Alton v. Mark J. Hanson

Supreme Court of New Hampshire · Filed December 21, 2016

Opinion text

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2016-0230, Town of Alton v. Mark J. Hanson,
the court on December 21, 2016, issued the following order:

Having considered the briefs and record submitted on appeal, we
conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1).
We affirm.

The defendant, Mark J. Hanson, appeals the order of the Superior Court
(O’Neill, J.), following a bench trial, granting the petition of the plaintiff, Town
of Alton (town), to enjoin violations of the town’s zoning ordinance and award
attorney’s fees. See RSA 676:17 (2016). The trial court found that the
defendant was operating a junk yard on his residential property from at least
December 2010 until May 2014, that he “either wholly ignored or only
minimally addressed” the town code enforcement officer’s repeated concerns
about the condition of the property during that time, and that, absent an
injunction, there is a substantial likelihood that he would resume using the
property in a noncompliant manner.

The defendant argues that the trial court erred in: (1) denying his
motion to dismiss, in which he argued that the town’s code enforcement officer
lacked authority to initiate this action; (2) enjoining him from operating a “junk
yard” or “automotive and truck junk yard,” when those terms are not defined in
the zoning ordinance or site plan review regulations; (3) finding that his
activities did not constitute an accessory use of his residence; (4) concluding
that his activities did not constitute noncommercial restoration of antique
automobiles; (5) concluding that he was using his property as a junk yard,
when some of the motor vehicles and parts on the property were allowed under
the ordinance; (6) finding that an injunction was necessary, when the town
conceded that he came into compliance prior to the final hearing, but after suit
was filed; (7) awarding attorney’s fees for violating the ordinance, when
attorney’s fees are not included in statutory penalties available under the junk
yard statute; (8) awarding attorney’s fees when the town failed to prove that he
was operating a junk automotive business or dealership, and when the town
sought to prohibit him from certain activities that are allowed under the
ordinance; and (9) approving the town’s request for approximately $36,000 in
attorney’s fees, subject to certain modifications by the court, despite his
assertion that such fees are excessive.

As the appealing party, the defendant has the burden of demonstrating
reversible error. Gallo v. Traina, 166 N.H. 737, 740 (2014). Based upon our
review of the trial court’s well-reasoned orders, the defendant’s challenges to
them, the relevant law, and the record submitted on appeal, we conclude that
the defendant has not demonstrated reversible error. See id.

Affirmed.

Dalianis, C.J., and Hicks, Conboy, Lynn, and Bassett, JJ., concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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