Agha S. Ahmad v. Federal National Mortgage Association

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2016-0049, Agha S. Ahmad v. Federal National
Mortgage Association, the court on April 6, 2017, issued the
following order:

Having considered the briefs and record submitted on appeal, we
conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1).
The plaintiff, Agha S. Ahmad, appeals an order of the Superior Court (Nicolosi,
J.) dismissing his complaint against the defendant, Federal National Mortgage
Association (Fannie Mae), in which he seeks to enjoin a foreclosure sale of his
residential property. The trial court determined that the case is barred by res
judicata. We affirm.

This is the third appeal arising out of the attempted foreclosure sale of
the plaintiff’s home. In Ahmad v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, No. 2013-0558 (N.H.
June 6, 2014) (Ahmad I), we vacated an order dismissing the plaintiff’s petition
to enjoin a foreclosure sale on the basis that the trial court had erroneously
found that the respondent in that case, Chase Home Finance, LLC (Chase),
held the mortgage, when in fact Chase had assigned the mortgage to Fannie
Mae prior to moving to dismiss. On remand, the plaintiff amended his petition
to substitute Fannie Mae for Chase, and to seek a declaratory judgment that
Fannie Mae is not entitled to foreclose based upon certain alleged deficiencies
that, he claimed, invalidated the relevant instruments. The trial court
dismissed the amended petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, and in Ahmad v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, No. 2015-0092, 2015
WL 11082438 (N.H. Aug. 10, 2015) (Ahmad II), we affirmed the dismissal.

Fannie Mae subsequently commenced the foreclosure process, and the
plaintiff filed the present action, once again seeking to enjoin the foreclosure on
the basis of purported deficiencies in the relevant instruments allegedly
depriving Fannie Mae of standing to foreclose. Following a temporary hearing,
the trial court dismissed the case, ruling that our order in Ahmad II precluded
the plaintiff’s claims. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the trial court erred
by: (1) making certain findings in the dismissal order that we vacated in Ahmad
I; (2) not addressing certain alleged deficiencies related to a loan modification
agreement that the plaintiff also raised or could have raised in Ahmad II; and
(3) allegedly relying upon arguments raised by Chase in Ahmad I.

The doctrine of res judicata has developed to avoid repetitive litigation so
that, at some point, litigation over a particular matter must come to an end.
Eastern Marine Const. Corp. v. First Southern Leasing, 129 N.H. 270, 273
(1987). The doctrine precludes not only claims that were raised in prior
litigation between the same parties, but claims that could have been raised in
the prior case. See id. at 274-76. We note that at the temporary hearing, in
response to Fannie Mae’s argument that res judicata barred the plaintiff “from
coming back and arguing these [issues] again,” he responded, “[T]hey’re saying
it be of the same issue I’m bringing back and back and back. . . . Until I get
. . . justice, I’m going to come back again and again . . . .” This response
suggests that the plaintiff indeed is engaged in precisely the sort of repetitive
litigation that the doctrine of res judicata was intended to prevent.

As the appealing party, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating
reversible error. Gallo v. Traina, 166 N.H. 737, 740 (2014). Based upon our
review of the trial court’s well-reasoned order, the plaintiff’s challenges to it, the
relevant law, and the record submitted on appeal, we conclude that the plaintiff
has not demonstrated reversible error. See id.

Affirmed.

Dalianis, C.J., and Hicks and Lynn, JJ., concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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