James Stile v. New Hampshire Attorney General's Office

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2016-0142, James Stile v. New Hampshire
Attorney General's Office, the court on September 30, 2016,
issued the following order:

Having considered the briefs, the memorandum of law, and the record
submitted on appeal, we conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this
case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1). We affirm.

The plaintiff, James Stile, appeals orders of the Superior Court
(McNamara, J.) requiring him to pay a reduced fee of $5.00 within 15 days to file
a civil action, denying his motion to waive the sheriff’s service fee, and dismissing
his action when he failed to pay the filing fee by the time specified. We construe
his brief to argue that the trial court violated Part I, Article 14 of the State
Constitution and his state and federal constitutional rights to due process and
equal protection by not finding that he was indigent pursuant to RSA 623-B:2, IV
(2011). See State v. Chick, 141 N.H. 503, 504 (1996).

At the outset, we note that, although the plaintiff characterizes his appeal
as “interlocutory,” the trial court’s order dismissing the case was final. Thus, the
appeal is not interlocutory. See Sup. Ct. R. 3. To the extent that the plaintiff
contends that his appeal is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (2012), that
statute applies to federal courts only. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (2012); Bruce v.
Samuels, 136 S.Ct. 627, 629 (2016). To the extent that he argues that the
federal Supremacy Clause renders that statute controlling, he does not develop
this argument. See State v. Blackmer, 149 N.H. 47, 49 (2003).

RSA 623-B:2, IV provides that “[n]othing in this section shall prohibit an
inmate from filing a civil action . . . if the inmate is indigent.” RSA 623-B:3, III
(2001) authorizes the trial court to order a partial payment of fees and costs, if it
concludes from the inmate’s affidavit that the inmate is able to make a partial
payment. See also RSA 499:18-b (2010) (authorizing trial court to waive filing
and service fees for indigent parties).

The plaintiff “does not take exception to . . . RSA 623-B:3,” and represents
that he “is not attempting to demonstrate that the process is unconstitutional.”
(Emphasis in original.) Nor does he argue that the deadline for payment of the
fee was too short. Instead, he argues that he “met all financial requirements to
qualify as an indigent person.” Thus, he appears to argue that he was
constitutionally entitled to a complete waiver of the filing and service fees. We
note, however, that the plaintiff represents that the trial court’s decision to
reduce the filing fee “was not an arbitrary decision” and “was arrived at by the
court by a review” of his financial affidavit.

The plaintiff has not provided a copy of the financial affidavit that he
submitted to the trial court pursuant to RSA 623-B:3, I (2001). Absent a
complete record, we assume the evidence was sufficient to support the result
reached by the trial court, Bean v. Red Oak Prop. Mgmt., 151 N.H. 248, 250
(2004), and review its order for errors of law only, see Atwood v. Owens, 142 N.H.
396, 397 (1997). These rules are not relaxed for self-represented parties. See In
the Matter of Birmingham & Birmingham, 154 N.H. 51, 56-57 (2006).

The plaintiff represents that the financial affidavit he submitted to the trial
court was “similar to those filed with this Court.” Even if we were to accept this
representation, but see Bean, 151 N.H. at 250, based upon the financial
information provided to us, we cannot conclude that the trial court deprived the
petitioner of his constitutional rights by finding that he could afford to pay a
$5.00 filing fee and the sheriff’s fee.

The remaining issues raised by the plaintiff are either not sufficiently
developed, see Blackmer, 149 N.H. at 49, or otherwise do not warrant further
discussion, see Vogel v. Vogel, 137 N.H. 321, 322 (1993).

Affirmed.

Dalianis, C.J., and Hicks, Conboy, Lynn, and Bassett, JJ., concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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