In the Matter of Donna DeNapoli and Anthony DeNapoli

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

SUPREME COURT

In Case No. 2015-0642, In the Matter of Donna DeNapoli
and Anthony DeNapoli, the court on May 31, 2016, issued the
following order:

Having considered the respondent’s brief and the record submitted on
appeal, we conclude that oral argument is unnecessary in this case. See Sup.
Ct. R. 18(1). We affirm.

The respondent, Anthony DeNapoli, appeals a final decree issued by the
Circuit Court (Cross, R., approved by Gordon, J.) in his divorce from the
petitioner, Donna DeNapoli. He argues that the trial court erred by: (1)
awarding the marital home to the petitioner, and ordering that she pay the
respondent’s share of its equity over five years; (2) deducting $4,211 from the
respondent’s share of the equity in the marital home to compensate the
petitioner for mortgage payments that had become delinquent prior to when
she was awarded exclusive occupancy of the marital home in the temporary
decree; (3) not accounting for the value of certain personal property that the
petitioner disclosed in her financial affidavit, but instead awarding both parties
whatever personal property they possessed at the time of the decree; (4) not
accounting for the value of alleged cash, gold, and antique coins that the
respondent claimed, but the petitioner disputed, he had left in the marital
residence; (5) ordering that the respondent solely satisfy a federal tax liability
arising from his construction business; and (6) not awarding the respondent
certain items of personal property that were in the marital home at the time of
the final hearing.

The trial court has broad discretion in fashioning a final decree of
divorce. In the Matter of Spenard & Spenard, 167 N.H. 1, 3 (2014). Its
discretion necessarily encompasses decisions concerning the distribution of
marital property, see id., and the allocation of marital debt, see In the Matter of
Muller & Muller, 164 N.H. 512, 518 (2013); Bourdon v. Bourdon, 119 N.H. 518,
520 (1979). We will not overturn the trial court’s rulings on such matters
absent an unsustainable exercise of discretion. Spenard, 167 N.H. at 3. “This
means that we review the record only to determine whether it contains an
objective basis to sustain the trial court’s discretionary judgments.” Id.
(quotation and brackets omitted). “[W]e defer to the trial court’s judgment on
such issues as resolving conflicts in the testimony, measuring the credibility of
witnesses, and determining the weight to be given evidence.” In the Matter of
Aube & Aube, 158 N.H. 459, 465 (2009). If the trial court’s findings could
reasonably have been made upon the evidence presented, they will stand.
Spenard, 167 N.H. at 3.

As the appealing party, the respondent has the burden of demonstrating
reversible error. Gallo v. Traina, 166 N.H. 737, 740 (2014). Based upon our
review of the trial court’s order, the respondent’s challenges to it, the relevant
law, and the record submitted on appeal, we conclude that the respondent has
not demonstrated reversible error. See id. Because the respondent has not
demonstrated reversible error, we have not considered the petitioner’s
“Response to Appellant’s Brief.” Accordingly, the respondent’s motion to strike
the response is moot. See Appeal of Silverstein, 163 N.H. 192, 199 n.1 (2012).

Affirmed.

Dalianis, C.J., and Hicks, Conboy, Lynn, and Bassett, JJ., concurred.

Eileen Fox,
Clerk

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