Zen Williams v. Tanya Krajcik

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2015-0702, Zen Williams v. Tanya Krajcik, the
court on August 22, 2016, issued the following order:

Having considered the brief, the memorandum of law, and the record
submitted on appeal, we conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this
case. See Sup. Ct. R. 18(1). We reverse.

The defendant, Tanya Krajcik, appeals a judgment issued by the Circuit
Court (Coughlin, J.) in favor of the plaintiff, Zen Williams, on his small claim
seeking reimbursement for rent he paid under a residential lease. She contends
that the trial court erred because: (1) the claim is barred by the statute of
limitations, see RSA 508:4 (2010); (2) the parties agreed in writing to remove her
from the lease; (3) she was not contractually obligated to the plaintiff to pay a
portion of the rent; (4) the plaintiff was collaterally estopped from making his
claim; and (5) the plaintiff did not establish that he had paid the rent. We review
the trial court’s application of law to facts de novo and defer to its findings of fact,
if they are supported by evidence in the record. Blagbrough Family Realty Trust
v. A & T Forest Prods., 155 N.H. 29, 33 (2007).

We first address whether the plaintiff’s claim is time barred. To be timely,
a contract claim must be brought within three years of when the breach
occurred. Coyle v. Battles, 147 N.H. 98, 100 (2001); see RSA 508:4. In this case,
the plaintiff claimed that the defendant breached a “de facto” contract to pay him
a portion of the monthly rent for a condominium in which he lived, but she had
vacated. The plaintiff testified that in May 2009 he and the defendant signed a
one-year lease on the condominium. Thus, any claim for breach of the alleged
oral contract must have been brought no later than three years from the lease
termination in June 2010. However, the plaintiff did not bring his action until
January 28, 2015, more than three years after the lease terminated.

The plaintiff acknowledged before the trial court that he was
“bootstrapping” his claim to the defendant’s previously successful claim against
him arising out of her ownership of a vehicle that he had been driving. On
appeal, he argues that his claim for rent “did not come due until” the defendant
received her judgment against him because “[t]he financial transactions . . . are
linked” and “[w]ithout one transaction the other would not exist.” However,
although he testified that, if the defendant had not purchased the vehicle for his
use, he would not have entered into the lease with her, he does not point to
anything that legally joined the two distinct transactions. Contrary to the
plaintiff’s assertion, any claim he might have had against the defendant for rent
arose no later than the end of that lease. See W. Gate Village Assoc. v. Dubois, 145 N.H. 293, 298 (2000) (stating breach of contract occurs when there is failure,
without legal excuse, to perform any promise which forms whole or part of
contract).

The plaintiff argues that the defendant “can give no logical reasoning for
her delayed litigation [regarding the vehicle] except for the purposeful and
malicious use of the statute of limitation[s] to prevent counter suit.” However, he
does not cite, nor are we aware of, any authority requiring a party to bring an
action when it is convenient for the other party.

Furthermore, aside from the untimeliness of his action, we note that on
December 11, 2009, the plaintiff sent the defendant an e-mail stating that, when
she vacated the condominium on August 8, 2009, “she was removed from the
lease and no longer ha[d] any claims of residency” there.

Because we conclude that the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant for
rent is barred by the statute of limitations, we need not address the defendant’s
other arguments.

Reversed.

Dalianis, C.J., and Hicks, Conboy, Lynn, and Bassett, JJ., concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

2