State of New Hampshire v. Michael Martin

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2016-0129, State of New Hampshire v. Michael
Martin, the court on September 15, 2016, issued the following
order:

Having considered the brief, memorandum of law, and record submitted on
appeal, we conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct.
R. 18(1). We affirm.

The defendant, Michael Martin, appeals his conviction in the Circuit Court
(Ashley, J.) on charges of speeding, see RSA 265:60 (Supp. 2015), and misuse of
or failure to display plates, see RSA 261:176 (2014). We construe his brief to
argue that statutes regulating private, as opposed to commercial, “travel” on
public ways, particularly those requiring driver’s licenses, violate his federal
constitutional right to travel.

In this case, the defendant has not supplied a transcript of the hearing
before the trial court. Therefore, we assume that the evidence was sufficient to
support the trial court’s findings, see Bean v. Red Oak Prop. Mgmt., 151 N.H.
248, 250 (2004), and examine the trial court’s order for errors of law only,
Atwood v. Owens, 142 N.H. 396, 397 (1997).

The defendant’s argument that all regulation of private travel on public
ways is unconstitutional is premised upon his contention that “the Citizen does
have a ‘Right’ to travel and transport his property upon the public highways and
roads and the exercise of this Right is not a ‘privilege.’” However, we have long
held that “the operation of an automobile upon the public highways is not a
right, but only a privilege which the state may grant or withhold at pleasure and
that what the state may withhold it may grant upon condition.” State v. Sterrin, 78 N.H. 220, 222 (1916) (citations omitted). This principle has been repeatedly
affirmed in succeeding cases. Opinion of the Justices, 94 N.H. 501, 503 (1947).
We have opined that “[t]he control which the State may exercise over the use of
its highways is practically unlimited.” Id. The right to travel under the
Fourteenth Amendment does not impede the State’s authority to regulate the
operation of automobiles upon public ways. See Hendrick v. State of Maryland,
235 U.S. 610, 622 (1915) (“[A] state may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations
necessary for public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its
highways of all motor vehicles . . . . And to this end it may require the
registration of such vehicles and the licensing of their drivers . . . .”).

Affirmed.

Dalianis, C.J., and Hicks, Conboy, Lynn, and Bassett, JJ., concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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